Foti v. Holliday

• Decision Date: 30 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2009-C-0093.,2009-C-0093.
• Citation: 27 So.3d 813
• Parties: Charles C. FOTI, Jr., Attorney General for the State of Louisiana v. Sarah HOLLIDAY.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

27 So.3d 813

Charles C. FOTI, Jr., Attorney General for the State of Louisiana v. Sarah HOLLIDAY.

No. 2009-C-0093.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

October 30, 2009.

Rehearing Denied January 29, 2010.

James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, David Alexander Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, for applicant.

Law Offices of Ronald R. Johnson, Ronald R. Johnson, Baton Rouge, for respondent.

GUIDRY, Justice.^*

We granted certiorari in this matter to address the issue raised in the exception of no cause of action subject of these proceedings. The peremptory exception poses the legal question of whether the State of Louisiana may recover reimbursement of salary and benefits paid to a former employee for the period the employee simultaneously held two full-time governmental positions in violation of Louisiana's Dual Officeholding and Dual Employment Law, La. R.S. 42:61, et seq., (hereafter, "DODEL"), when suit was filed after the employee vacated one of her positions. For the reasons that follow, we find reimbursement is barred when the prohibited dual employment is terminated prior to the filing of a petition seeking relief under the DODEL. Accordingly, the court of appeal's ruling reversing the trial court and granting the exception of no cause of action filed by the defendant, Sarah Holliday, is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 17, 2005, Sarah Holliday commenced full-time employment with the United States Small Business Administration's Disaster Assistance Office. At the time, Ms. Holliday was already employed on a full-time basis as a judicial assistant and deputy clerk for the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge (hereafter, "19th JDC"). Ms. Holliday worked simultaneously for both unrelated governmental agencies until February 15, 2006, the date she resigned from her 19th JDC position.

On March 31, 2006, the State of Louisiana, through the Office of the Attorney General, (hereafter, "the State"), instituted summary proceedings against Ms. Holliday pursuant to La. R.S. 42:65 of the DODEL, which provides in pertinent part:

A. The attorney general, a district attorney, or any citizen of the state of Louisiana may by summary process petition for a declaratory judgment against a person alleged to be holding incompatible offices or employments or holding a combination of offices or employments prohibited in this Part....

B. If the court declares that the person is holding offices or employments in violation of this Part, the court shall declare the office with the term first to expire or one of the employments vacant and shall enjoin the person from further carrying out the duties of that office or employment; however, a person holding an elective office shall continue to serve and perform the duties of that office until his successor has qualified.

C. The court may order the reimbursement to the appropriate governmental body of all pay or other compensation and all allowances, including all allowances and payments for travel and other expenses which have been received by the official or employee in the position vacated as provided in Subsection B hereof, during a period of time not to exceed six months preceding the filing of suit for declaratory judgment....

Specifically, through its Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Reimbursement, the State seeks pursuant to Subsection (A) a judgment declaring Ms. Holliday engaged in conduct prohibited under La. R.S. 42:63¹ by virtue of her simultaneous retention of incompatible governmental positions. Based on such a declaration, the State requests under Subsection (C) of La. R.S. 42:65 reimbursement of $16,158.50, representing the salary and related benefits paid in connection with her judicial post for the period of her dual employment.

In addition to filing an answer to the petition denying a violation of the DODEL, Ms. Holliday filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action urging the State is barred from pursuing its suit and obtaining relief under La. R.S. 42:65. Applying a strict interpretation of La. R.S. 42:65, she advances any cause of action the State had under the DODEL became moot when she resigned from her state position. In support, Ms. Holliday contends the statute is couched in language that the wrongdoer must be engaged in the prohibited conduct at the time the litigation is instituted and the declaratory judgment is imposed. She relies on Subsection (A) of the provision, which provides that the State is afforded the right to file "a petition for a declaratory judgment against a person alleged to be holding incompatible offices or employments or holding a combination of offices or employments ..." (emphasis added). As to the issue of reimbursement, Ms. Holliday contends monetary recovery pursuant to Subsection (C) is exclusively conditioned on the judicial declaration imposed under Subsection (B). The latter provision provides for the issuance of an order requiring that one of the offices be vacated and the defendant enjoined from carrying out the related duties "[i]f the court declares that the person is holding offices or employment in violation of this Part ...." (emphasis added).

