Fort Wayne Educ. Ass'n v. Indiana Dept. of Educ.

• Citation: 692 N.E.2d 902
• Decision Date: 13 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-9703-CV-164,49A02-9703-CV-164
• Parties: 125 Ed. Law Rep. 199 FORT WAYNE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Micaela Funk, Tom W. Richarson, Donald L. Bernard, Delene Rutledge, Bruce A. Flohr, Georgeanna Balogh and Becky Gnau, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Indiana State Board of Education, Board of School Trustees of Fort Wayne Community Schools, and Richard M. Milburn High School, Inc., Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 902

692 N.E.2d 902

125 Ed. Law Rep. 199

FORT WAYNE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Micaela Funk, Tom W.

Richarson, Donald L. Bernard, Delene Rutledge, Bruce A. Flohr, Georgeanna Balogh and Becky Gnau, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Indiana State Board of

Education, Board of School Trustees of Fort Wayne

Community Schools, and Richard M.

Milburn High School, Inc.,

Appellees-Defendants.

No. 49A02-9703-CV-164.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

March 13, 1998.

Richard J. Darko, Lowe Gray Steele & Darko, Indianapolis, for Appellants-Plaintiffs.

William L. Sweet, Jr., Kristen L. Maly, Beckman, Lawson, Sandler, Snyder & Federoff, L.L.P., Fort Wayne, for Appellees-Defendants.

OPINION

RUCKER, Judge.

Fort Wayne Education Association, Micaela Funk, Tom W. Richardson, Donald L. Bernard, Delene Rutledge, Bruce A. Flohr, Georgeanna Balogh and Becky Gnau (Appellants) appeal the dismissal of their action against the Indiana Department of Education, Indiana State Board of Education, Board of School Trustees of Fort Wayne Community Schools, and Richard M. Milburn High School, Inc. (Defendants). Appellants appeal one issue which we rephrase as whether the trial court erred in finding the Appellants lack standing to bring an action. We affirm.

On February 20, 1996 the Board of School Trustees of Fort Wayne Community Schools (School Board) entered into an agreement with Richard M. Milburn High School, Inc. (High School). Under the agreement, the School Board agreed to pay the High School two thousand three hundred thirty-four dollars ($2,334.00) per semester for each student enrolled in an alternate education program provided by the High School. Funding for the program was based upon a statutory formula and included both state and local monies.

On April 26, 1996 the Appellants filed a Complaint and Verified Petition for Judicial Review with the Marion Superior Court, challenging the legality and constitutionality of the agreement and sought recovery of monies paid. In response, the School Board, Department of Education, State Board of Education and High School filed separate motions to dismiss the action alleging the Appellants lacked standing. The trial court granted the motions. This appeal ensued in due course.

Defendants contend the Appellants lack standing to challenge the actions of the School Board. Specifically, they contend that the Appellants are taxpayers and ordinary citizens with only a general interest common to all members of the public. Consequently, they continue, Appellants cannot demonstrate any injury beyond the fact that less money will be available for other school programs as a result of the agreement between the School Board and the High School. Appellants counter that, as parents and taxpayers they have a personal stake in the outcome and are in danger of suffering some direct injury, thereby establishing both public and personal standing. They further cite Appeal of Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 Ind.App. 358, 109 N.E.2d 620 (1952), as establishing a common law right permitting taxpayers to challenge transactions involving municipalities.

Although not identical, standing is similar to the real party in interest requirement of Ind.Trial Rule 17. Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486 (Ind.1995), reh'g denied. Both are threshold requirements intended to insure that the party before the court has the substantive right to enforce the claim being asserted. Id.

Standing remains an essential element in litigation which serves as a check on the exercise of judicial power by Indiana courts and thereby maintains our state constitutional scheme of separation of powers. Id. at 488. It mandates that courts act in real cases, and refrain when called to engage in abstract speculation. Id. Jurisdiction is conferred only upon an actual dispute involving those harmed. Id. Further, standing "denies the courts any jurisdiction absent an actual injured party participating in the case." Id.

Under the traditional private standing doctrine, a party must demonstrate both a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and, at a minimum, that he is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the conduct at issue. Shand Mining Inc., v. Clay County Bd. of Comm'rs, 671 N.E.2d 477 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. Appellants contend that they meet these requirements. They argue that by virtue of the fact that their children attend Fort Wayne public schools, they have a very personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit. They also contend that they will suffer direct injury due to the fact...