Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler

• Decision Date: 25 February 1927
• Docket Number: No. 24535.,24535.
• Citation: 199 Ind. 95,155 N.E. 465
• Parties: FOUNTAIN PARK CO. v. HENSLER et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

199 Ind. 95

155 N.E. 465

FOUNTAIN PARK CO.

v.HENSLER et al.

No. 24535.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 25, 1927.

Appeal from Jasper Circuit Court; George A. Williams, Judge.

Action by the Fountain Park Company to take by eminent domain the land of Christian Hensler, who filed objections. Upon the death of Christian Hensler a supplemental complaint was filed against George Hensler and others. From a judgment sustaining the objections, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.Hanley & Hanley, of Rensselaer, and Fraser & Isham, of Fowler, for appellant.

Gaylord & Sills, of Lafayette, for appellees.

MARTIN, J.

The General Assembly, on March 2, 1923, passed the following act:

“That any voluntary association organized and incorporated for the purpose of establishing, conducting and maintaining a religious chautauqua or assembly, which has had a continuous legal existence for a period of not less than fifteen years, during all of which period of time such voluntary association has held, operated and conducted a religious chautauqua or assembly, giving an annual program covering a period of not less than sixteen days during each year, and has held a lease on a tract of timber land for a period of not less than fifteen years, is hereby endowed with the right of eminent domain insofar as the same may be necessary for the purpose of acquiring possession in the corporate name of such voluntary association of the tract of land on which such voluntary association holds a lease and on which the religious chautauqua or assembly operated and conducted by such voluntary association is held, not exceeding forty acres in area. Any voluntary association which, by the provisions of this act, is endowed with and authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain for the purpose hereinbefore prescribed, shall proceed in compliance with the provisions of an act entitled ‘An act concerning proceedings in the exercise of eminent domain,’ approved February 27, 1905.” Acts 1923, c. 57, p. 172 (section 4903, Burns' § 1926).

On August 22, 1923, the appellant, a corporation organized under the general incorporation laws of this state, brought this action to take and hold, by the right of eminent domain, 29.87 acres of land in Jasper county. The complaint sets out facts that bring appellant within each of the qualifying provisions of the law, describes the tract of wood or timber land which it holds under a lease and seeks to condemn, alleges that it cannot agree with the owner on a price and asks for the appointment of appraiser, etc., in accordance with the act providing for the procedure in eminent domain cases.

Christian Hensler, the owner, filed objections in writing setting forth grounds or reasons why the prayer of the complaint should be denied. Upon the death of Christian Hensler, appellant filed its supplemental complaint making his heirs at law and the administrator of his estate parties defendant. The appellees, who are the defendants substituted for the deceased owner of the land, refiled the objections, and by agreement of the parties and on order of court, the objections were made to apply to the supplemental complaint as well as to the original complaint as amended. The trial court, being of the opinion that the objections were well taken, sustained the same and, as the plaintiff refused to plead further, pronounced a judgment for defendant at plaintiff's costs. The appellant assigns as error the action of the court in sustaining the objections.

Two principal propositions were presented by the objections with relation to the constitutional validity of the act of 1923 upon which this proceeding is founded: First, that the act is void because the attempted classification of chautauqua companies therein is arbitrary and not founded upon any reasonable basis, and constitutes that sort of “class legislation” which is forbidden by both the state and federal constitutions; and, second, that the act is void because it attempts to confer the power of eminent domain upon a private corporation to take private property for purposes which do not constitute a public use.

[1] The provisions of the federal and state Constitutions by which the validity of the classification feature of the act will be measured are as follows:

“*** No state shall make or enforce any law which shall *** deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U. S. Const., Amendment 14, § 1.

“The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Indiana Const. art. 1; Bill of Rights, § 23 (section 75, Burns' 1926).

“The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases. ***” Indiana Const. art. 4, § 22 (section 125, Burns' 1926).

“In all cases enumerated in the preceding section, and in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general, and of uniform operation throughout the state.” Indiana Const. art. 4, § 23 (section 126, Burns' 1926).

