Foster v. State
| Decision Date | 26 November 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. A02A1125.,A02A1125. |
| Citation | 574 S.E.2d 843,258 Ga. App. 601 |
| Parties | FOSTER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
J. Louise Dietzen, Decatur, for appellant.
Gwendolyn R. Keyes, Solicitor-General, Kimberly Sanders-Bjurmark, Asst. Solicitor-General, for appellee. PHIPPS, Judge.
David Foster was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent he was a less safe driver (DUI), driving with a suspended license, and failure to maintain lane. His motion for new trial was denied. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, admission of his statements to police, and the trial court's refusal to strike a juror for cause. The record shows that the evidence was sufficient and that the trial court did not err in admitting Foster's statements. The record also reveals that the trial court's refusal to strike a juror for cause was error. Accordingly, we reverse.
1. Foster challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found Foster guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.1
Viewed in this light, the evidence showed that on March 14, 2000, Officers Frank and Hinson of the DeKalb County Police Department investigated a sport utility vehicle that apparently had crashed into a concrete wall alongside a highway. The vehicle had front-end damage, and steam was coming from the engine. The driver's door was open. The windshield on the driver's side was cracked, apparently from the inside, and there was blood on the cracked area. The passenger door was not open, and there was no damage to the windshield on that side.
No one was at the scene when the officers arrived; however, Frank noticed Foster approximately 100 yards away. Foster walked back to the wrecked vehicle. Frank saw a bleeding gash on Foster's forehead and glass in his hair. He also noticed that Foster had the odor of alcohol on his breath, that Foster had difficulty maintaining his balance, and that Foster had slurred speech. Frank summoned emergency medical assistance. Because he and Hinson were part of a canine unit that was required to remain available for narcotics investigations, he called for a uniform officer to take over the investigation.
Officer Amar of the DeKalb County Police Department responded. She noticed Foster's bleeding cut. At trial, she recounted that while paramedics were bandaging Foster's head, Later, Foster changed his account of the accident and told Amar that he had been the victim of an armed robbery. He claimed that he had been a passenger in the vehicle when he was robbed by four individuals, one of whom had wrecked the vehicle. No evidence was found at the scene to indicate that anyone other than Foster had been present. Amar filed a report about the alleged robbery pursuant to department procedure; however, no arrest had been made at the time of Foster's trial.
Amar noticed that a strong odor of alcoholic beverage emanated from Foster's breath and person, that his speech was slurred, that his eyes were bloodshot, and that he swayed and staggered when he walked. Foster's alco-sensor test registered positive for alcohol. Because Foster had sustained a head injury, no field sobriety tests were administered. Despite the officer's request, Foster never produced a driver's license. Officer Frost of a DUI task force for the DeKalb County Police Department was at the scene during the DUI investigation. He noticed that the tall grass near the vehicle had been "pushed down" on the driver's side, but there was no indication that the grass had been similarly matted on the passenger side or near either of the rear doors. Amar and Frost concluded that based on their observations, Foster was a less safe driver and placed him under arrest. After being read the Implied Consent Notice, Foster refused to submit to a State-administered blood test.
At trial, the State presented evidence that the vehicle belonged to Foster's wife. It introduced evidence of Foster's two prior convictions for DUI. Also, the State presented evidence that Foster had received notice that his license was suspended, and the court announced to the jury that Foster had stipulated that on the date of the incident, his license was suspended.
We find sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found Foster guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of DUI, driving with a suspended license, and failure to maintain lane.2
2. Foster contends that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence his statements to Amar, arguing that he had not been given Miranda warnings when he told her that he had driven the wrecked vehicle. After a Jackson-Denno hearing, the trial court allowed the statements based on its determination that Foster was not in custody when he made them.
Police officers at the scene of a traffic incident may conduct a "general onthe-scene investigation," which may require that persons be temporarily detained, without such being classified as custodial interrogation.3 In determining whether a suspect was in custody for Miranda purposes, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.4 An individual who has not been formally arrested is nevertheless in custody for Miranda purposes only if "a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest."5 A reasonable person has been defined as one neither overly apprehensive because of criminal conduct nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances.6
The evidence adduced at the hearing showed that Foster walked to the scene of the accident on his own volition, that he was not physically restrained by the officers, and that he was not placed in handcuffs or in a patrol car until his arrest. When Amar arrived at the scene, Foster was standing between Frank and Hinson. Amar looked at the gash on Foster's forehead, and then examined the wrecked vehicle for about five or ten minutes. Meanwhile, the summoned emergency help arrived and began treating Foster. Foster made the incriminating statements while he was receiving medical treatment.
