Ford v. Williams
| Decision Date | 25 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:13-cv-00087-APG-PAL |
| Parties | MARK MICHAEL FORD, Petitioner, v. BRIAN WILLIAMS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
This represented habeas matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 comes before the Court for a decision on the merits as to the remaining claims.
Petitioner Mark Michael Ford challenges his 2004 Nevada state conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and burglary while in the possession of a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to: (a) two consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole after ten years on each sentence on the murder charge and weapon enhancement; and (b) a term sentence of 22 to 96 months on the burglary charge consecutive to the foregoing sentences. He challenged his conviction on both direct appeal and state post-conviction review.
When the state courts have adjudicated a claim on the merits, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) imposes a "highly deferential" standard for evaluating the state court ruling that is "difficult to meet" and "which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011). Under this deferential standard of review, a federal court may not grant relief merely because it might conclude that the decision was incorrect. 563 U.S. at 202. Instead, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the court may grant relief only if the state court decision: (1) was either contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 563 U.S. at 181-88.
A state court decision is "contrary to" law clearly established by the Supreme Court only if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court case law or if the decision confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court decision and nevertheless arrives at a different result. E.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003). A state court decision is not contrary to established federal law merely because it does not cite the Supreme Court's opinions. Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a state court need not even be aware of its precedents, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of its decision contradicts them. Id. Moreover, "[a] federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from Court is, at best, ambiguous." 540 U.S. at 16. For, at bottom, a decision that does not conflict with the reasoning or holdings of Supreme Court precedent is not contrary to clearly established federal law.
A state court decision constitutes an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law only if it is demonstrated that the state court's application of Supreme Court precedent to the facts of the case was not only incorrect but "objectively unreasonable." E.g., Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 18; Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004).
"A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The state court decision must be "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014)(internal quotation marks omitted).
When a state court's factual findings are challenged, the "unreasonable determination of fact" clause of Section 2254(d)(2) controls on federal habeas review. E.g., Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 972 (9th Cir. 2004). This clause requires that the federal courts "must be particularly deferential" to state court factual determinations. Id. The governing standard is not satisfied by a showing merely that the state court finding was "clearly erroneous." 393 F.3d at 973.
Rather, AEDPA requires substantially more deference:
. . . . [I]n concluding that a state-court finding is unsupported bysubstantial evidence in the state-court record, it is not enough that we would reverse in similar circumstances if this were an appeal from a district court decision. Rather, we must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.
Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), state court factual findings are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
The petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to habeas relief. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 569.
In the portion of Ground 1 that remains before the Court,1 petitioner alleges that his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as recognized in the Miranda2 decision were violated after the police allegedly "did not correctly follow procedures for arresting" and interrogating him.3
As discussed further infra as to Ground 4(a)(2), evidence at trial tended to establish that Ford unlawfully entered the home where Vincent Gomes was living, through a bathroom window. Ford thereafter stabbed Gomes in the neck while Gomes was calling 911. Ford left the scene on a moped moments later. Gomes died from the stab wound before help could arrive.
Ford killed Gomes on February 24, 2003. As discussed further below, Ford was arrested and interviewed that same date. On that date, Ford was fifteen years and seven months old.4
As backdrop, according to history provided to a clinical psychologist retained by the defense in May 2003:5 (1) Ford was born in Lithuania;6 (2) his mother moved to the United States when he was five years old and initially left him in Lithuania for two years, first briefly with his godparents and then his maternal grandparents;7 (3) when he first started school in the United States he could not speak English "well" and reportedly was picked upon as a result;8 (4) however, he "learned the language rather quickly" and completed first and second grade in one year, doing "well" in school;9 (5) Ford thereafter obtained As and Bs in school and exhibited no behavioral issues at home or in school during the thirdthrough fifth grades, with Ford participating in baseball the latter two years, despite his stepfather reportedly being critical and nonsupportive;10 (6) family stressors increased thereafter, however, after the stepfather had triple bypass surgery and a prolonged rehabilitation at home; and Ford reported that he began smoking marijuana in the sixth grade;11 (7) Ford's grades slipped in the sixth grade in 1999 to 2000 to As and Bs with Cs; he did not participate in sports; and he had some fights and "minor trouble;" (8) in or around seventh grade, in 2000 to 2001, Ford learned that his father had committed suicide in Lithuania; he had been physically abused by his stepfather; the stepfather became more seriously ill; the family learned that the stepfather years before had sexually molested his daughter and apparently thereafter also Ford's sister; Ford became involved with other adolescents of whom his mother did not approve, and she caught him with marijuana; and he was arrested for possession of marijuana and thereafter also for another offense;12 (9) by eighth grade, in 2001 to 2002, Ford's grades were down to Bs and Cs; (10) at around this time, a physician placed Ford on Zoloft "due to the issues pertaining to his father's death . . . and other stressful family issues;"13 (11) in or around this same time period, Ford was stabbed in the back with a knife by another adolescent; he was shot by another older adolescent with a BB gun in an apparently random incident; his mother filed for divorce from his stepfather, who ultimately passed away; and she remarried;14 and (12) by ninth grade, in 2002 to 2003, Ford had only "average grades;" he was having minor behavioral issues at school (e.g. spitting on someone); and he was arrested for more criminal offenses, with his mother ultimately opting for home schooling.15
The psychologist's May 2003 report further reflects that three months following his arrest and despite 23-hour lockdown confinement:16 (1) Ford was alert, oriented, cooperative; his mood and effect were stable; his thought processes were logical and goal oriented; he had no concentration problems; his thought content did not reflect delusions; and he denied suicidal or homicidal ideation;17 (2) Ford reported that he stopped using marijuana in the spring of 2002 and that, while he had experimented once each with methamphetamine, acid (LSD), and alcohol as well as (psilocybin) mushrooms twice, he had not continued using these substances thereafter;18 (3) Ford understood the different roles played by the various court, legal and other personnel involved in his case;19 (4) considering his age, he had an adequate knowledge of legal concepts, had demonstrated adequate legal reasoning skills, and was competent to stand trial and aid and assist defense counsel; and (5) while the report found that Ford had adjustment disorder with depressed mood, oppositional disorder - moderate, cannabis abuse in full remission, and adolescent antisocial disorder, the report did not include any explicit findings that Ford - at the time of the evaluation or previously - had any cognitive impairments and/or psychological conditions that would impair his ability to understand Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest and to voluntarily consent to giving a...
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