The basis of classification of companies to which the power of eminent domain is granted as set forth in the act under consideration is as follows:

(1) It must be a voluntary association.

(2) It must be organized and incorporated for the purpose of establishing, conducting and maintaining a religious chautauqua or assembly.

(3) It must have had a continuous legal existence for a period of not less than 15 years.

(4) It must have held, operated and conducted a religious chautauqua or assembly during all of said 15-year period.

(5) It must have given an annual program during all of said 15-year period.

(6) Its annual program must have covered a period of not less than 16 days during each of the 15 years.

(7) It must have held a lease on land.

(8) Its lease must have been on a tract of timber land.

(9) It must have held the lease for a period of not less than 15 years.

And the property which it is authorized to take under the act is as follows:

(10) The tract of land must be one on which the voluntary association holds a lease.

(11) The tract of land must be one on which the religious chautauqua or assembly operated by such voluntary association is held.

(12) The tract must not exceed 40 acres in area.

The appellant contends that “by this act a natural and reasonable classification is made of chautauqua societies for legislative purposes”; that the act applies to all that are in the class of appellant; and that the class consists of those chautauquas which have been proved to be permanent and past the experimental stage by having had a corporate existence and continuous record of service for 15 years, and being substantial in that they devote 16 days each year to the enlightenment of the people, and permanent by abiding in one place for the 15-year period. It contends that the classification of the land is natural, reasonable, and inherent in the nature of the thing-no tract greater than 40 acres, no land which at the time is in other use by the owner, and only woodland long occupied by the chautauqua society under a lease.

The appellee maintains that the classification attempted in the act is nothing more than an arbitrary selection, is not based upon any principle of public policy or upon any differences which have a natural, reasonable and just relation to chautauqua companies; that it is essential that the reason for the classification must inhere in the subject-matter and rest upon some reason which is natural and substantial and not artificial, and that by the many arbitrary qualifications prescribed all voluntary associations except the appellant company are excluded from the operation of the act.

[2] The question of classification is primarily for the Legislature and does not become a judicial question unless it clearly appears that the legislative classification is not based on substantial distinctions with reference to the subject-matter, or is manifestly unjust or unreasonable. Denny v. City of Muncie, 197 Ind. 28, 149 N. E. 639;Koplovitz v. Jensen, 197 Ind. 475, 151 N. E. 390;Maercker v. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 324, 139 N. W. 199, L. R. A. 1915F, 1196, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 199.

[3] In determining the legality of classifications, the subject to be regulated, the character, extent and purpose of the regulation, the classes of persons or corporations legally and naturally affected by the regulation should all be considered. One of the essential requirements in order that the classification may not violate the constitutional guaranty as to equal protection of the laws is that it must be reasonable and natural and not capricious or arbitrary. 12 C. J. 1128-1130; 6 R. C. L. 373-386, and cases cited.

The law requires something more than a mere designation of characteristics which will serve to divide into groups. Arbitrary selection or mere identification cannot be justified by calling it classification. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17 S. Ct. 255, 41 L. Ed. 666;Rosencranz v. City of Evansville, 194 Ind. 499, 143 N. E. 593;McKinster v. Sager, 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854, 68 L. R. A. 273, 106 Am. St. Rep. 268. The characteristics which can serve as a basis of a valid classification must be such as to show an inherent difference in situation and subject-matter of the subjects placed in different classes which peculiarly requires and necessitates different or exclusive legislation with respect to them. Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, 168 Ind. 671, 80 N. E. 529, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 418;Selvage v. Talbott, 175 Ind. 648, 95 N. E. 114, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 973, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 724;Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen, 177 Ind. 1, 97 N. E. 1, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 708;Dixon v. Poe, 159 Ind. 492, 65 N. E. 518, 60 L. R. A. 308, 95 Am. St. Rep. 309;Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97, 23 S. Ct. 272, 47 L. Ed. 400; Alexander v. Elizabeth, 56 N. J. Law, 71, 28 A. 51, 23 L. R. A, 525;State v. Ramsey County, 48 Minn. 236, 51 N. W....