Tinder v. Clarke Auto Co., 29611

• Decision Date: 30 April 1958
• Docket Number: No. 29611,29611
• Citation: 149 N.E.2d 808,238 Ind. 302
• Parties: John TINDER, as Prosecuting Attorney of the 19th Judicial Circuit, Robert O'Neal, as Sheriff of Marion County, Frank Mueller, as Chief of Police of the City of Indianapolis, and Automobile Dealers' Association of Indiana, Inc., Appellants, v. CLARKE AUTO CO., Inc., on Behalf of Itself and Others Similarly Situated, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 808

149 N.E.2d 808

238 Ind. 302

John TINDER, as Prosecuting Attorney of the 19th Judicial Circuit, Robert O'Neal, as Sheriff of Marion County, Frank Mueller, as Chief of Police of the City of Indianapolis, and Automobile Dealers' Association of Indiana, Inc., Appellants, v. CLARKE AUTO CO., Inc., on Behalf of Itself and Others Similarly Situated, Appellee.

No. 29611.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 30, 1958.

Rehearing Denied June 3, 1958.

Asa J. Smith, Indianapolis, for John Tinder, as Prosecuting Atty. for 19th Judicial Circuit of State of Indiana.

Andrew Jacobs, Indianapolis, for Robert O'Neal, Sheriff of Marion County.

Michael B. Reddington, Indianapolis, for Frank Mueller as Chief of Police of City of Indianapolis.

Alan W. Boyd, Indianapolis, for Automobile Dealers Assn. of Indiana, Inc.

Barnes, Hickam, Pantzer & Boyd, Indianapolis, of counsel, for appellants.

John A. Carson, Indianapolis, for appellee.

ACHOR, Judge.

This action was brought by appellee on behalf of himself and all other motor vehicle dealers similarly situated to enjoin the appellants from enforcing the provisions of Chapter 222, § 2, p. 490, Acts 1957 (being § 10-4305, Burns' 1957 Supp.). The law subjects motor vehicle dealers who engage in the business of buying, selling and/or exchanging motor vehicles at retail on Sunday to fines and/or imprisonment ¹ greater than that imposed upon this and other businesses which are made unlawful by the general Sunday closing law. ²

The injunction was asked for on the ground that the classification of the act which imposed a greater penalty on the class was 'wholly arbitrary and unreasonable,' and therefore unconstitutional, in violation of Article 1, § 23, and Article 4, § § 22 and 23 of the Indiana Constitution. ³ The injunction was granted, as prayed. The error assigned is that the court erred in granting the temporary injunction and the only issue presented thereunder is whether the act violates the above referred to provisions of the Indiana Constitution. ⁴ We will therefore consider only these issues as presented by the litigants in the record before us.

It is not disputed that each of the foregoing provisions permit reasonable classification. The legal principles which govern the validity of classifications within the limitation of the above constitutional provisions have long been settled. In the case of State v. Griffin, 1948, 226 Ind. 279, at pages 285, 287, 288, 290-291, 79 N.E.2d 537, 541, this court considered and upheld the validity of a statute making it a crime for males, but not females, to visit gambling houses. In that case, as in this, it was contended that the statute violated each of the three constitutional provisions referred to above. In sustaining the statute this court considered said three constitutional provisions as related to the particular classification.

This court first considered Article 1, § 23, supra:

"The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges, or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens."

With respect to this provision the court reasoned as follows:

'In the matter of the classification of objects for the purpose of legislation, the rules have been well stated thus: '* * * It is, of course, competent for the legislature to classify objects of legislation. It has a large discretion in this regard, and if the classification is reasonable, not artificial or arbitrary, and rests upon some substantial difference of situation or circumstances indicating the necessity of propriety of legislation restricted to the class created, it will be upheld. It must have regard to the character of the legislation and the distinctions must bear a proper relation to the classification. * * * However, if these fundamental requirements are present, it has been said that classification need not be scientific, consistent, logical or exact. It is not necessary that the reason for the classification should appear on the face of the legislation. In determining the propriety of the classification the court may resort to facts that are within its judicial knowledge, contemporaneous conditions and situations of peoples, existing state policies, and matters of common knowledge.' 59 C.J. Statutes § 319, pages 732, 733.

'See also Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 1927, 199 Ind. 95, 101, 155 N.E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Sarlls, City Clerk v. State ex rel., 1929, 201 Ind. 88, 104, 166 N.E. 270, 67 A.L.R. 718; Long v. State, 1910, 175 Ind. 17, 92 N.E. 653. * * *

'Any classification that may be made, necessarily is arbitrary. The most that can be said is that some may be more arbitrary than others. Horack's Sutherland Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) § 2106--quoted in Perry Twp. of Marion County v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., supra, 224 Ind. at page 68, 64 N.E.2d , at page 300. (Our italics.)

