Stermer v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.
| Decision Date | 24 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15–811.,15–811. |
| Citation | 186 So.3d 319 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
| Parties | Adrienne STERMER v. ARCHER–DANIELS–MIDLAND COMPANY, et al. |
Georges M. Legrand, Adam P. Sanderson, Mouledoux, Bland, Legrand & Brackett LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants–Appellants, American River Transportation Co., Agrinational Insurance Company.
Lawrence N. Curtis, Lawrence N. Curtis, LTD., A Professional Law Corporation, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff–Appellee, Adrienne Stermer.
Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, and JOHN E. CONERY, Judges.
, Judge.
Employer appeals the trial court's award of $309,174 in attorney fees to plaintiff's attorney for work performed to secure payment of maintenance and cure to his client. In answer to appeal, employee claims attorney fees for work done on the trial on remand and on this appeal, requests ninety percent of the court costs on remand be assessed to defendant, asks for additional court costs not awarded by the trial court on remand to be assessed, and prays he be awarded attorney fees for work done on this appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment in its entirety, award $10,000 in attorney fees to employee for work done on appeal, and assess all costs of this appeal to employer.
Adrienne Stermer sued her employer, ARTCO, its insurer, Agrinational Insurance Company, and Archer–Daniels–Midland Company, owner of the M/V COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE and ARTCO's parent company (hereinafter referred to collectively as "ARTCO"), alleging that she was a seaman injured through the negligence of her employer on October 9, 2007, while working in the service of the M/V COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE, and that she was entitled to damages under the Jones Act. Ms. Stermer further alleged that the vessel was unseaworthy, that she was improperly dismissed, and that her dismissal constituted a retaliatory discharge by ARTCO. She further claimed that ARTCO unreasonably refused to pay her maintenance and cure after she was injured, and that she was thereby entitled to punitive damages and attorney fees. ARTCO rigorously defended the suit and, from the beginning, took the position that the claim was fraudulent and that Ms. Stermer did not sustain an injury while in the service of the vessel. Following a hotly contested bench trial, the trial court made the following awards on the Jones Act claim:
| Loss of past employee benefits | $ 25,740 |
| Loss of future employee benefits | $ 73,922 |
| Loss of past wages | $133,054 |
| Loss of future wages | $204,231 |
| Past pain and suffering | $100,000 |
| Future pain and suffering | $100,000 |
In thorough written reasons for judgment, the trial court also determined that ARTCO's refusal to pay Ms. Stermer maintenance and cure for two and one-half years following her injury was arbitrary and capricious and awarded her $300,000 in punitive damages and $150,000 in attorney fees. It dismissed her claims of unseaworthiness and retaliatory discharge, finding she did not prove those claims.
On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the Jones Act claim and its determination that Ms. Stermer was entitled to $300,000 in punitive damages for ARTCO's arbitrary and capricious failure to pay maintenance and cure. The original panel also affirmed the trial court's finding that Ms. Stermer was entitled to attorney fees for arbitrary and capricious failure to pay maintenance and cure, but reversed the award of $150,000 in attorney fees, as no analysis was made by the trial court as to how it arrived at the amount awarded. The original panel remanded the matter "for the trial court to consider the traditional factors pertinent to an award of attorney fees and determine the appropriate amount of attorney fees for work performed by Ms. Stermer's counsel in the trial court." The original panel awarded Ms. Stermer $10,000 in attorney fees for work performed by her attorneys on the original appeal, plus all costs of that appeal. Stermer v. Archer–Daniels–Midland Co., 14–147 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/4/14), 140 So.3d 879
. ARTCO filed a writ application with the supreme court which was denied. Stermer, 14–1434 (La.10/24/14), 151 So.3d 603. Except for the amount of attorney fees owed, that judgment is now final.
On remand, the trial court1 awarded Ms. Stermer $309,174 in attorney fees and court costs in the amount of $1,037.15, plus "all court costs assessed against [Ms. Stermer] by the Clerk of Court, subject to a credit for those costs already reimbursed or paid by [ARTCO]." ARTCO appealed the trial court's award, and Ms. Stermer answered the appeal.
ARTCO assigns two errors with the trial court's judgment:
Ms. Stermer answered the appeal and requests that we modify and amend the trial court's judgment as follows:
We review the factual conclusions of the trial court's judgment in this matter pursuant to the manifest error standard of review. Menard v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 09–1869 (La.3/16/10), 31 So.3d 996
. In Menard, the supreme court restated the importance of this doctrine explaining: Id. at 1011
. The court noted:
More recently in Hayes Fund For The Frist United Methodist Church of Welsh, LLC v. Kerr–McGee Rocky Mountain, LLC, 14–2592 (La.12/08/15), ––– So.3d ––––, the supreme court reiterated the duty of appellate courts in a manifest error review and stated in pertinent part:
In all civil cases, the appropriate standard for appellate review of factual determinations is the manifest error-clearly wrong standard, which precludes the setting aside of a trial court's finding of fact unless that finding is clearly wrong in light of the record reviewed in its entirety. Cenac v. Public Access Water Rights Ass'n, 02–2660, p. 9 (La.6/27/03), 851 So.2d 1006, 1023
. Thus, a reviewing court may not merely decide if it would have found the facts of the case differently. Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., 03–1734, p. 9 (La.4/14/04), 874 So.2d 90, 98. Rather in reversing a trial court's factual conclusions with regard to causation, the appellate court must satisfy a two-step process based on the record as a whole: there must be no reasonable factual basis for the trial court's conclusion, and the finding must be clearly wrong. Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993).
This test requires a reviewing court to do more than simply review the record for some evidence, which supports or controverts the trial court's findings. The court must review the entire record to determine whether the trial court's finding was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Parish Nat. Bank v. Ott, 02–1562, pp. 7–8 (La.2/25/03), 841 So.2d 749, 753–54. The issue to be resolved on review is not whether the judge or jury was right or wrong, but whether the judge's or jury's factfinding conclusion was a reasonable one. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989) ; Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716, 724 (La.1973).
–.
Errors of law, however, are reviewed de novo. See Foti v. Holliday, 09–93 (La.10/30/09), 27 So.3d 813
. Accordingly, when reviewing an issue of law, we "render[ ] judgment based on the record without deference to the legal conclusions of the lower courts." Id. at 817.
An award of attorney fees for an employer's failure to pay maintenance and cure is appropriate only when an employer's failure or refusal to pay maintenance and cure is found to be "callous and recalcitrant, arbitrary and capricious, or willful, callous and persistent." Morales v. Garijak, Inc., 829 F.2d 1355, 1358 (5th Cir.1987)
(abrogated on other grounds by Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc)). The trial court so found, a panel of this court affirmed that finding on original appeal, Stermer, 140 So.3d 879, and that issue is now res judicata. See La.R.S. 13:4231.
However, ARTCO argued to the trial court, as it does here, that when it paid all the maintenance and cure owed Ms. Stermer on April 19, 2010, "under protest," and kept those payments current, her claim for attorney fees was limited to the time period preceding the date of its "payment under protest." It now asserts that the trial court's award for work performed by Ms. Stermer's attorney after that date constitutes an error of law. We disagree and hold that the attorney fees award was set pursuant to a limited remand and was decided in well-articulated factual findings by the trial court which must be reviewed using the manifest error standard. See Hayes, –––So.3d –––
–.
Pursuant to our remand order, the...
To continue reading
Request your trial