Foster v. Advanced Corr. Healthcare, Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 5:16-cv-00521-MHH |
| Parties | WHITNEY ELIZABETH FOSTER, Plaintiff, v. ADVANCED CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This case is before the Court on three motions to dismiss filed by various defendants. While incarcerated at the Madison County Jail, plaintiff Whitney Foster alleges that she did not receive adequate treatment for many severe health problems. She eventually was hospitalized and now suffers from permanent neurological deficits and cortical blindness. In her amended complaint, Ms. Foster asserts claims of deliberate indifference to medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, negligent medical practice, negligent correctional care, wantonness, and civil conspiracy. (Doc. 60, pp. 16, 18-21).
In her amended complaint, Ms. Foster names as defendants Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc. ("ACH"), the corporation contracted to provide healthcare to inmates residing in the Madison County Jail; Dr. Arthur Williams, a physician at Madison County Jail; specific nurses at the jail ("the nurses");1 Madison County; Blake Dorning, the Madison County Sheriff; Jerry Morrison as the personal representative of the estate of Steve Morrison, the Jail Administrator ("Mr. Morrison"); and specific correctional officers at the jail ("the correctional officers").2 (Doc. 60, pp. 1-3).
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Madison County asks the Court to dismiss the claims of negligent correctional care, wantonness, and civil conspiracy asserted against it. (Doc. 62, p. 1). The correctional officers ask the Court to dismiss the § 1983 and tort claims asserted against them. (Doc. 84, p. 1). Mr. Morrison asks the Court to dismiss the § 1983 claims asserted against the estate of Steve Morrison. (Doc. 86, p. 1). For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Madison County's motion to dismiss and denies both the correctional officers' and Mr. Morrison's motions to dismiss.
Rule 12(b)(6) enables a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for"failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint against the "liberal pleading standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2)." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, (2007)).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must view the allegations in a complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). A court must accept well-pled facts as true. Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000).
The factual allegations in the amended complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Foster, indicate that pursuant to its contract with Madison County, ACH provides healthcare services to inmates at the Madison County Jail. (Doc.60, ¶¶ 15, 17). The contract caps outside medical care costs at $200,000 per quarter. (Doc. 60, ¶ 17). The contract permits ACH to keep as profit the difference between the $200,000 cap and actual outside medical care costs incurred in a quarter when those costs fall below $200,000. (Doc. 60, ¶ 17). According to Ms. Foster, this contract provision incentivized ACH to deny prison inmate referrals to outside medical care providers as a cost controlling mechanism, the "result of which [was] unnecessary inmate suffering." (Doc. 60, ¶ 17).3
Ms. Foster alleges that ACH personnel refused to refer inmates for outside care when necessary, failed to respond to or evaluate inmates' serious medical needs, and let inmates' health deteriorate. (See Doc. 60, ¶ 30). She also alleges that Sheriff Dorning and Mr. Morrison encouraged correctional officers to defer to ACH personnel for medical decisions even though the officers were aware that ACH's medical care endangered inmates because ACH elevated cost control over healthcare. (Doc. 60, ¶¶ 22-23, 25). Ms. Foster asserts that at least six inmates died due to the failure of ACH and correctional personnel to provide inmates withbasic medical care.4 (Doc. 60, ¶¶ 24, 28). Ms. Foster alleges that no defendant investigated the circumstances of these deaths, nor did the defendants investigate grievances regarding medical care. (Doc. 60, ¶¶ 27-28).
Ms. Foster was arrested and booked at Madison County Jail on April 4, 2014. (Doc. 60, ¶ 31). Before her arrest, she had been taking 80 mg of methadone daily. The methadone was administered by a methadone clinic. (Doc. 60, ¶ 35). Once incarcerated, Ms. Foster alleges that she "began to show visible signs of being weak and suffering from methadone withdrawal." (Doc. 60, ¶ 38). The visible symptoms grew more severe each day, although the defendants "did nothing to help her." (Doc. 60, ¶ 38).
