Fort v. Orndoff

• Decision Date: 06 January 1872
• Parties: SUGG FORT et al. v. ELI ORNDOFF, Guardian, et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

54 Tenn. 167

SUGG FORT et al.

v.ELI ORNDOFF, Guardian, et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Jan. 6, 1872.

FROM ROBERTSON.

From the Chancery Court, March Term, 1871. CHAS. G. SMITH, Ch.

JNO. E. & A. E. GARNER for complainants.

W. A. QUARLES for defendants.

NICHOLSON, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

Eli Orndoff, as guardian of the minor heirs of John W. Orndoff, brought two suits in the Circuit Court of Robertson county against Sugg Fort & Co. One was to recover of them the amount of four notes, each for $200, payable to Eli Orndoff, guardian, for rent of a saw-mill, all of which were due and unpaid; the other was to recover damages for breach of a contract of lease for one-half of the water privilege of Red River at and near the saw-mill of Orndoff's heirs upon said river, at the rate of $200 annually, from August 30, 1862, to 30th of August, 1866.

Before any trial or judgment, Sugg Fort & Co. filed their bill of injunction in the Chancery Court at Springfield, and obtained a fiat enjoining the further prosecution of the suits at law. A demurrer was filed to the bill, upon the ground that the allegations therein did not make a case for the jurisdiction of the chancery court, but that the defense of the suits at law was clear and unembarrassed. The Chancellor overruled the demurrer and required the defendants to answer.

After the original bill had been answered, Sugg Fort, E. A. Fort, and E. S. Fort filed another bill against Harriet H. Orndoff, Harriet L. Orndoff, and Eli Orndoff, enjoining them from prosecuting a suit commenced in the Circuit Court of Robertson county by Harriet H. Orndoff, as next friend of Eli and Harriet L. Orndoff, against complainants, for damages done by them to the saw-mill and lands of said Eli and Harriet L., by said Fort's raising too high a mill-dam across Red River. Defendants demurred to this bill because complainants had a plain and unembarrassed defense at law. This demurrer was overruled, and both bills having been answered and proof taken, they were consolidated and tried together, when the Chancellor dismissed the last named bill and left the parties to litigate the matters involved at law.

As to the first bill, he gave defendant Eli Orndoff, as guardian, a decree for the amount of the four notes, and for the rent of the water privilege as claimed, which, after allowing credits, with interest, amounted to about $1,600, for which he gave a decree against complainants.

From this decree complainants have appealed to this court.

The first question presented is as to the correctness of the decree overruling the demurrer to the first bill. After setting out the facts with much particularity and at great length, complainants sum up their case by stating that the conduct of the defendant in the premises is unconscientious and fraudulent; that their remedy and defenses at law are embarrassed and inadequate; that the writings, particularly the four notes described, should be reformed, so as to set forth properly and fully the agreement of parties; and that they are entitled to a discovery of the various facts charged. The first suit was based on four promissory notes, and the second on a written contract of lease. Complainants allege that they have a good defense to both these suits, but that the remedy at law is embarrassed and inadequate.

It is well settled that general allegations like these furnish no grounds for assuming equitable jurisdiction. The specific facts and circumstances alleged and charged can alone furnish the foundation on which a court of equity can interpose to withdraw a case from a court of law, after such court has acquired jurisdiction. The bare allegation that complainants have not a clear and unembarrassed remedy at law, or that the conduct of the plaintiff at law has been f??audulent, or that a discovery from the defendant is necessary--such general allegations have no weight, but the jurisdiction of the chancery court must rest on the facts and circumstances alleged. To the facts and circumstances then alleged in the present case, we must look, to see if there is any valid ground on which the circuit court can be ousted of the jurisdiction which it had legitimately acquired.

1. It is said two of the notes sued on were given after the contract of lease of August 30, 1862, and that the consideration therein expressed--“for rent of saw mill,” was inserted by inadvertence or mistake, instead of for “the use of one-half of the water of Red River at and near the saw mill,” as expressed in the contract; and that the second suit, based on the contract of lease, seeks to recover for the use of the water, from August 30, 1862, to August 30, 1866; and therefore that plaintiff has two suits pending for the same matter.

Assuming all this to be true, we are at a loss to see what embarrassment there would be in making the defense at law. We know of no rule which would prevent the defendant at law from showing that the real consideration of the notes was the use of the water, as well as the rent of the saw mill. Upon showing this, it would appear that the two last notes given were both for rent of the saw mill and the use of water, and therefore that plaintiff could only recover on the contract of lease from the 1st of July, 1865, when the last note became due. To make this defense, the remedy at law would be complete, and no necessity for reforming the contract exists.

The fact that the plaintiff brought two suits for the same cause of action in the circuit court, furnished no ground for the interference of court of equity. The rules of pleading at law were amply sufficient to remedy such an evil.

2. It is said that the defendant failed to keep one-half of the dam in repair, as he was bound to do by the contract of lease of August 30, 1862, whereby complainants were damaged to the amount of several thousand dollars, in consequence of their flouring mill remaining idle, at one time for twelve months, and at another for four months, during which time their mill was not able to run, and their dam exposed and injured, and their machinery greatly deteriorated, and large losses sustained in not being able to grind wheat purchased, etc. Whatever damage the defendants in the action at law were entitled to recover, growing out of a breach of the contract by plaintiff, they could have proven and had set off at the trial. They had their election, to rely upon the allowance of...