Fortner v. State
Decision Date | 28 September 2001 |
Citation | 825 So.2d 876 |
Parties | Charles Quinlyn FORTNER v. STATE of Alabama. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Charles Quinlyn Fortner, pro se.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Frances R. Clement, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Alabama Supreme Court 1010551.
On December 19, 1989, Charles Quinlyn Fortner was convicted of first-degree sodomy. On January 3, 1990, the trial court sentenced him to 25 years in prison. Fortner appealed, and this Court affirmed his conviction. Fortner v. State, 582 So.2d 581 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). This Court issued the certificate of judgment on May 17, 1991. On April 8, 1993, Fortner filed his first Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition, which the circuit court summarily denied. This court affirmed the circuit court's denial in an unpublished memorandum. Fortner v. State, (No. CR-93-338) 655 So.2d 57 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) (table). On August 17, 2000, Fortner filed this, his second, Rule 32 petition. On September 26, 2000, the State responded. On January 3, 2001, the circuit court summarily denied the petition. This appeal followed.
"[W]hen the facts are undisputed and an appellate court is presented with pure questions of law, that court's review in a Rule 32 proceeding is de novo." Ex parte White, 792 So.2d 1097 (Ala.2001). We find that the circuit court's summary denial of this petition was appropriate.
(Emphasis added.) A petition may be precluded as successive under Rule 32.2(b):
See also Whitt v. State, 827 So.2d 869 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (citing Rule 32.2(b), Ala. R.Crim. P.).
Fortner argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in summarily denying his petition as successive because 1) he did not pay a docket fee and the circuit court did not approve his in forma pauperis status; 2) the district attorney never gave specific grounds for preclusion in his motion to dismiss Fortner's petition; 3) his first petition had not been adjudicated on the merits; 4) his claims were jurisdictional; 5) the failure to address his petition on the merits results in a miscarriage of justice; and 6) the circuit court should have granted him an evidentiary hearing.
The record refutes claims 1 and 2. The notice of appeal the Cullman Circuit Court filed in this Court reflects that Fortner was granted indigency status both at trial and on appeal. (C.R.6.) The State's motion to dismiss Fortner's petition states specific grounds for preclusion of his claims. (C.R.251-54.)
As for Fortner's argument that the claims in his petition were jurisdictional and that the circuit court should therefore have held an evidentiary hearing on those claims, Fortner presented the following issues to the circuit court:
Although Fortner couches his arguments in jurisdictional terms, his claims are actually nonjurisdictional. We begin by discussing Fortner's claim that the jury venire was not sworn before voir dire. We have held, albeit reluctantly, that this claim is jurisdictional and that it cannot be waived or precluded. Nix v. State, 819 So.2d 84 (Ala.Crim.App.2001). We stated that, In Nix, we concluded that Hamlett suggested that Nix's claim that the jury venire in his case had not been properly sworn before voir dire was jurisdictional and nonwaivable. A closer examination of the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Hamlett indicates that this Court construed the holding in Hamlett too broadly. Upon reconsideration, we find that Hamlett does not indicate that we are to treat jury-swearing issues as jurisdictional and therefore nonwaivable.
Our rereading of Hamlett teaches us, first, that Hamlett's claim was within the two-year limitations period in Rule 32.2(c). Thus, the simple fact that the Court was willing to reach the claim does not indicate that the claim was jurisdictional because the claim was raised in a petition that had been filed within the two-year limitations period. Second, the Court remanded the cause to the circuit court both because it would not assume from a silent record that the venire had been sworn and because it could not reach Hamlett's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim without knowing whether Hamlett's counsel had in fact rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the trial court's alleged failure to administer the oath to the venire. Thus, because of Hamlett's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the Court could not simply find that Hamlett had waived his claim that the venire had not been sworn because that claim had a direct bearing on the result of Hamlett's claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. If the Court allowed the waiver of the jury-swearing claim, it effectively allowed the waiver of Hamlett's ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, which would have been contrary to the law in Alabama concerning the waivability of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Ex parte Ingram, 675 So.2d 863, 866 (Ala.1996) () Thus it was the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that concerned the Court in Hamlett.
Nothing in Hamlett indicates that the Alabama Supreme Court set out to overrule precedent of this Court and thereby render jury-swearing claims jurisdictional and nonwaivable. A trial court's failure to administer the oath to a jury venire, while reversible error, does not rob the trial court of its jurisdiction to render judgment and to impose sentence against a defendant. We therefore narrow our reading of Hamlett, overrule our decision in Nix, and find that a petitioner's claim that the...
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