Ms. Foster experienced elevated blood pressure on numerous occasions. (Doc. 60, ¶¶ 39, 41). On April 6, 2014, nurses placed her on vistaril and dicyclomine, as was "protocol for withdrawal patients." (Doc. 60, ¶ 40). Nurses did not write down multiple blood pressure readings "in the 200s." (Doc. 60, ¶ 42.1). Nurses and correctional officers accused Ms. Foster of faking when she slurred her speech, bit her tongue, and exhibited limited control of her body. (Doc.60, ¶ 47). Ms. Foster was seen in the clinic on April 18, 2014, given ibuprofen, and put on three day blood pressure watch. (Doc. 60, ¶ 48).
On April 21, 2014, Ms. Foster began having strokes and seizures, during which she was harassed and ridiculed by officers and nurses. (Doc. 60, ¶¶ 50-51). She was found shaking and sweating, with a blood pressure of 180/110, slightly lethargic, and slurring her words. (Doc. 60, ¶¶ 53-54). She was given clonidine, apparently for methadone withdrawal. (Doc. 60, ¶ 54). The next day, Ms. Foster called her mom and told her with slurred speech that she was going to die. (Doc. 60, ¶ 57). Ms. Foster was left to lie on the ground, and a nurse picked her up and dropped her, saying "get the fu** up." (Doc. 60, ¶ 58). Some officers and nurses put Ms. Foster in the shower because she urinated on herself. (Doc. 60, ¶ 58).
On April 22, 2014, correctional officers saw Ms. Foster shaking and sweating. Ms. Foster alleges that the officers knew she was having strokes. (Doc. 60, ¶ 59.1). Ms. Foster asserts that the officers knew she had to be sent to the hospital, but no defendant would send her to the hospital. (Doc. 60, ¶ 59.1). The officers harassed and ridiculed her throughout the day. (Doc. 60, ¶ 59.1). That night, officers found Ms. Foster twitching in her bunk, complaining of hurting all over and tensing muscles. (Doc. 60, ¶ 59).
On the morning of April 23, 2014, a nurse could not pull Ms. Foster out from under a bed. (Doc. 60, ¶ 61). Dr. Williams ordered that Ms. Foster be sent tothe Huntsville Hospital emergency room due to signs of a stroke. (Doc. 60, ¶ 62). When Ms. Foster arrived at the hospital, her blood pressure was 154/131, she had a heart rate of 115, she looked like she had been beaten, she was blind, and she was partially paralyzed. (Doc. 60, ¶ 64).
Ms. Foster remained hospitalized for three weeks and was diagnosed with Posterior Reversible Encephalopathy Syndrome; Ms. Foster contends her condition is no longer reversible. (Doc. 60, ¶ 65). Ms. Foster has some use of her arms and legs, but the repeated strokes and seizures caused permanent neurological deficits and cortical blindness. (Doc. 60, ¶ 65).
Madison County asks the Court to dismiss the state law tort claims (civil conspiracy, negligent correctional care, and wantonness) that Ms. Foster asserts against it.5 (Doc. 62, p. 1). Madison County argues that Ms. Foster failed to comply with Alabama law requiring proper pre-suit notice before bringing anactionable claim against a county.
Madison County raises a procedural challenge to Ms. Foster's conspiracy claim. Under Alabama law, before a plaintiff may sue a county, the plaintiff must present a notice of claim to the county within 12 months after accrual of the claim. Ala. Code § 11-12-8 (1975). This notice must be "itemized." Ala. Code § 11-12-5. The plaintiff cannot file suit until the county denies the claim or the claim is denied by operation of law after 90 days. Ala. Code § 6-5-20. Ms. Foster presented Madison County her notice of claim within 12 months of accrual of the claim. (Doc. 63, p. 22). The claim was denied by operation of law after 90 days. (Doc, 70, p. 19). Madison County argues that the notice is not properly itemized because it omits a theory of liability asserted in the amended complaint.
The itemization requirement in § 11-12-5 provides a county "with notice of claims against the county and an opportunity to audit and investigate the claims." Elmore Cnty. Comm'n v. Ragona, 540 So. 2d 720, 723 (Ala. 1989). The "items" should include "a factual background, a description of the event or transaction giving rise to the claim, the alleged basis for the county's liability for damages resulting from the event or transaction, the nature of the damages, and the compensation demanded." Id....
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