Fort Worth Gas Co. v. Cooper

• Decision Date: 28 April 1922
• Docket Number: (No. 2535.)
• Parties: FORT WORTH GAS CO. v. COOPER.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

241 S.W. 282

FORT WORTH GAS CO. v. COOPER.

(No. 2535.)

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.

April 28, 1922.

Rehearing Denied May 11, 1922.

Appeal from District Court, Tarrant County; Ben M. Terrell, Judge.

Action by Mattie L. Cooper against the Forth Worth Gas Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The action is by appellee to recover damages for personal injuries caused by an explosion of gas which had accumulated in a closet in her kitchen. It was alleged in the petition that the discharge of the gas was due to a defective condition of the meter or its connections, known to, and negligently suffered to exist by, appellant. The appellant answered by general denial, and specially pleaded that the appellee was guilty of negligence proximately causing her injury.

The appellant installed a gas meter in the dwelling house in evidence prior to the time the appellee moved into it as an occupant or tenant of the owner. The meter was located in a closet in the kitchen, in a corner thereof. The closet is about 2½ feet wide, extending to the ceiling. The kitchen is a room 13 by 14 feet. The cooking stove was about 3 feet distant from the closet. It was the duty of the appellant to install, inspect, and keep in safe repair the meter. On the morning of the day of the explosion the appellee shut her house and remained away on business matters until about 7 o'clock p. m. Upon her return home she went into the kitchen to make a cup of coffee. According to her evidence, she struck a match and lighted one of the burners of the gas cooking stove, then walked to the sink on the opposite side of the room and about 10 feet distant from the stove, and drew from the water pipe a dipper of water to put in the coffeepot, and then started back to the stove. Quoting her statement:

"I turned around with the dipper to go to the stove to put the water in my coffeepot, and when I got pretty close [about 2 feet] to the stove the gas exploded, and it just came into my face, and I didn't know anything more. The explosion came from the meter; the pipe bursted out; there was so much gas in that closet; it had accumulated there in it. The closet door was closed and the gas bursted it open. I do not know how loud the explosion was, but it sounded like a cannon to me. It came right into my face. I had not gotten quite to the closet door when it flew open and the gas came out. The explosion knocked me unconscious."

On cross-examination appellee testified:

"I had been away from the house nearly all day. I do not remember whether it [the meter] was leaking on that particular morning or not. The house was closed up that day, and when I came home the house was full. You could not take the leak out through the stove. Of course, I did not know it leaked that much in there, and I did not know anything about that. I knew it was leaking, but I did not know it was all full of gas. The stove had been lit just a very short time before the explosion. I had no cause to go to the closet, and did not open it at that time. The coffeepot was not in the closet, and I had no occasion to go to the closet to get any vessels out of the closet on that particular occasion. I did not strike any matches inside the closet, but I did strike matches for the purpose of lighting the stove."

No other witness but appellee saw or knew of the exact cause of the explosion. Appellee is a woman 64 years old, and had, as shown, been accustomed to use gas as a fuel for about 11 years, was familiar with its smell, could detect its presence, and was acquainted with its inflammable and explosive character. Appellee made frequent complaints to appellant about a leakage of gas in the meter connections, and made many efforts to have appellant remedy the leakage, insistently claiming that there was a discharge of gas. These complaints covered a period of about 3 months. The appellant had its inspector visit the place, with instructions to make necessary repairs. He testified that he did safely repair the meter and left it in good condition. Whether or not the leakage, if any, was stopped and the meter, and its connections were put in safe repair before the injury in suit rests entirely upon conflicting evidence. The evidence went to show a defective condition of the meter connections, and that this defective condition continued until finally it resulted in such a discharge of gas as to cause the injury in suit. It appears that just after the explosion the city fire department came and extinguished the flames. It further appears that the fire burned through the closet wall, and the paper on the walls of the kitchen was burned to the ceiling. It also appears that "the glass was broken out on the meter." It was proven that "any kind of a leak where the gas is confined would be liable to cause an explosion, if fire were about. Of course, it would have to come in contact with a spark or flame, and there would have to be a sufficient amount of gas confined."

The testimony is conflicting as to the nature and extent of the appellee's injuries. According to her own evidence appellee suffered serious injury, to the extent of constant disability. The jury made the findings of fact, on special issues submitted, that the explosion was caused by reason of gas escaping or leaking from the appellant's gas meter, or its immediate connections with the gas pipes, located in the closet of the kitchen, and that the escape of the gas was proximately caused by the negligence of the appellant in failing to repair the meter or its immediate connections, and that the appellee suffered injuries as a result of the explosion, in damages in the sum of $3,000. The jury further found as a fact that the appellee was not guilty of contributory negligence in igniting the gas on the cooking stove just prior to the explosion. There is evidence to warrant the findings of the jury.

H. T. Cooper, Slay, Simon & Smith, and Lockett & Crowley, all of Fort Worth, for appellant.

R. L. Carlock and R. L. Carlock, Jr., both of Fort Worth, for appellee.

LEVY, J. (after stating the facts as above).

Appellant's first proposition is that, even if it be conceded that its failure to remedy and prevent the discharge of the gas from the meter or its immediate connections was negligence still such negligence was not, as a matter of law, the proximate cause of the explosion and injury resulting therefrom. It is insisted that the ignition of the gas was the proximate cause of the injury, and that because the ignition was not made by the appellant or its employees, but by the appellee herself, for whose acts appellant was not responsible, it could not be held liable.

According to the circumstances and physical facts, there was an explosion of gas which had accumulated in the closet located near the cooking stove. It is not definitely shown that the flame or fire from the stove ignited the gas. But the evidence, considered altogether, furnishes a foundation for the reasonable inference that the flame or fire from the stove did ignite the gas.

It could not be said that there was no proximate causal relation between the...