Foster v. United Airlines, Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 3:19-cv-02530-JD |
| Parties | NATHANIEL FOSTER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
On February 8, 2019, plaintiff Nathaniel Foster Jr. was injured during an assisted deboarding of United Airlines Flight 4193 at Monroe Regional Airport in Monroe, Louisiana. See Dkt. No. 74. Foster was quadriplegic and required a tracheal tube and ventilator to breathe, and a power wheelchair for mobility. See id. at 3. In the course of deplaning Foster's tracheal tube was dislodged, preventing him from breathing for a significant period of time. See id. ¶ 66; Dkt. No. 213 at 3-4. Foster was left in a coma from which he has not awakened. See Dkt. No. 213 at 4.
Foster's mother Pamela, father Nathaniel Sr., and sister Natalie, are also plaintiffs and were with him during the incident.[1] Dkt. No. 74 ¶ 13. Pamela purchased the airline tickets from defendant United Airlines, Inc. (United) after calling discuss accessibility arrangements for her son. See id. ¶¶ 4, 6. The itinerary started with a United flight from San Francisco International Airport in California, the Fosters' home state, to Houston, Texas. See id. ¶ 7. From there, the family boarded a plane operated by defendant ExpressJet Airlines LLC d/b/a United Express (ExpressJet), with Monroe as the destination. See Id. ¶ 20; Dkt. No 143-16. Defendant DAL Global Services, LLC (DGS) provided ground and ramp services for United at around 170 to 180 “stations” across the country, including Monroe Regional Airport. Dkt. No. 143-1 at ECF p. 7.
The Fosters have sued United, ExpressJet, DGS, and United Airlines Holdings, Inc. for: (1) negligence and negligence per se; (2) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; (3) breach of contract; (4) negligent misrepresentation; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dkt. No. 1 (original complaint); Dkt. No. 74 (second amended complaint). United Airlines Holdings was dismissed because the operative complaint did not adequately allege an alter ego claim. Dkt No. 116.
In February and March 2022, the parties filed a raft of summary judgment and Daubert motions. Dkt. Nos. 138, 139 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150. The motions were terminated without prejudice, and the parties were directed to file a joint statement outlining their trial plan, which could include “a short proffer (1) by any party proposing to re-file a summary judgment motion that explains in no more than 2 pages the issue of undisputed fact suitable for summary judgment, and (2) by any party proposing to re-file a Daubert motion that explains in no more than 1 page the reasons for exclusion.” Dkt. No. 193 at 1. The statement also directed the parties to “state each side's understanding of what state law applies to the case, and why.” Id. The parties filed a joint statement with summary judgment and Daubert proffers, Dkt. No. 195, and a status conference was held to discuss these issues, Dkt. No. 205.
After the parties agreed to streamline the case, Dkt. Nos. 210 and 218, the remaining claims are negligence and negligence per se against all defendants, breach of contract against United and ExpressJet, and negligent misrepresentation against United. Four motions, each fully briefed, are now before the Court for disposition. The first is whether California or Louisiana law applies to plaintiffs' claims, to the extent that those states' laws materially differ. Dkt. Nos. 212, 213. The second is plaintiffs' motion to exclude the testimony of aviation expert Daniel Mazzeo. Dkt. No. 222. The third and fourth are two motions for partial summary judgment brought by United. Dkt. Nos. 216, 217.
The partial summary judgment motions will be addressed in a separate order. This order resolves the choice-of-law question, and the admissibility of Mazzeo's testimony. The parties' familiarity with the record is assumed.
“It is well-established that in diversity cases, such as this one, ‘federal courts must apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state.'” Rustico v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 993 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Ledesma v. Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., 816 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also In re Facebook Biometric Privacy Litig., 185 F.Supp.3d 1155, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2016). “As the forum state, California will apply its own law ‘unless a party litigant timely invokes the law of a foreign state.'” Chen v. L.A. Truck Ctrs., LLC, 7 Cal. 5th 862, 868 (2019) (quoting Hurtado v. Superior Ct., 11 Cal.3d 574, 581 (1974)). “[T]he foreign law proponent must identify the applicable rule of law in each potentially concerned state and must show it materially differs from the law of California.” Wash. Mut. Bank, FA v. Superior Ct., 24 Cal.4th 906, 919 (2001). Choice-of-law questions are examined on an issue-by-issue basis.[2] See id. at 920 ().
