Ford v. Sturgis, No. 4026.
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia) |
| Writing for the Court | MARTIN, Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices |
| Citation | 14 F.2d 253 |
| Parties | FORD v. STURGIS et al. |
| Docket Number | No. 4026. |
| Decision Date | 10 June 1926 |
14 F.2d 253 (1926)
FORD
v.
STURGIS et al.
No. 4026.
Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Submitted January 7, 1924.
Reargued April 5, 1926.
Decided June 10, 1926.
J. C. Gibson and J. W. Hazell, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
C. A. Douglas, J. W. Cox, C. H. Syme, and J. L. Fort, all of Washington, D. C., for appellees.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.
MARTIN, Chief Justice.
The decedent, Victor M. Sturgis, while attending a moving picture exhibition in the Knickerbocker Theater in the city of Washington, on January 28, 1922, was instantly killed by the collapse of the theater building. His administrator brought suit for damages in the lower court, naming as joint defendants the Knickerbocker Theater Company, a corporation, which built the theater and owned and operated it at the time of the accident, Harry M. Crandall, its president and general manager, Reginald W. Geare, the architect of the building, John H. Ford, and the Union Iron Works Company, who furnished the iron and steel work for the building, and the District of Columbia.
The defendant Ford filed a motion to strike out the declaration for alleged misjoinder of parties defendant and causes of action. This was overruled. He next filed a general demurrer to the declaration, which also was overruled. He then took this special appeal.
The declaration sets out that the building in question was erected and designed, as all of the defendants well knew, to be used for profit as a moving picture theater; that it was constructed and caused to be constructed by the defendants the theater company and Crandall, the latter having active control and direction of the construction; that the defendant Geare was employed to design and draw the plans and specifications, and to exercise general direction and supervision of the construction; that the defendants Ford and the Union Iron Works Company were the contractors for the structural steel and iron to be used for supporting the roof, ceiling, and balcony; that the District of Columbia undertook to supervise and inspect the plans and specifications, as well as the construction of the building; that it was the duty of each of the defendants to use reasonable care and diligence in the performance of said duties, in order that the building should be safe and secure for its intended use; and that it was the duty of the theater company and Crandall to cause the theater to be so constructed that it would be safe and secure, and to maintain it in a safe condition. Yet the defendants and each of them negligently and carelessly failed to perform their duties in the premises, so that, while the decedent was occupying one of the seats in the theater as a patron and spectator, the roof, ceiling, and balcony collapsed and fell, and "through the negligence and carelessness of the defendants, and each of them, and as a result thereof, the decedent, without any negligence on his part, was then and there killed."
The complaint against the appellant Ford, accordingly, is that he contracted with the theater company and Crandall to design, fabricate, furnish, and install, under their direction, the structural steel and iron to be used in the building for supporting its roof, ceiling, and balcony; that it was his duty to use reasonable care and diligence in performing the contract, but that he "negligently and carelessly" designed, fabricated, furnished, and installed the structural steel and iron aforesaid; and that the roof, ceiling, and balcony of the theater collapsed and fell, because of his negligence and that of the other defendants as aforesaid. The complaint does not specify or describe any particular defect in Ford's work or materials, nor is it claimed that he had actual knowledge of any such defect, or of any defect in any other part of the building, or that he was guilty of fraud or concealment. It is fairly implied that he was not a part owner of the building, nor an officer of the theater company, and that he had no part in the construction of the building, except for his
We think it unnecessary to discuss the motions relating to the alleged misjoinder of parties and causes, for in our opinion the allegations of the declaration are not sufficient to warrant a recovery against Ford by the plaintiff.
There was, of course, no privity of contract existing between Ford and the decedent, and the general rule is well established that the negligence of a contractor in constructing a building will not render him liable to a third person, who is injured in consequence thereof after the work has been completed and accepted by the owner of the building. 20 R. C. L. 49. "After completion and acceptance of a building, the liability of the builder for accidents caused by defective construction ceases, and...
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THE SS SAMOVAR, 23891-R.
...than the buyer. The rule of the MacPherson case has not been universally followed in this country (Ford v. Sturgis, 1926, 56 App.D.C. 361, 14 F.2d 253, 52 A.L.R. 619), but it has been adopted in whole or in part in most jurisdictions and is now recognized as a landmark in our jurisprudence.......
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Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 870031
...was not liable for negligence once the building was completed and accepted by the owner. See, e.g., Ford v. Sturgis, 56 App.D.C. 361, 14 F.2d 253 (1926). See generally Heller at In 1916, the landmark decision of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), struck down ......
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Strakos v. Gehring, A-8422
...the 'accepted work' doctrine, expressly overruling one of the leading cases supporting the doctrine, Ford v. Sturgis, 56 App.D.C. 361, 14 F.2d 253, 52 A.L.R. 619, certificate dismissed per curiam, 266 U.S. 584, 45 S.Ct. 126, 69 L.Ed. 453. In the course of its opinion, the Court analyzed and......
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Hanna v. Fletcher, 12050.
...only to Fletcher, the landlord, with whom Gichner contracted, and not to Mrs. Hanna, the injured tenant. Ford v. Sturgis, 56 App.D.C. 361, 14 F.2d 253, 52 A.L.R. 619, certificate dismissed per curiam, 266 U.S. 584, 45 S.Ct. 126, 69 L.Ed. 453, is relied upon as laying down the rule in this j......
-
Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, No. 870031
...was not liable for negligence once the building was completed and accepted by the owner. See, e.g., Ford v. Sturgis, 56 App.D.C. 361, 14 F.2d 253 (1926). See generally Heller at In 1916, the landmark decision of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), struck down ......
-
THE SS SAMOVAR, No. 23891-R.
...than the buyer. The rule of the MacPherson case has not been universally followed in this country (Ford v. Sturgis, 1926, 56 App.D.C. 361, 14 F.2d 253, 52 A.L.R. 619), but it has been adopted in whole or in part in most jurisdictions and is now recognized as a landmark in our jurisprudence.......
-
Strakos v. Gehring, No. A-8422
...the 'accepted work' doctrine, expressly overruling one of the leading cases supporting the doctrine, Ford v. Sturgis, 56 App.D.C. 361, 14 F.2d 253, 52 A.L.R. 619, certificate dismissed per curiam, 266 U.S. 584, 45 S.Ct. 126, 69 L.Ed. 453. In the course of its opinion, the Court analyzed and......
-
Hanna v. Fletcher, No. 12050.
...only to Fletcher, the landlord, with whom Gichner contracted, and not to Mrs. Hanna, the injured tenant. Ford v. Sturgis, 56 App.D.C. 361, 14 F.2d 253, 52 A.L.R. 619, certificate dismissed per curiam, 266 U.S. 584, 45 S.Ct. 126, 69 L.Ed. 453, is relied upon as laying down the rule in this j......