Fout v. State
| Decision Date | 18 August 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 50A05-9207-CR-00236,50A05-9207-CR-00236 |
| Citation | 619 N.E.2d 311 |
| Parties | Karrie FOUT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Tom A. Black, Plymouth, for appellant-defendant.
Pamela Carter, Atty. Gen., Louis E. Ransdell, Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee-plaintiff.
Karrie Fout appeals her conviction of the crime of neglect of a dependent, a class B felony. We reverse and need address only the following issue Was the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and judgment of the trial court?
This case arose out of the death of Karrie's less than one day old daughter Lela Rebecca. Lela died as a result of Group B Beta Hemolytic Streptococcus septicemia which she contracted while in utero. The infection followed the premature breaking of Karrie Fout's water some eleven days before Lela's birth.
While she was pregnant with Lela, Karrie and her husband decided that they wanted to deliver the baby in their home. They attended five sessions of a six session home delivery class taught by Roxanne Parker, a registered nurse. Before she admitted the Fouts into her class, Parker examined Karrie Fout and asked her to complete a medical questionnaire. On the basis of the examination and the medical questionnaire, Parker determined that Karrie's pregnancy was low risk and admitted the Fouts into the class.
On November 20, 1989, approximately five weeks before her due date, Karrie's water broke and she called Parker for advice. Parker told Karrie that she should seek medical attention from a doctor because the baby was not full term and the pregnancy was now high risk. Because Karrie had not consulted a doctor throughout the course of the pregnancy and apparently did not have a family doctor, Parker arranged for her to see a doctor of Parker's acquaintance named Cynthia Heckman-Davis.
Karrie did not go to see the doctor until November 25, five days after her water broke. The doctor examined Karrie and confirmed that her water had broken. In addition, the doctor determined that some amniotic fluid remained in Karrie's vaginal vault. Because of the danger that the remaining fluid could host a bacterial infection, the doctor took samples of the fluid in order to have them cultured for bacteria. Karrie was informed of the possibility that she had a bacterial infection in her reproductive tract.
Lela Fout was born on December 1. She would not breast feed after her birth, and, in the short period of time from her birth to her death, the only sustenance she could take was a very small amount of warm water. Approximately twenty-four hours after her birth, Richard Fout noticed that Lela had died. The Fouts did not seek medical attention for Lela at any time from her birth until her death.
On December 2, Richard Fout attempted to procure a casket from a local funeral home in order to bury Lela. The funeral home director informed the coroner, who instructed the funeral home director to have Richard Fout return to his home. The coroner then proceeded to the Fout residence. When the coroner arrived at the Fout home, Richard Fout told him that Lela's body was in the refrigerator. In the refrigerator, the coroner found the body in a plastic bag and the placenta in a stainless steel bowl. He removed both for forensic examination.
The pathologist conducted an examination of the placenta and found visual evidence suggesting a bacterial infection. He then conducted an autopsy on Lela's body. He discovered a subarachnoid hemorrhage and determined that the hemorrhage was caused by the bacterial infection. The pathologist determined that the bacterial infection caused Lela's death.
Karrie challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict and judgment of the trial court. When we review the evidence supporting a conviction, we may neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Washington v. State (1982), Ind., 441 N.E.2d 1355, 1358. Where the evidence is in conflict, we are bound to view only that evidence which is most favorable to the verdict and judgment of the trial court. Id. If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, we must affirm. Hutchinson v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 850.
We have reviewed the record, and we find insufficient evidence to support the verdict and judgment. In order to meet its burden of proving neglect as charged in the information, the state had to introduce evidence showing that Karrie: 1) had the care of a dependent (Lela); and 2) knowingly or intentionally; 3) placed Lela in a situation that endangered her life by failing to obtain proper medical care; 4) which failure resulted in serious bodily injury (Lela's death). (Record, p. 12); Ind. Code Sec. 35-46-1-4. This court previously has held, "A person knowingly commits neglect of a child when [the person] is 'subjectively aware of a high probability that [the person] placed the dependent in a dangerous situation.' " Hill v. State (1989), Ind.App., 535 N.E.2d 153, 154 (quoting Ware v. State (1982), Ind.App., 441 N.E.2d 20, 23); see also Fout v. State (1991), Ind.App., 575 N.E.2d 340, 342.
The state's evidence showed that Karrie was Lela's mother making Lela Karrie's dependent. The state argues that it also presented evidence, in the form of the temperature chart, which gave rise to the reasonable inference that Karrie knew that Lela had a streptococcal infection. Other evidence showed that Karrie was aware before Lela was born that the pregnancy had become high risk because Lela was in the breech position and because of the premature breaking of Karrie's water. Additional evidence showed that Doctor Heckman-Davis had recommended that Karrie go to the hospital for a sonogram after her water broke, but that Karrie did not comply with these instructions.
Our further review of the record reveals a piece of...
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