Fort Wayne Intern. Airport v. Wilburn
| Decision Date | 22 February 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 02A03-9907-CV-255.,02A03-9907-CV-255. |
| Citation | 723 N.E.2d 967 |
| Parties | FORT WAYNE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT and The Fort Wayne/Allen County Airport Authority, Appellants-Defendants, v. Cynthia R. WILBURN and Reggie Wilburn, Appellees-Plaintiffs. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Steven E. Springer, Eric D. Johnson, Kightlinger & Gray, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellants.
David J. Avery, Avery & Van Gilder, Fort Wayne, Indiana, Attorney for Appellees.
Appellants-defendants Fort Wayne International Airport and the Fort Wayne/Allen County Airport Authority (the Airport) bring this interlocutory appeal following the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss the complaint filed against it by the appellees-plaintiffs, Cynthia and Reggie Wilburn (collectively, the Wilburns). Specifically, the Airport contends that its motion should have been granted because the Wilburns failed to commence their cause of action for negligence within the two-year statute of limitations.
On February 17, 1997, Cynthia allegedly slipped and fell on the floor as she entered the restroom area of the Fort Wayne Airport. On February 16, 1999, the Wilburns submitted their complaint for damages, along with the appropriate filing fee, to the trial court clerk. The summons was not tendered, however, until February 19, 1999.
On March 15, 1999, the Airport moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that because the summons, complaint and filing fee were not all tendered within the applicable two-year statute of limitations, the Wilburns failed to commence their cause of action in a timely fashion. Thus, the Airport contended that the Wilburns' action was time-barred.
Our decision is controlled by Boostrom v. Bach (1993) Ind., 622 N.E.2d 175, cert. denied, (1994) 513 U.S. 928, 115 S.Ct. 318, 130 L.Ed.2d 279. In that case, our Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was required to tender the filing fee to the Clerk in her small claims action in addition to filing the notice of claim, i.e., the complaint, in order to commence the civil action within the applicable statute of limitations.1
Clearly and unmistakably, our Supreme Court stated in that case:
. (Emphasis supplied). 622 N.E.2d at 177 n. 2.
In Boostrom, it was the filing fee which was lacking and here it is the tender of the summons. Still, only two out of the three requisites for commencement of the action have been met. Fulfillment of two of the three requirements may equate with a Hall of Fame .667 batting average in the major leagues. However, such is not adequate under our rules and case precedent to permit plaintiff to continue compete in this contest.
We would further observe that the dissent inappropriately finds support in the Supreme Court's observation that "[p]ayment of the filing fee, unlike issuance of summons by the clerk, is wholly in the hands of the plaintiff." (Emphasis supplied). Id. In the case before us, we are not concerned with the failure of the Clerk to issue a summons after its proper tender by the plaintiff. Here, the plaintiff failed to carry out one of the three requisites over which she had total control.
Were it not for the Boostrom decision, we might well focus upon Trial Rule 3 which provides that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. . . ." This rule does not seem to contemplate engraftment of other requirements such as filing fee and tender of summons. Nevertheless, such requirements are in place as a matter of binding precedent.
The denial of Appellant-Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions to dismiss Appellee-Plaintiffs' complaint.
If the commencement of an action at law were based solely upon the filing of the complaint, the wheels of justice would quickly become mired down and the judicial system ineffective as a means to settling disputes. Requiring the plaintiff to file a summons shifts the burden where it belongs. Initially, the plaintiff should move the complaint along in the judicial process to the extent that he can by providing the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Dennis v. Donahoe
...within the statute of limitations for the action. Rule 3; Ray-Hayes v. Heinamann, 760 N.E.2d 172, 174 (2002); Fort Wayne Intern. Airport v. Wilburn, 723 N.E.2d 967 (2000). The applicable period of time for plaintiff to commence her title VII action in court is found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(......
-
Atkinson v. Forest Research Inst., Inc.
...and could never be considered "commenced" after the time to file expired, her case would have been dismissed by the state court); Fort Wayne, 723 N.E.2d at 968 (granting defendants' motion to dismiss where plaintiff filed her complaint and paid the filing fee prior to the expiration of the ......
-
Oxley v. Lenn
...summary judgment. According to his affidavit, Attorney Lenn was not aware of the Court of Appeals decision in Fort Wayne Int'l Airport v. Wilburn, 723 N.E.2d 967 (Ind.Ct.App.2000)[, trans. denied]. That decision stated the rule that it was necessary to tender a summons to toll the statute o......
-
Jones v. Ramos
...or filing an order waiving the filing fee; and, (3) where service of process is required, a summons. In Ft. Wayne Int'l Airport v. Wilburn, 723 N.E.2d 967, 968-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that failure to tender a summons to the clerk prevented the commencemen......