Former Employees of Fisher v. U.S. Dept. of Labor
| Decision Date | 23 August 2007 |
| Docket Number | Slip. Op. 07-129.,Court No. 06-00403. |
| Citation | 507 F.Supp.2d 1321 |
| Parties | FORMER EMPLOYEES OF FISHER & COMPANY, INC., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of International Trade |
Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, Department of Justice, Civil Division, Commercial Litigation Branch (Joan M, Stentiford); and Frank Buckley, Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, Division of Employment and Training Legal Services, of Counsel, for Defendant United States Secretary of Labor.
Plaintiffs, Former Employees of Fisher & Company, Inc., challenge the U.S. Department of Labor's ("Labor") denial of Linda Willhoft's petition for Trade Adjustment Assistance ("TAA") certification regarding her termination from Fisher & Company, Inc. on August 9, 2005. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2395(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(d)(1). For the following reasons, although Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is Denied, the matter is deemed a motion for summary judgment, and on the merits, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
Fisher & Company, Inc. ("Fisher") is a manufacturer of automotive seat components, headquartered in Michigan. On August 9, 2005, Willhoft was among the third or fourth group to be laid off from the Fisher plant in Troy, Michigan. Willhoft Affidavit ¶¶ 2-3, Plaintiffs App. at 1. On January 6, 2006 the plant where Willhoft had worked was closed permanently. Id. ¶ 6.
On August 12, 2006, former employees of Fisher Dynamics in St. Clair Shores Michigan were certified for TAA eligibility. Willhoft says that she spoke with one of those workers on August 31, 2006 and thus learned of the TAA program. Id. 1115. On the next business day, September 5, 2006, former employees of Fisher at Troy applied for TAA certification through the state workforce office. Petition for Trade Adjustment Assistance and Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance for Fisher & Company. Employees (September 5, 2006) ("Petition"), Defendant's App. at 5. Willhoft attached her petition to that of the group and indicated that she had been laid off from Fisher for more than one year. Id.
Labor certified the former employees of Fisher on September 28, 2006, but limited eligibility to those who had been laid off on September 5, 2005 or later. Notice of Determinations Regarding Eligibility to Apply for Worker Adjustment Assistance and Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance, 71 Fed.Reg. 60,761 (October 16, 2006). Thus, Willhoft, who had been laid off on August 9, 2005, was `denied certification for TAA eligibility. On October 24, 2006, Willhoft initiated this suit as a pro se litigant by letter to the court. The Clerk of the Court deemed the letter to be the filing of a complaint. Complaint of Linda Willhoft ("Complaint"), Plaintiff's App. at 2. Plaintiffs request that the court remand its case to the Department of Labor for reconsideration of Willhoft's eligibility for TAA certification, arguing that the one-year time limit for filing petitions should be equitably tolled because Willhoft had not been informed of the TAA program and would have applied on time, had she known of the program. Complaint ¶ 1.
A defendant is entitled to USCIT Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal where, accepting the factual allegations made in the Complaint to be true, and drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiff, it appears beyond doubt that no set of facts can be proven that would entitle plaintiff to relief. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936); Forest Labs., Inc. v. United States, 403 F.Supp.2d 1348, 1349 (CIT 2005) ().
The court has exclusive jurisdiction to affirm or remand "in whole or in part" the actions of the Department of Labor with respect to the eligibility of workers for trade adjustment assistance. 19 U.S.C. § 2395(c); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1581(d)(1). The court will uphold Labor's determination for TAA eligibility if it is supported by substantial evidence and is otherwise in accordance with law. 19 U.S.C. § 2395(b); Former Employees of Federated Merchandising Group v. United States, 2005 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 19 at *6 (CIT February 7, 2005). Additionally, the court shall consider whether the agency's determination is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," as provided for by the. Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). 5 U.S.C. § 706. Given "the ex parte nature of the certification process, and the remedial purpose of the [TAA] program," the court has noted that Labor must conduct TAA investigations "with the utmost regard for the interests of the petitioning worker." Former Employees of IBM Corp. v. United States, 387 F.Supp.2d 1346, 1351 (CIT 2005) (quoting Abbott v. Donovan, 588 F.Supp. 1438, 7 CIT 323, 327-28 (1984) (internal quotations omitted)).
The court carries out a two-step analysis to determine whether an agency has properly interpreted and applied a statute. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). First, the court examines whether Congress has spoken directly on the precise issue. Id. If Congress has spoken and its intent is clear, the court and the agency must give effect to that objective. Id. However, if Congress is silent or the intent of Congress on that particular issue is ambiguous, the second step of the court's analysis is to determine whether the agency's interpretation is permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. "Provided the agency has acted rationally, the Court may not substitute its judgment for the agency's." Rene v. Sec'y of Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2007 WL 708905 at *6 n. 12, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15215 at *21 n. 12 (D.N.J.2007) (citing Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed.Cir. 1994)).
In Plaintiffs' response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs included Willhoft's Affidavit, attesting to facts not contained in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Pursuant to Rule 12(c), when "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." In NEC Elecs. U.S.A. v. United States, 13 CIT 214, 709 F.Supp. 1171 (1989), where the defendant interposed an answer to the plaintiff's complaint, the court treated the defendant's motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(c). A similar situation is presented here by the Plaintiffs' submission of Willhoft's Affidavit. Therefore, the court will treat Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment.
Defendant requests that the court dismiss Plaintiffs' case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Labor states that the Government must explicitly waive its sovereign immunity in the context of a statute, and so establish a court's jurisdiction in a suit against the Government. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction ("Defendant's Motion") at 4. Defendant acknowledges that 28 U.S.C. § 1581(d) and 19 U.S.C. §§ 2395(a)-(c) grant the court jurisdiction to review Labor's TAA certification determinations, but argues that this does not include instances where there is no case or controversy. Defendant's Motion at 6. Because the Fisher class was certified, Labor argues, there is no case or controversy here and Plaintiffs' suit is moot. Id.
Plaintiffs counter that Willhoft is not challenging the certification of her fellow former employees, but rather Labor's rejection of her individual petition. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ("Plaintiffs' Opposition") at 5. Willhoft claims that the state workforce office told her that her petition was denied because she had applied after the one-year deadline. Complaint ¶ 2. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue, Willhoft was denied benefits pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2273(b)(1), and the court has subject matter jurisdiction over denials in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 2395(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(d)(1). Id.
The Supreme Court has stated that "a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Even if a defendant addresses some of a plaintiff's claims or injuries prior to judicial review, "the case is not moot if other consequences of defendants' actions remain." NEC Corp. v. United States, 151 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed.Cir.1998); accord Former Employees of Quality Fabricating, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 343 F.Supp.2d 1272, 1286-1287 (CIT 2004). The court in NEC Corp. found that the plaintiff's case was not moot because even though the agency had issued a final antidumping duty order, the trial court could still provide relief by granting an injunction on that order. NEC Corp., 151 F.3d at 1369. In the present case, although the agency certified former employees of Fisher, Willhoft was a member of that class and her petition was denied. Plaintiffs seek a remand of Labor's determination in her case, so that she may apply for...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Williams v. the Bd. of Review
...1107, 1111–14 (2000). Additionally, the Court of International Trade,3 in Former Employees of Fisher & Co. v. United States Department of Labor, 31 Ct. Int'l Trade 1272, 1278–79, 507 F.Supp.2d 1321, 1329 (2007), held that equitable tolling applies to the Act's one-year deadline for filing a......