Forehand v. Hall

• Decision Date: 09 April 1962
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 48827,48827,1
• Citation: 355 S.W.2d 940
• Parties: Edmund C. FOREHEAD, Administrator d.b.n. of the Estate of Arthur R. Cobb, Deceased, Appellant, v. Durward G. HALL, Respondent
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 940

355 S.W.2d 940

Edmund C. FOREHEAD, Administrator d.b.n. of the Estate of Arthur R. Cobb, Deceased, Appellant, v. Durward G. HALL, Respondent.

No. 48827.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

April 9, 1962.

Edmund C. Forehand, Lincoln, Haseltine, Keet, Forehand & Springer, Springfield, for appellant.

Meredith B. Turner, Kenneth H. Reid, Stewart, Reid & Turner, Springfield, for respondent.

HOUSER, Commissioner.

In this wrongful death action, brought under Sec. 537.080 ¹ et seq., the Circuit Court of Greene County sustained a motion to dismiss the amended petition of an administrator de bonis non and sustained a motion to strike the administrator's motion to substitute the minor child of deceased as plaintiff and to amend the petition. The administrator d. b. n. has appealed. We have jurisdiction, since the prayer of the amended petition was for $25,000 damages.

On October 6, 1959 Arthur R. Cobb, a patient of the defendant physician, died.

On October 5, 1960 Goldie M. Cobb, Administratrix of the Estate of Arthur R. Cobb, Deceased, filed a petition for damages for the death of Arthur R. Cobb, based upon charges of negligent failure to give proper prophylactic treatment for the prevention of tetanus, alleging that the probate court issued letters of administration to her and that she was the duly qualified and acting administratrix.

On November 29, 1960 defendant filed a motion to dismiss on these grounds: that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; failed to set forth a cause of action against defendant; showed lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Goldie M. Cobb's legal capacity to sue was challenged on the ground that she was disqualified from administering the estate under Sec. 473.117 (because not a resident of this state) and did not have legal capacity to sue under the provisions of Chapter 537, RSMo, V.A.M.S.

On December 8, 1960 Goldie M. Cobb resigned as administratrix and Edmund C. Forehand was appointed administrator d. b. n. in her place.

On December 12, 1960 the administrator d. b. n. filed an amended petition in the case naming himself as plaintiff, reciting the resignation of Goldie M. Cobb, his appointment as administrator d. b. n. and that he was the duly qualified and acting administrator d. b. n. He realleged the same cause of action in the same words and figures as in the original petition.

On December 21, 1960 defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition, alleging (and here for the first time in any of the pleadings it appears) that Cobb died leaving surviving him a wife, Goldie, and a minor child, David Earl, age 18; that both of them were still living and that neither of them, to the date of the motion, had commenced any action under Secs. 537.080-537.100, as amended, within one year after the alleged cause of action might have accrued, and that they would now be barred from commencing any such action; that no action under Sec. 537.080 was commenced in time because none of the persons who might have been authorized to sue and recover for the alleged wrongful death commenced an action within the one-year limitation period; that the amended petition failed to allege the existence of anyone entitled to compensation under Secs. 537.080-537.100; failed to allege whether deceased left surviving him a 'wife, minor child or minor children, natural born or adopted' ² and therefore failed to show that the administrator was entitled to sue; and failed to show that the administrator had any cause of action or right to institute this action of recovery for wrongful death under Secs. 537.080-537.100. The motion to dismiss was supported by affidavit that on October 6, 1959, the date of his death, Arthur R. Cobb was married; that Goldie M. Cobb was his wife; that he had one minor child, David Earl Cobb, age 18; that Cobb left surviving him wife Goldie and child David, both of whom were living on December 20, 1960, the date of the affidavit.

On January 23, 1961 the administrator d. b. n. filed a motion for permission to withdraw as plaintiff and that David Earl Cobb, by his natural mother and next friend, Goldie M. Cobb, be substituted as plaintiff in said cause, and that David be allowed to file an amended petition.

On January 24, 1961 defendant filed a motion to strike the administrator d. b. n.'s motion to substitute and amend, alleging failure to set forth matters authorizing a substitution or justifying an amendment and that to permit this would serve only to increase costs and harass defendant.

