Foster v. Dillard
Decision Date | 12 April 2016 |
Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:13-CV-288-WHA (WO) |
Parties | EDDIE LEE FOSTER, #143404, Plaintiff, v. CYNTHIA DILLARD, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on an amended complaint filed by Eddie Lee Foster ("Foster"), an indigent state inmate. Doc. No. 11 and Doc. No. 19. In these pleadings, Foster challenges the five-year set off date assigned for his next parole consideration as violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause and asserts that a generic statement contained in the letter notifying him of the denial of parole created a liberty interest in being released on parole. Foster also argues that the defendants deprived of his right to proper consideration for parole because they ignored the directives of a state statute requiring evaluation by a psychiatrist prior to determining his suitability for parole. Foster next alleges that the actions of the defendants deprived him of due process, violated his equal protection rights and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, Foster complains that the statute governing parole is unconstitutionally vague as it permits total discretion by parole board members in determining which inmates to release on parole. The defendants in this case are Cynthia Dillard, the Executive Director of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, and William Wynne, Jr. and Cliff Walker, members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles. Foster seeks issuance of a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and monetary damages.
The defendants filed a special report and supporting evidentiary materials addressing Foster's claims for relief. In this filing, the defendants deny they acted in violation of Foster's constitutional rights during the parole consideration process and in making the determination to deny parole. Upon receipt of the defendants' special report, the court issued an order directing Foster to file a response to the report, including affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and other evidentiary materials. Order of October 15, 2013 - Doc. No. 30 at 2. This order specifically cautioned Foster that "the court may at any time [after expiration of the time for his response] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special report and any evidentiary materials as a motion for summary judgment and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion for summary judgment in accordance with law." Id. 2-3. Pursuant to this order, the court deems it appropriate to treat the defendants' report as a motion for summary judgment. Thus, this case is now pending on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of this motion, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, the sworn complaint and the plaintiff's response and supportingaffidavit, the court concludes that the defendants' motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.
"Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) ( ); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(a) ().1 The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) ( ). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that thenonmoving party has failed to present appropriate evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-324.
The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the claims presented by the plaintiff. Based on the foregoing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-594 (internal quotation marks omitted) (Once the moving party meets its burden, "the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or statements made under penalty of perjury], or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact.). This court will also consider "specific facts" pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return averdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Public Education for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007).
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal citation omitted). To proceed beyond the summary judgment stage, an inmate-plaintiff is required to produce "sufficient [favorable] evidence" which would be admissible at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) ( ); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) ( ); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) (); Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forthspecific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) ( ); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ( ). At the summary judgment stage, this court must "consider all evidence in the record . . . [including] pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits, etc. -- and can only grant summary judgment if everything in the record demonstrates that no genuine [dispute] of material fact exists." Strickland v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012).
For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800...
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