Fowler v. Director of Revenue, State
| Decision Date | 28 January 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 60406,60406 |
| Citation | 823 S.W.2d 134 |
| Parties | John FOWLER, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE of Missouri, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Sandra Ann Mears, Jefferson City, for appellant.
Marsha Brady, Hillsboro, for respondent.
Appellant, Director of Revenue of the State of Missouri, appeals entry of an order of expungement by the Circuit Court of St. Charles County. We reverse.
On October 2, 1979, in the Circuit Court of St. Charles County, respondent John Fowler was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol content in excess of .10 percent. More than ten years later, on September 25, 1990, respondent was issued a ticket for driving while intoxicated (DWI) in the City of Bonne Terre. Pursuant to that citation, respondent attended an administrative hearing on November 26, 1990, regarding the suspension of his driving privileges. After the hearing, on December 10, 1990, respondent received notice that his license would be suspended effective December 25, 1990. Respondent's license was indeed suspended on that date.
The day after the hearing, December 11, 1990, respondent filed a petition pursuant to RSMo § 577.054 (Supp.1990) for expungement of the records regarding his October 2, 1979, conviction. In his petition, respondent alleged that he had not been convicted of any alcohol-related offenses and he had no other alcohol-related enforcement contacts during the ten years immediately proceeding the filing of his petition.
A hearing on respondent's petition was held on January 11, 1991, in the Circuit Court of St. Charles County. The case was continued to February 1, 1991, to permit appellant to file additional pleadings. On March 29, 1991, after hearing evidence and arguments from both sides, the trial court entered an order which, inter alia, granted respondent the expungement he requested in his petition. Appellant appeals this order.
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation only. The proper resolution to the instant litigation may be defined through a careful analysis of the statute involved. The primary task of statutory interpretation is to determine the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute at issue and to give effect to that intent. Community Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 752 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Mo. banc 1988). The first source to determine the intent of the legislature is the words and phrases used in the statute. Sermchief v. Gonzalas, 660 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Mo. banc 1983). However, a proper analysis does not stop with an examination of the bare words alone, but also considers the context in which they are used and, importantly, the problem the legislature sought to address with its enactment. Id.
The statute at issue, RSMo § 577.054 (Supp.1990) provides, in relevant part:
577.054. Alcohol--related driving offenses, expunged from records, when--procedures, effect-limitations
After a period of not less than ten years, an individual who has pleaded guilty or has been convicted for a first alcohol-related driving offense which is a misdemeanor or a county or city ordinance violation and which is not a conviction for driving a commercial motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and who since such date has not been convicted of any other alcohol-related driving offense may apply to the court in which he pled guilty or was sentenced for an order to expunge from all official records all recordations of his arrest, plea, trial or conviction. If the court determines, after hearing, that such person has not been convicted of any alcohol-related driving offense in the ten years prior to the date of the application for expungement, and has no other alcohol-related enforcement contacts as defined in section 302.525, RSMo, during that ten-year period, the court shall enter an order of expungement.
Thus, the statute puts forth a two-pronged test for expungement, and any potential petitioner must be able to satisfy both parts to be entitled to expungement of his record.
First, one must show that the violation complained of was a first offense, that it was a misdemeanor or a city or county ordinance violation, that it did not involve driving a commercial motor vehicle, and that the petitioner has not been convicted of any other alcohol-related driving offense. Id.
Once the petitioner has met the somewhat mundane requirements of the first prong, the court is...
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