Former Employees of Sonoco Products Co. v. Chao

• Decision Date: 18 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-1557.,03-1557.
• Citation: 372 F.3d 1291
• Parties: FORMER EMPLOYEES OF SONOCO PRODUCTS CO., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Elaine CHAO, Secretary of Labor, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

372 F.3d 1291

FORMER EMPLOYEES OF SONOCO PRODUCTS CO., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Elaine CHAO, Secretary of Labor, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03-1557.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

DECIDED: June 18, 2004.

Lynn S. Preece, Baker & McKenzie, of Chicago, IL, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With her on the brief was Bart M. McMillan.

Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. With her on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; David M. Cohen, Director; and Victoria L. Strohmeyer, Trial Attorney.

Before MAYER, Chief Judge, BRYSON, and LINN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge LINN. Dissenting opinion filed by Chief Judge MAYER.

LINN, Circuit Judge.

A group of former employees of Sonoco Products Company ("Sonoco") appeals from the dismissal of its untimely-filed claim by the United States Court of International Trade. Former Employees of Sonoco Prods. Co. v. United States Sec'y of Labor, 273 F.Supp.2d 1336 (CIT 2003). Because the Court of International Trade did not err in determining that the appellants were neither diligent nor misled by government agents and, thus, were not eligible for equitable tolling, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Following Sonoco's closure of a plant in North Carolina, it filed a petition on behalf of the company's workers under the North American Free Trade Agreement-Transitional Adjustment Assistance Act ("NAFTA-TAA"). Dorothy Fail ("Fail") was one of these workers. During the spring and early summer of 2002, Fail made a series of visits to the local state unemployment office to look for work and to maintain her unemployment benefits. Sonoco, 273 F.Supp.2d at 1339. She inquired during these visits about the status of the petition Sonoco had filed and alleged that she was told that the office would be notified of the decision and would subsequently communicate it to her "during one of her visits."

The Department of Labor ("agency") denied the petition; the result was published in the Federal Register on May 17, 2002. Notice of Determinations Regarding Eligibility to Apply for Worker Adjustment Assistance and NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,140 (Dep't Labor May 17, 2002). Fail was apparently informed of the agency's denial of the petition on July 16, 2002, on her third visit to the unemployment office after the result was published. Sonoco, 273 F.Supp.2d at 1341. Fail then researched her options and on August 26, 2002, along with other workers, filed a claim in the Court of International Trade. This claim was filed 101 days after the final determination was published in the Federal Register. Id. at 1338. The Court of International Trade noted that 19 U.S.C. § 2395(a) prescribes that workers aggrieved by a denial of a NAFTA-TAA petition may challenge the agency's determination "within sixty days after notice of such determination."¹ The court held that the deadline was not subject to equitable tolling because Fail had not been diligent, nor had she been misled by government officials into filing late. Accordingly, the court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1342.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

The parties disagree as to the standard of review applicable to the issues presented in this appeal. Appellants, citing Frazer v. United States, 288 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2002), argue that whether a statute is subject to equitable tolling is a legal determination reviewed de novo, while application of the equitable tolling doctrine in a particular case is reviewed for clear error. On the other hand, the agency, quoting Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed.Cir.1997), argues that the dismissal of a complaint for lack of jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo by this court. While the parties apparently agree that the question of whether equitable tolling applies to a statute is a question of law, they apparently disagree as to the appropriate standard of review for whether Fail is entitled to equitable tolling under the facts in this record.

We have had the opportunity to address the standard of review in several prior equitable tolling cases. In Leonard v. Gober, 223 F.3d 1374 (Fed.Cir.2000), we considered equitable tolling in an appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ("Veterans Court"). In Leonard we concluded that to reverse the Veterans Court would require consideration of the various facts adduced to determine whether the appellant's failure to timely file was due to her own neglect. We also noted that this required the court to "judge the accuracy of the facts found by the lower court." Id. at 1376. Because the evaluation of factual findings of the Veterans Court and the application of the law of equitable tolling to the facts are beyond our jurisdiction in an appeal from the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims under 38 U.S.C. § 7292, we dismissed the appeal. Id.