'The desirability, or need for legislation is entirely for the legislature to determine. The question of its wisdom in adopting a classification is a matter of no concern to the courts. The courts may determine only whether the classification is founded on substantial distinctions in the subject matter, or is so manifestly unjust and unreasonable as to destroy the lawful use of property. Koplovitz v. Jensen, 1926, 197 Ind. 475, 487, 151 N.E. 390; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, 1907, 168 Ind. 671, 674, 80 N.E. 529, 14 L.R.A.,N.S., 418. (Our italics.)

* * *

* * *

'* * * The section complained of is but an implementation of the police power of the state, to guard the morals of the citizens, and to forbid any one from visiting such places of iniquity. In such matters the legislature has a large discretion. It may determine when such legislation is needed and the means necessary to accomplish the intended purpose. * * * The exercise of a purely police power, when applied alike to all who may be affected in its exercise cannot violate Sec. 23, art. 1 of the Indiana Constitution. * * *'

This court next considered Article 4, § 22, supra:

"The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws, in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: * * * (2) for the punishment of crimes or misdemeanors * * *."

With regard to that provision this court stated:

'This section of the Constitution is not violated by the involved act, because it applies to all who come within its provisions, generally and without exceptions, and it rests upon an inherent and substantial basis of classification. 'A law which applies generally to a particular class of cases is not local or special. The Constitution does not require that the operation of a law shall be uniform, other than that its operation shall be the same in all parts of the state under the same circumstances.' Sarlls, City Clerk v. State ex rel., supra, 201 Ind. [at] page 104, 166 N.E. at page 276, 67 A.L.R. 718; Saraceno v. State, 1931, 202 Ind. 663, 666, 177 N.E. 436.' (Our italics.)

Finally the court considered Article 4, § 23, supra:

"In all the cases enumerated in the preceding Section, and in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general, and of uniform operation throughout the State."

With regard to this provision the court merely stated:

'What we have said above applies to the contention that the statute involved violates § 23 of art. 4 of the Constitution of Indiana, * * *'.

Furthermore, it is a matter of common knowledge that, with regard to other offenses, the legislature has enacted many 'special laws' which have imposed greatly varied penalties 'for the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors' (Art. 4, § 22, supra) within certain other general classifications of crime, depending upon the type of each particular offense.

For example, there are no less than 16 distinct penalties provided for the general crime of embezzlement, with penalties which vary from a $1.00 fine to imprisonment for a period of 21 years. §§ 10-1701 to 10-1717, Burns' 1956 Repl. There are no less than nine distinct penalties for the general crime of burglary, with penalties which vary from 10 days imprisonment to imprisonment for 10 to 21 years. §§ 10-701 to 10-706. There are no less then eight distinct penalties provided for the general crime of arson, with penalties which vary from a $5.00 fine to imprisonment for two to twenty-one years. §§ 10-301 to 10-308.

From the foregoing discussion, it appears that the issue of whether a particular classification rests upon an inherent and substantial basis is basically the same under each of the three constitutional provisions herein claimed to be violated.

Furthermore, in determining whether such classification rests upon a substantial basis inherent to the subject-matter, or is purely arbitrary, this court is committed to the following well established rules. (1) The making of classifications in the exercise of the police power is a matter of public policy, and therefore in the first instance it is the province of the legislature to determine what classifications are reasonable in view of the purpose to be accomplished. This court may not substitute its judgment on such question for that of the legislature, unless the classification is so manifestly arbitrary as to leave no room for reasonable minds to differ on the subject. State v. Griffin, supra, 226 Ind. 279, 79 N.E.2d 537; Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. State, 1919, 188 Ind. 173, 181, 122 N.E. 584; Bolivar Tp., Board of Finance of Benton County v. Hawkins, 1934, 207 Ind. 171, 181, 191 N.E. 158, 96 A.L.R. 271; Baldwin v. State, 1924, 194 Ind. 303, 141 N.E. 343; Bally v. Guilford Township School Corp., 1954, 234 Ind. 273, 126 N.E.2d 13. (2) The classification may be distinguished (a) by the extent of the injurious effect considered to exist within the general class. Therefore, where the class affects an unusually large number of people adversely to the purpose of the law, or (b) where the nature of the particular business is such as to...