Fowkes v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company
Decision Date | 10 March 1959 |
Docket Number | No. 12680.,12680. |
Parties | Charles C. FOWKES v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Bruce R. Martin, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Pringle, Bredin & Martin, Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for petitioner.
Samuel H. Stewart, Philadelphia, Pa. (Robert C. Duffy, Philadelphia, Pa., Norman P. Wolken, Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before GOODRICH, STALEY and HASTIE, Circuit Judges.
The sole question on this appeal from a money judgment in a Federal Employers' Liability Act case is whether the court erred in its disposition of a question concerning the statute of limitations.
At the trial the defendant offered no evidence after the completion of the plaintiff's case in chief. Judgment was for the plaintiff pursuant to a jury's answers to special interrogatories. In an opinion denying a motion for a new trial the court correctly summarized the uncontradicted evidence pertinent to the statute of limitations as follows:
This action was filed August 31, 1955. The applicable statute of limitations reads: "No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the day the cause of action accrued." 45 U.S.C.A. § 56. Thus, plaintiff's action was timely only if the evidence justified or required a conclusion that this "cause of action accrued" on or after August 31, 1952. It is not disputed that, in drilling with a heavy hammer plaintiff, as the court put it, "continued to experience the regular jolts a number of times daily until September 9, 1952" when he was assigned to new and lighter duties. It is also undisputed that the jolting in question caused "intermittent pain for about two years before September, 1952."
The court, relying upon Urie v. Thompson, 1949, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282, and similar occupational disease cases, reasoned that the statute did not begin to run until plaintiff became aware that an arthritic condition was being or had been developed in his shoulder and back. So the jury was asked: "Did the plaintiff, Charles Fowkes, know or should he have known on or before August 31, 1952, that the physical condition for which he now claims damages existed?" The jury answered, "no", and on that basis the court ruled that the action was timely. Challenging the court's reasoning, the appellant insists that the cause of action necessarily accrued during that extended period prior to August 31, 1952 during which plaintiff was suffering damaging jolts and experiencing pain therefrom. At most, appellant reasons, the present action is a timely claim for such aggravation of injury as may have been caused by jolting experienced during the nine day period from August 31, 1952 until the September 9, 1952 termination of injurious work.
The artificiality of this last suggestion points up the conceptual difficulty and the practical problem of applying a statute of limitations phrased in terms of the accrual date of a cause of action to this type of injury. As the Supreme Court pointed out in an early F.E.L.A. case:
"We do not think it is possible to assign to the word `accrued\' any definite technical meaning which by itself would enable us to say whether the statutory period begins to run at one time or the other; but the uncertainty is removed when the word is interpreted in the light of the general purposes of the statute and of its other provisions, and with due regard to those practical ends which are to be served by any limitation of the time within which an action must be brought." Reading Co. v. Koons, 1926, 271 U.S. 58, 61-62, 46 S.Ct....
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