The several motions were argued to the court, taken under advisement, and in due course defendant's motions to dismiss and to strike were sustained. The appeal of the administrator d. b. n. followed.

The administrator d. b. n. asserts error in sustaining the motion to dismiss his amended petition. His theory is that an action was instituted within one year after the cause of action accrued, in compliance with Sec. 537.100; that the action filed by Goldie M. Cobb, administratrix of the estate, the widow of deceased and natural mother of minor child David, was instituted by her as trustee of an express trust for the beneficiaries of the estate under the law of descent and distribution, Sec. 474.010; that minor child David, as a beneficiary of the estate, had an interest in the original action, a right to sue, a right as the real party in interest to be substituted as party plaintiff and file his amended petition; and that an amended petition filed by David would relate back to the original action, which was filed within one year after the cause of action accrued.

The administrator d. b. n. also asserts error in sustaining defendant's motion to strike. He claims that under Civil Rule 55.53, V.A.M.R., a party has the right to amend his pleading as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is filed and served; that under Civil Rule 52.06 parties may be added by motion of any party at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just; that under Civil Rule 52.01 every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, and that under Civil Rule 41.03 the rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every civil procedure and fairness in the administration of justice.

The governing statute, Sec. 537.080, provides that damages may be sued for and recovered

'(1) By the husband or wife of the deceased; or

'(2) If there be no husband or wife, or he or she fails to sus within six months after such death, then by the minor child or children of the deceased, * * *; or

'(3) If such deceased be a minor and unmarried * * * (other provisions inapplicable here); or

'(4) If there be no husband, wife, minor child or minor children, * * * (other provisions inapplicable here) then in such case suit may be instituted and recovery had by the administrator or executor of the deceased and the amount recovered shall be distributed according to the laws of descent.'

Section 537.100 provides that 'Every action instituted under section 537.080 shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action shall accrue; * * *.'

Arthur R. Cobb died October 6, 1959, leaving surviving him his wife Goldie, and one minor child, David. Under Sec. 537.080 his surviving wife was entitled to sue in her own name and right within six months after October 6, 1959. Slater v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., Mo.Sup., 271 S.W.2d 581, 582. This she did not do. The cause of action not having been appropriated by the surviving wife within the period authorized by the statute, the right to maintain the suit then passed to and vested in minor child David. Nelms v. Bright, Mo.Sup., 299 S.W.2d 483, 487. To avail himself of his cause of action minor child David was 'required to file suit within one year from date of death of deceased.' Goldschmidt v. Pevely Dairy Co., 341 Mo. 982, 111 S.W.2d 1, 3; Cummins v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920, 931; Sec. 537.100. This he did not do. The statute of limitations therefore ran on the minor child's cause of action on October 6, 1960. Goldschmidt v. Pevely Dairy Co., supra. The institution of the suit by Goldie M. Cobb as administratrix on October 5, 1960 did not prevent the running of the one year statute of limitations. At that date no cause of action existed in the surviving wife as a widow, she not having sued within the six-month period following the accrual of her cause of action. At that date no cause of action existed in the surviving wife as administratrix, since deceased left surviving him a wife and minor child. Longan v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 299 Mo. 561, 570, 253 S.W. 758, 761; Meservey v. Pratt-Thompson Const Co., Mo.App., 291 S.W. 174; Fair v. Agur, 345 Mo. 394, 133 S.W.2d 402; Goldschmidt v. Pevely Dairy Co., supra. An administrator or executor has a cause of action for wrongful death only 'If there be no husband, wife, minor child or minor children * * *.' Section 537.080(4). The administratrix as such never had any legal or beneficial interest in the subject matter of the action.

We disagree with the theory of the administrator d. b. n. that the administratrix filed suit as trustee of an express trust for minor child David who, as a beneficiary of the estate and the real party in interest, is entitled to be substituted as party plaintiff. There is no authority for an administratrix, suing in a representative capacity as trustee, to bring a wrongful death action for a surviving minor child. In fact, Goldie M. Cobb did not purport to sue as a representative of the minor child or manifest any intent to sue in such capacity. On the contrary, she instituted her action as administratrix, alleging her appointment and the fact that she was acting as administratrix, and praying for damages that she, 'plaintiff,' had sustained. Her petition revealed no intendment to maintain the action in the interests of the minor child David, in whom the claim...