In this case, the choice-of-law question is whether Louisiana law should determine the availability of punitive damages and the apportionment of liability for compensatory damages, as defendants contend. See Dkt. No. 213.
California courts “have ‘adopted and consistently applied the so-called “governmental interest” analysis as the appropriate general methodology for resolving choice-of-law questions.'” Rustico, 993 F.3d at 1091 (quoting McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 48 Cal.4th 68, 83 (2010)). This analysis entails three steps:
First, the court determines whether the relevant law of each of the potentially affected jurisdictions with regard to the particular issue in question is the same or different. Second, if there is a difference, the court examines each jurisdiction's interest in the application of its own law under the circumstances of the particular case to determine whether a true conflict exists. Third, if the court finds that there is a true conflict, it carefully evaluates and compares the nature and strength of the interest of each jurisdiction in the application of its own law to determine which state's interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state.
Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 39 Cal.4th 95, 107-08 (2006) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Rustico, 993 F.3d at 1091; In re Capacitors Antitrust Litig., No. 17-md-02801-JD, 2020 WL 6462393, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2020). Under this approach, the place of the wrong is not necessarily determinative of the law to be applied. As the California Supreme Court stated in adopting the governmental interest analysis, “when application of the law of the place of the wrong would defeat the interests of the litigants and of the states concerned, we have not applied that law.” Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 554 (1967).
Step one of the choice-of-law analysis is readily satisfied with respect to punitive damages: California allows them in a broader range of circumstances than Louisiana does. “Punitive damages are permissible under California law when there is ‘clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.'” Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., 997 F.3d 941, 971 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a)). In contrast, the “general public policy in Louisiana is against punitive damages.” Stephenson v. Bryce W. Hotard Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 271 So.3d 190, 192 (La. 2019) (per curiam); see also Ross v. Conoco, Inc., 828 So.2d 546, 555 (La. 2002) (same). Louisiana law makes punitive damages “available only where authorized by statute.” Warren v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 233 So.3d 568, 586 (La. 2017); see also La. Civ. Code art. 3546. Neither party contends that this case implicates one of Louisiana's narrow statutory authorizations for punitive damages.
For step two of the choice-of-law analysis, the Court “must determine what interest, if any, California and [Louisiana] have in seeing their respective laws applied to this case.” Rustico, 993 F.3d at 1091. “Only if each jurisdiction involved as a legitimate but conflicting interest in applying its own law will there be a ‘true conflict,' requiring us to move on to step three of the analysis.” Id. (quoting Cooper v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co. Holdings, Inc., 960 F.3d 549, 560 (9th Cir. 2020)).
Both sides agree that California has a legitimate interest in seeing its laws governing punitive and compensatory damages applied to this case. Plaintiffs are residents of California and arranged in California for assistance with boarding and deplaning their United flights. See Dkt. No. 212 at 1-2. California has an obvious interest in business dealings between California residents and commercial enterprises. In addition, Foster, who remains “in a persistent vegetative state,” id. at 2, is being cared for in California, and is subject to a possible lien on a monetary award in this case by the California Department of Health Care Services (DHCS), although there is some indication that DHCS will not pursue a lien, see Dkt. No. 219-1 at ECF p. 1. Overall, as defendants forthrightly acknowledge, “California has an interest in assisting California residents.” Dkt. No. 213 at 11.
The crux of the dispute at step two is whether Louisiana has a “legitimate but conflicting interest” in seeing its punitive damages law applied. Plaintiffs say that Louisiana has no interest in enforcing its punitive damages law because this case is not in a Louisiana court and defendants are not “Louisiana corporations or headquartered” there. Dkt. No. 212 at 4-5. They cite authority for the...
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