We have declined to find that custody existed in cases where suspects' freedom of movement was restricted to a greater degree than was Foster's. For instance, in Morrissette v. State,7 we held that a defendant was not in custody when, after a traffic incident, he was placed in the back of a patrol car to await another officer's arrival and his driver's license had been retained by the police. We determined that a reasonable person would have concluded under such circumstances that the detention was only temporary and not the equivalent of a formal arrest.8 In Turner v. State,9 we concluded that a defendant who was detained in a patrol car for 15 minutes was not in custody. That defendant was placed in the squad car for her own safety while the accident was being cleared. Again, we found that a reasonable person would have concluded that the detention was temporary.10 And in Gunn v. State,11 where the defendant was seated in the back of a patrol car when she was questioned, the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes. There, the defendant was in the patrol car because she had been transported back to the scene of the accident. We determined that a reasonable person would have concluded that the detention was temporary and not the equivalent of a formal arrest. In this case, Foster answered Amar's questions while he was receiving medical attention. Even assuming, arguendo, that Foster was detained while his head was bandaged, we find that a reasonable person in Foster's position would have concluded that the detention was only temporary and not equivalent to a formal arrest.12
Foster's reliance on State v. O'Donnell13 and Hadley v. State14 is misplaced. In O'Donnell, the State stipulated that the defendant had been placed under arrest when the officer questioned him.15 Not only was there no stipulation that Foster was in custody at the time of his statements, but the record shows that Foster had not been arrested at that time.
Likewise, Hadley is distinguishable. There, officers located and detained the defendant, who was their prime suspect and the focus of their arson investigation.16 We recognized that once the officers had confirmed that the defendant was the sought-after suspect, they had probable cause to arrest him. Under the circumstances of that case, we determined that further questioning was nothing more than a thinly veiled effort to solicit inculpatory information and was not aimed at determining the nature of the situation.17 However, in Foster's case, pretermitting whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Foster, under the "reasonable person" test applicable in DUI cases, Foster was not in custody when he gave the incriminating statements as the result of the officer's general on-the-scene investigation.18
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting Foster's statements.
3. Foster argues that the trial court erred in refusing to strike Juror No. 2 for cause.
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Willis v. State
...App. 215, 217 (1), 587 S.E.2d 385 (2003) ; Park v. State, 260 Ga. App. 879, 882 (1), 581 S.E.2d 393 (2003) ; Foster v. State, 258 Ga. App. 601, 609 (3) n.28, 574 S.E.2d 843 (2002) ; Ivey v. State, 258 Ga. App. 587, 593 (2) & n.15, 594 (2), 574 S.E.2d 663 (2002) ; Cannon v. State, 250 Ga. Ap......
-
Wells v. State
...355, 358(2), 629 S.E.2d 197 (2006). 38. See id.; Jones v. State, 258 Ga.App. 229, 230, 573 S.E.2d 470 (2002); Foster v. State, 258 Ga. App. 601, 603-604(2), 574 S.E.2d 843 (2002). 39. See Tennyson v. State, 282 Ga. 92-93(3), 646 S.E.2d 219 (2007) (voluntary, spontaneous outbursts that are n......
-
Axelburg v. State
...State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008). 4. Bass v. State, 282 Ga.App. 159, 160(2), 637 S.E.2d 863 (2006). 5. Foster v. State, 258 Ga.App. 601, 603(2), 574 S.E.2d 843 (2002) (footnote omitted). 6. State v. Wintker, 223 Ga.App. 65, 68, 476 S.E.2d 835 (1996) (citations omitted). 7. 281 Ga.A......
-
Trim v. Shepard, S16A0960
...the trial court "err on the side of caution by dismissing, rather than trying to rehabilitate, biased jurors." Foster v. State, 258 Ga.App. 601, 608 (3), 574 S.E.2d 843 (2002). See also Ashmid v. State, 316 Ga.App. 550, 556 (2), 730 S.E.2d 37 (2012). Consistent with these notions, the appel......
-
Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure - John O. Cole and Bonnie K. Cole
...201 (2002) and Cash v. State, 254 Ga. App. 718, 563 S.E.2d 459 (2002). Id. 327. Naylor, 257 Ga. App. at 900, 522 S.E.2d at 411. 328. 258 Ga. App. 601, 574 S.E.2d 843 (2002). 329. Id. at 608, 574 S.E.2d at 849. 330. Id. 331. Id. at 606, 574 S.E.2d at 848. 332. Id. 333. Id. 334. Id. The judge......
-
Trial practice
...juror had been a resident, is simply irrelevant and improper. Abuse of Discretion for Refusing to Strike Juror In Foster v. State, 574 S.E.2d 843 (Ga.App. 2002), police officers went to the scene of an accident and found an SUV, which had crashed into a cement wall along the highway. The SU......