Forwarders v. Dragone Classic Motorcars, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 33768.,33768.
• Citation: 49 A.3d 798,137 Conn.App. 623
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: SPECIALIZED FREIGHT FORWARDERS v. DRAGONE CLASSIC MOTORCARS, INC.

137 Conn.App. 623

49 A.3d 798

SPECIALIZED FREIGHT FORWARDERS

v.DRAGONE CLASSIC MOTORCARS, INC.

No. 33768.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 25, 2012.

Decided Aug. 28, 2012.

James M. Kearns, Bridgeport, for the appellant (defendant).

Brenden P. Leydon, Stamford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

DiPENTIMA, C.J., and ROBINSON and MIHALAKOS, Js.

ROBINSON, J.

The defendant, Dragone Classic Motorcars, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Specialized Freight Forwarders. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case, (2) improperly determined that the plaintiff could recover against the defendant for shipping costs despite the fact that the term “freight collect” was used on the bill of lading ¹ and (3) improperly determined that the plaintiff has recourse against the defendant for shipping charges incurred under the air waybill ² when the plaintiff should have recouped those charges from the purchaser. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court found the following facts. The plaintiff is a business based in the Netherlands that forwards freight internationally. The plaintiff was introduced to the defendant through the owner of the plaintiff, David Freriks, when Freriks was employed with another shipper, Mission Freight. During Freriks' employment with Mission Freight, he observed a series of shipping transactions between Mission Freight and the defendant, all of which involved the defendant paying euros for shipping services. Freriks later started Specialized Freight Forwarders and began shipping vehicles for the defendant, using the same arrangements as were used between Mission Freight and the defendant.

The plaintiff shipped five vehicles from the United States to Europe for the defendant in 2009. The invoices provided to the court demonstrate that a 1929 Alfa Romeo was shipped by air and that a 1915 Metz, a 1932 Chrysler, a 1908 Buick and a 1932 Lincoln were shipped by ocean freight from New York City to the Netherlands. The business relationship between the parties deteriorated after the defendant failed to pay for the shipment of these vehicles. The plaintiff filed this action on July 12, 2010, and filed an amended complaint on August 10, 2010, alleging that it had not been paid for the services renderedto the defendant and that the defendant was unjustly enriched as a result.

A two day bench trial was held on July 14 and July 15, 2011. The court heard testimony from only Freriks and the defendant's president, Emanuel G. Dragone. ³ At the conclusion of trial, the court issued an oral decision finding in favor of the plaintiff. The court determined that it was understood between the parties that payment was to be made in euros and that the plaintiff was to determine the fees and expenses associated with the shipment of goods and notify the defendant of the itemized value and total amount prior to making actual shipping arrangements. The court determined that this procedure was the “usual and customary way that all shipping arrangements were handled by the parties” and that the plaintiff would advance all sums for the shipment and would be reimbursed for all such advancements by the defendant. The court further determined that despite the defendant's argument that the buyer of the vehicles was responsible for shipping fees, that was not the arrangement that the parties had used in the past. The court, therefore, awarded the plaintiff Q26,560.59, plus prejudgment interest under General Statutes § 37–3a, for a total of Q33,138.45, which converted to $46,877.60. The court also ordered legal interest of 8 percent to be paid from the date of the judgment until the unsatisfied amounts have been paid. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant's first claim on appeal is that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's case because it is an admiralty action over which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. “A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law and, therefore, we employ the plenary standard of review and decide whether the court's conclusions are legally and logically correct and supported by the facts in the record.... [I]t is well established that a reviewing court properly may address [subject matter jurisdiction] claims that neither were raised nor ruled on in the trial court. Indeed, [o]nce the question of lack of [subject matter] jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented.... The court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Warner v. Bicknell, 126 Conn.App. 588, 594, 12 A.3d 1042 (2011).