In Jaquay v. Principi, 304 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc), another appeal from the Veterans Court, we considered the narrow issue of "whether the misfiling within the [agency] of a motion for reconsideration tolls the Rosler limitations period until the initial [Board of Veterans Appeals] decision is abated by the [Board of Veterans Appeals'] receipt of the motion." We held that such a misfiling tolls the limitations period as a matter of law. We went on to state explicitly that we were not applying law to facts; rather, we concluded that "our holding resolves a contested interpretation of the Veterans Court's jurisdictional statute, 38 U.S.C. § 7266, and its relationship to the regulation directed to the filing of a motion for BVA reconsideration, 38 C.F.R. § 20.1001." Id. at 1289.

In two subsequent veterans cases, we resolved similar issues without dismissing for lack of jurisdiction. In Santana-Venegas v. Principi, we held

as a matter of law that a veteran who misfiles his or her notice of appeal at the same [regional office] from which the claim originated within the 120-day judicial appeal period of 38 U.S.C. § 7266, thereby actively pursues his or her judicial remedies, despite the defective filing, so as to toll the statute of limitations.

314 F.3d 1293, 1298 (Fed.Cir.2002). Again, we expressly stated that we were not applying law to fact but were resolving "whether the Veterans Court properly interpreted 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) when it dismissed Mr. Santana-Venegas' appeal as being untimely." Id. Similarly, in Bailey v. Principi, 351 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed.Cir.2003), we considered our authority to address the ultimate question of equitable tolling after deciding the appropriate standard in the context of a veteran's appeal. After discussing Leonard, Jaquay, and Santana-Venegas, we concluded that when the material facts are not in dispute and the adoption of a particular legal standard would dictate the outcome of the equitable tolling claim, this court has treated the question of the availability of equitable tolling as a matter of law that we are authorized by statute to address.

Id. In Bailey, we went on to conclude that "the Veterans Court misconstrued 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) when it dismissed Mr. Bailey's appeal as untimely." Id. at 1385.

Thus, in the context of veterans cases, we have drawn a distinction between cases, such as Jaquay, Santana-Venegas, and Bailey, at one end of the spectrum where the facts are not in dispute and the selection of the appropriate standard resolves the case, and cases, such as Leonard, at the other end of the spectrum where application of the standard to disputed facts is necessary to determine whether the diligence requirement is met. Falling in the middle of the spectrum are cases where the facts are undisputed, but application of the appropriate standard to the undisputed facts is required. For these cases, selection of the standard does not automatically dictate the outcome.

An example of the cases in the middle of the spectrum is found in Newell Cos. v. Kenney Manufacturing Co., 864 F.2d 757 (Fed.Cir.1988). In Newell we considered, in the patent context, whether a trial court could direct a verdict in an obviousness determination after a jury had delivered a verdict on the issue. We said:

All of our precedent holds that, where the only issue is, as here, the application of the statutory standard of obviousness (35 U.S.C. § 103) to an established set of facts, there is only a question of law to be resolved by the trial judge, and that the trial court's conclusion on obviousness is subject to full and independent review by this court.

Id. at 762. Where the facts are undisputed, all that remains is a legal question, even if that legal question requires the application of the appropriate standard to the facts of a particular case. In Newell, we analogized the standard for a directed verdict in an obviousness determination to the standard to be applied in the context of a summary judgment motion, stating, "In that connection, we have held that where the ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness is disputed, but not the underlying facts, there is no issue of fact requiring a trial, even though some facts favor obviousness, some nonobviousness." Id. at 763. Thus, cases falling in the middle of the spectrum, requiring application of the appropriate standard to undisputed facts, are properly questions of law reviewed de novo by this court.

We believe that the present case falls in this middle ground. Here, the court will have to consider whether, in view of all the undisputed facts in this case, Fail meets the diligence standard required for equitable tolling. The application of the diligence standard to the undisputed facts of this case presents a question of law that we review de novo.

Our resolution of this issue is not inconsistent with Frazer. The standard of review articulated in Frazer...