Following a hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the State overruling the exception of no cause of action. The court concluded Ms. Holliday's simultaneous holding of the incompatible full-time positions giving rise to the instant proceeding was adverse to the public's interest and, thus, prohibited under La. R.S. 42:63(A).² In the absence of citing statutory or jurisprudential support, the court determined it was within its discretion to order reimbursement pursuant to La. R.S. 42:65(C) for the violation. It assessed Ms. Holliday payment of $16,158.60, constituting the salary and related benefits paid during the tenure of her dual employment.³ Subsequently, the court denied Ms. Holliday's request for a new trial.

The court of appeal reversed the trial court and granted Ms. Holliday's peremptory exception. Foti v. Holliday, 08-0055 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/18/08), 4 So.3d 823, reh'g denied (12/15/08). While the court did not contest the trial court's finding that Ms. Holliday's dual employment violated La. R.S. 42:63(A), it applied a strict interpretation of La. R.S. 42:65 to qualify the State's claim was only actionable while Ms. Holliday was engaged in the misconduct. The court reasoned Ms. Holliday's resignation from her judicial position prior to the filing of the State's petition precluded the commencement of proceedings under Subsection (A) of La. R.S. 42:65 because she was no longer simultaneously "holding" the employment positions prohibited under the DODEL. Further, the court of appeal recognized, in the absence of an action properly commenced under Subsection (A), relief could not be rendered through the issuance of a judicial declaration directing the termination of the dual employment and reimbursement pursuant to Sections (B) and (C), respectively. Based on its reasoning, the court of appeal determined the State failed to articulate a cause of action under La. R.S. 42:65 because the petition did not allege Ms. Holliday was holding offices or employments prohibited by the DODEL at the time suit was filed. The State filed an application for rehearing, which was denied by the appellate court.

We granted certiorari to review the correctness of the court of appeal's ruling reversing the district court's denial of the exception of no cause of action. Foti v. Holliday, 09-0093 (La.4/3/09), 6 So.3d 779. The Court has no objection to the lower courts' conclusions that Ms. Holliday's dual employment subject of these proceedings is violative of La. R.S. 42:63. Our review is premised on the narrow issue of whether the State has a viable cause of action for reimbursement under La. R.S. 42:65(C) when the prohibited conduct was terminated prior to the filing of the petition under the DODEL.

APPLICABLE LAW

Exception of No Cause of Action

The peremptory exception of no cause of action is designed to test the legal sufficiency of a petition by determining whether a party is afforded a remedy in law based on the facts alleged in the pleading. La. C.C.P. arts. 681 and 927; Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., et al., 616 So.2d 1234, 1235 (La.1993). All well-pleaded allegations of fact are accepted as true and correct, and all doubts are resolved in favor of sufficiency of the petition so as to afford litigants their day in court. La. C.C.P. art. 865; Kuebler v. Martin, 578 So.2d 113, 114 (La.1991). The burden of demonstrating that a petition fails to state a cause of action is upon the mover. Ramey v. DeCaire, 09-1299, p. 7 (La.3/19/04), 869 So.2d 114, 119.

The sufficiency of a petition subject of an exception of no cause of action is a question of law. Fink v. Bryant, 01-0987, p. 4 (La.11/28/01), 801 So.2d 346, 349. We are mindful that a de novo standard is applied to the review of legal questions, wherein this Court renders a judgment based on the record without deference to the legal conclusions of the lower courts. Cleco Evangeline, LLC v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 01-2162, p. 3 (La.4/3/02), 813 So.2d 351, 353.

Statutory Construction

In addressing the sufficiency of the State's petition, we must examine whether any statutory remedy is afforded to the State under the DODEL for Ms. Holliday's prohibited conduct. This inquiry turns on the proper interpretation of La. R.S. 42:65, which also involves a question of law. Id.

"[T]he paramount consideration in statutory construction is ascertainment of the legislative intent and the reason or reasons which prompted the Legislature to enact the law." M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371, p. 13 (La.7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 27, citing State v. Johnson, 03-2993, p. 12 (La.10/19/04), 884 So.2d 568, 575. It is well established that "[t]he starting point for the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself." Dejoie v....