Foster v. State
| Decision Date | 23 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. S00A1853.,S00A1853. |
| Citation | 273 Ga. 34,537 S.E.2d 659 |
| Parties | FOSTER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Thomas J. O'Donnell, Jr., Sandersville, for appellant.
Richard A. Malone, District Attorney, William S. Askew, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Wylencia H. Monroe, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Clay Foster appeals his conviction for malice murder. For the reasons which follow, we affirm.1
1. The evidence at trial demonstrates that the victim, Tammy Foster, was murdered in her home on September 4, 1996. She had been struck in the head multiple times with a blunt, circular object consistent with the head of a hammer. A hammer with one bent prong, identified as one the victim had borrowed from her grandmother, was found in a wooded area behind her home.
Clay Foster and the victim were divorced in May 1996. At the time of the murder, he owed more than $10,000 to the victim and their son in child support and had recently been informed by a county child support enforcement officer that a contempt action would be filed against him. On the night before the murder, Foster was at the victim's home and caused a disturbance. The day of the murder, witnesses saw the victim and Foster in the front yard of her home at approximately 4:00 p.m. The victim was walking away from Foster and Foster appeared angry. The victim's car was parked at her home at that time. Shortly thereafter, witnesses saw Foster driving the victim's car. Later that evening, the victim was found lying in her bed with her face covered by pillows. Blood stains on the bed and the floor revealed that the body was moved from the edge of the bed to the center of the bed soon after the injuries were sustained. The medical examiner testified that the approximate time of death was 4:30 p.m.
Foster contends the evidence was insufficient to support the murder conviction because the evidence was entirely circumstantial. "To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall... exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused." OCGA § 24-4-6. Questions as to the reasonableness of hypotheses are generally to be decided by the jury which heard the evidence. Where the jury is authorized to find that the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt, that finding will not be disturbed unless the verdict of guilty is insupportable as a matter of law. Robbins v. State, 269 Ga. 500(1), 499 S.E.2d 323 (1998). We find the evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Foster guilty of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could have found that every reasonable hypothesis except Foster's guilt was excluded. See Rushing v. State, 271 Ga. 102(3), 515 S.E.2d 607 (1999).
2. At trial, the State presented expert testimony from a crime scene reconstructionist who testified based on his education and experience that there are specific reasons why a perpetrator might move or cover his victim's body. Foster objects to that portion of the...
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