The defendant argues that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty actions under the constitution of the United States ⁴ and federal law, and, that therefore the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Section 1333 of title 28 of the United States Code provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled. (2) Any prize brought into the United States and all proceedings for the condemnation of property taken as prize.”

In its brief, the plaintiff cites Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 74 S.Ct. 298, 98 L.Ed. 290 (1954), in support of its argument that the court had subject matter jurisdiction. We find Madruga is dispositive of the defendant's claim. In Madruga, the United States Supreme Court stated: “Admiralty's jurisdiction is ‘exclusive’ only as to those maritime causes of action begun and carried on as proceedings in rem, that is, where a vessel or thing is itself treated as the offender and made the defendant by name or description in order to enforce a lien.... It is this kind of in rem proceeding which state courts cannot entertain. But the jurisdictional act does leave state courts ‘competent’ to adjudicate maritime causes of action in proceedings ‘in personam,’ that is, where the defendant is a person, not a ship or some other instrument of navigation.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id., at 560–61, 74 S.Ct. 298.See In re Millenium Seacarriers, Inc., 419 F.3d 83, 102 (2d Cir.2005) (“[T]he jurisdiction of the federal admiralty courts has never been wholly exclusive. State courts, for example, may exercise in personam jurisdiction over litigants to provide remedies to causes of action that are cognizable under both admiralty and state law.” [Emphasis in original.] ); Dluhos v. Floating & Abandoned Vessel, 162 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir.1998) (“[i]t is well-established that a claim may be cognizable under both federal admiralty law and state law”). In the present case, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was a ship or other instrument of navigation. The proceeding, therefore, was in personam, and the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff's claims.

II

The defendant's second claim on appeal is that the court improperly determined that the plaintiff could recover against the defendant for shipping costs despite the fact that the term “freight collect” ⁵ was used on the bill of lading. The defendant argues that the use of the term “freight collect” on the bill of lading demonstrated that only the buyer of the goods was to pay for shipping costs, not the seller, and, therefore, it should not be liable for the costs incurred in shipping the vehicles overseas. We disagree.

Whether the use of the term “freight collect” in the bill of lading meant that the buyer and not the seller organizing the shipment of the goods was responsible for shipment costs is a matter of contract interpretation. “The standard of review for the interpretation of a contract is well established. Although ordinarily the question of contract interpretation, being a question of the parties' intent, is a question of fact ... [when] there is definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties intended by their ... commitments is a question of law [over which our review is plenary].” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, Inc., 284 Conn. 1, 7, 931 A.2d 837 (2007).

The defendant contends that the use of the term “freight collect” in the bill of lading demonstrates that it is not responsiblefor the shipment costs, and rather, that the plaintiff should have recouped those costs from the buyer of the transported goods. One decision of our Supreme Court has commented on the issue of whether the term “freight collect,” in and of itself, demonstrates that the buyer and not the seller who organized shipment of the goods is responsible for freight costs. In New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. v. California Fruit Growers Exchange, 125 Conn. 241, 243, 5 A.2d 353, cert. denied, 308 U.S. 567, 60 S.Ct. 79, 84 L.Ed. 476 (1939), the defendant seller shipped a carload of fruit with the plaintiff carrier from California, consigned to itself at Providence, Rhode Island. After the fruit arrived in Rhode Island, the defendant directed the carrier to deliver the fruit to Shore Brothers, Inc., “ ‘on payment of freight and all other charges.’ ” Id. The carrier delivered the fruit to Shore Brothers, Inc.; however, the carrier did not collect the freight costs. Id. After Shore Brothers, Inc., became insolvent, the carrier sued the defendant to recover the cost of shipping the fruit. Id. In reaching its conclusion that the defendant was to pay for the shipping costs, our Supreme Court commented: “In New York Central [ Railroad ] Co. v. Frank H. Buck Co. [2 Cal.2d 384, 392,41 P.2d 547 (1935) ], upon facts similar in all material respects to those of the present case, the...