Fowler v. Block, CV-97-2098-WJR (EX).
| Citation | 2 F.Supp.2d 1268 |
| Decision Date | 15 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-97-2098-WJR (EX).,CV-97-2098-WJR (EX). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | A. FOWLER, Plaintiff, v. Sherman BLOCK, et al., Defendants. |
Stephen Yagman, Marion Yagman, Yagman & Yagman, P.C., Venice, CA, for Plaintiff.
Scott D. MacLatchie, Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, A Professional Corporation, Pasadena, CA, Kevin C. Brazile, Principal Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.
AMENDED ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S DENIAL OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY TO SHERMAN BLOCK AND DENYING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY TO THE DEPUTY DEFENDANTS
The instant matter arises from Plaintiff's claim that he was deprived of his constitutional rights when he was "over-detained" by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was acquitted on January 3, 1997 of certain criminal charges in a state court proceeding and then returned to the County Jail and held in custody without proper legal cause until January 5, 1997. (Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 10.) The gravamen of Plaintiff's claim is that such "over-detention" violated his Fourth Amendment rights since there was no probable cause to "rearrest" him after acquittal, and his Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law. In contravention, Defendants argue that such "over-detention" is not a constitutional violation, but rather, a necessary step in performing the required administrative discharge of an incarcerated person.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 1, 1997, naming as Defendants the County of Los Angeles, Sheriff Sherman Block, and Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Michael Antonovich, Deana Dana, Don Knabe, Yvonne Burke, Gloria Molina, and Zev Yaroslavsky. All individual Defendants were named in both their official and individual capacities.
On June 19, 1997, the Court dismissed Supervisors Antonovich, Dana, Knabe, Burke, Molina, and Yaroslavsky under the doctrine of absolute legislative immunity.
On November 7, 1997, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint wherein Robert Corbett, Sergeant Black, and Sharon Walton were identified as three of the previously unnamed Doe Defendants. Such Defendants were the courtroom deputies involved in returning the Plaintiff to custody, thereby leading to the alleged "over-detention." As in the original Complaint, such individual Defendants were named in both their official and individual capacities.
On January 30, 1998, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's June 19, 1997 Order, requesting that the various Supervisors be reinstated as Defendants. Despite reconsideration under Plaintiff's presentation of newly discovered evidence, the Court continued to find that the Supervisors were entitled to absolute immunity. Therefore, Plaintiff's reconsideration motion was denied on its merits.
On January 5, 1998, deputy Defendants Corbett, Black, and Walton (hereinafter "Deputy Defendants"1) filed their motion to dismiss several of the Plaintiff's claims. That motion argued, among other points, that the Deputy Defendants should be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity. (Defendants' Jan. 5, 1998 Motion to Dismiss at 2.) In granting such immunity, the Court found, in relevant part, that "[i]n the instant case, ... there appears to be no preexisting, established law." (Feb. 2, 1988 Order at 7.) Accordingly, the Deputy Defendants were dismissed with prejudice. (Id.)
In that same motion, the Deputy Defendants, Block and the County also sought to dismiss the Plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim on grounds of insufficient pleading. In denying this aspect of the motion, the Court found that the conspiracy claim was properly plead.2,3
On February 13, 1998, the Deputy Defendants and Sheriff Block filed their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(c). That Motion made three essential arguments: (1) Defendant Block should be dismissed in his official capacity since the County was a named Defendant; (2) Defendant Block should be dismissed in his individual capacity under the doctrine of qualified immunity "for the same reasons outlined in the Court's February 2, 1998 Order granting the Motion to Dismiss by defendants Corbett, Black and Walton[,]" i.e., there was no clearly established law. (Defendants' Feb. 13, 1998 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 2.); and (3) Plaintiff's claim for civil conspiracy4 must be dismissed since Block and the Deputy Defendants were all entitled to qualified immunity under the Plaintiff's constitutional claims.
After oral argument, the Court granted in part, and denied in part, Defendants' Motion. (See generally Mar. 27, 1998 Order.) The Court dismissed Block in his official capacity, granted the Deputy Defendants judgment on the pleadings as to civil conspiracy since no underlying Constitutional claim remained as against them, but denied Block's requests for qualified immunity and judgment on the pleadings under the civil conspiracy claim. [Id.] In denying such requests, the Court stated the following, in relevant part:
[The Court denies] Defendant Block's request for qualified immunity in his individual capacity on the Fourteenth Amendment claim[] since the Court cannot find qualified immunity on the pleadings alone. Since Defendant Block is a policymaker, there is a question of fact whether he acted reasonably.
* * * * * *
[The Court also denies] Defendant Block's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Plaintiff's Count Three Conspiracy claim[] since there still may be a viable Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendant Block.
[Id. at 2.]
Of course, the denial of the motion with respect to the conspiracy claim was based, at least in part, on the Court's finding that Block was not entitled to qualified immunity.
On March 16, 1998, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Sheriff Block Qualified Immunity. In that Motion, the Defendants argued that the law of the case requires a finding that Block is entitled to qualified immunity. More specifically, since the Court already established, in cloaking the individual deputies with qualified immunity, that there appears to be no preexisting, clearly established law with respect to Plaintiff's alleged over-detention, Defendant Block must also be protected under the immunity doctrine. (Defendants' Mar. 16, 1998 Motion for Reconsideration at 6.) In addition, Defendants sought reconsideration of the Court's ruling on the conspiracy claim since, as argued in the original Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Defendants felt that immunity for all individual Defendants was appropriate.
On April 10, 1998, the Court issued its order agreeing to examine its rulings on the issues of qualified immunity and civil conspiracy. While Defendants only sought reconsideration of the denial of qualified immunity as to Sheriff Block, the Court found it appropriate to also re-examine the grant of immunity to the Deputy Defendants. Furthermore, the Court found it necessary to reconsider its findings as to the efficacy of the civil conspiracy claim since its prior decisions were based, at least in part, on the Court's qualified immunity determinations. However, the Court did not limit its reconsideration of the conspiracy claim within the framework of its previous decisions. Rather, the Court undertook to examine the viability of the conspiracy claim whether or not the Deputy Defendants and Sheriff Block were found qualifiedly immune since the County remained in the action as a nonimmune Defendant.
In finding such reconsideration appropriate, the Court requested additional briefing in response to the following five questions:
(1) What is the specific right at issue?
(2) Was such right clearly established at the time of the alleged offense?
(3) If there is a clearly established right, is the issue of qualified immunity [] properly addressed in a motion for summary judgment?
(4) If there are disputed issues of fact relevant to a determination of an officer's reasonable conduct under the test for qualified immunity (assuming a clearly established law), can such issues proceed to trial?
(5) If the Court finds that [the Deputy Defendants] and Sheriff Block are entitled to qualified immunity, can the Plaintiff proceed on his theory of conspiracy based on the facts that: (a) immunity does not mean there is no constitutional harm (just that the defendants are immune from the liability it creates); and (b) the [County] is still a Defendant. In other words, can the individuals be used to complete the alleged conspiracy to create liability on the part of the [County] even though they are immune? In briefing this issue, the parties should address the theory of conspiracy as a vehicle to transfer liability from one to another, as under principles of agency.
(April 10, 1998 Order for Supplemental Briefing at 7.)
Accordingly, the following issues are now before the Court: (1) whether the Deputy Defendants and Block are entitled to qualified immunity; and (2) if so, whether a claim for civil conspiracy is still viable by using immune Defendants to hold the County liable.
Qualified immunity "shields...
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