Fowler v. Peyton, Civ. A. No. 67-C-10.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1967
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 67-C-10.
• Parties: William R. FOWLER, Jr., Petitioner, v. C. C. PEYTON, Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

266 F. Supp. 252

William R. FOWLER, Jr., Petitioner, v. C. C. PEYTON, Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary, Respondent.

Civ. A. No. 67-C-10.

United States District Court W. D. Virginia, Danville Division.

April 19, 1967.

Reno S. Harp, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va., for respondent.

No counsel for petitioner.

OPINION and JUDGMENT

DALTON, Chief Judge.

This case comes before the court upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by William R. Fowler, Jr., a state prisoner, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and is filed in forma pauperis.

Petitioner is currently serving a term of twenty years in the Virginia State Penitentiary following his conviction for robbery in the Corporation Court of the City of Danville on January 23, 1965. A writ of error to this conviction was refused by the Virginia Supreme Court on October 14, 1965. Petitioner subsequently sought state habeas corpus relief which was denied in a plenary hearing before the Corporation Court of the City of Danville on June 10, 1966. The Virginia Supreme Court refused a writ of error to this judgment on January 13, 1967. Petitioner is properly before this court, having exhausted his presently available state remedies in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as interpreted by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963).

In substance, the allegations which petitioner says entitle him to a writ of habeas corpus are as follows:

(1) The petitioner, prior to making an oral statement which was reduced to writing and admitted into evidence against him at his trial, was not advised of his right to consult with counsel, or of his constitutional right to remain silent.

(2) Petitioner was denied the equal protection and due process of law because he was mentally ill, or mentally incompetent at the time of the commission of the crime for which he was convicted, and at the time petitioner made certain oral statements to arresting officers.

(3) Petitioner was not effectively represented by counsel.

(4) Petitioner was not represented by counsel at his preliminary hearing before the Corporation Court of the City of Danville.

The transcripts of petitioner's trial and state habeas corpus proceedings disclose the following facts:

On May 12, 1964, two police officers, responding to an alarm, arrested petitioner in the vicinity of a bank which had been robbed only minutes before. Petitioner had a pistol and a paper sack containing a substantial sum of money in his possession at the time of his arrest, which was executed without incident. The arresting officers immediately placed petitioner in a police car and drove him directly to the police station. Petitioner made spontaneous, detailed, and incriminating statements regarding the robbery for which he had been arrested, during the short ride to the police station. Neither officer asked him any questions, nor advised petitioner of any rights relating to silence or counsel. Petitioner was advised by the arresting officers, upon their arrival at the police station, that he had a right to counsel, and that anything he said could be used against him at trial. Petitioner did not indicate he desired the assistance of counsel, or that he wished to communicate with anyone. A statement was prepared incorporating the remarks petitioner had made to the arresting officers during the course of the ride from the scene of arrest to the police station. The statement was read to petitioner, notarized, and signed by petitioner and the arresting officers. The statement was admitted into evidence at petitioner's trial.

Petitioner was not represented by counsel at his preliminary hearing on May 15, 1964.

The trial of petitioner was to have taken place on July 27, 1964, but by order of July 29, 1964, the Corporation Court was of the opinion that petitioner should be committed to the Department of the Criminal Insane pursuant to statute. The physician who attended petitioner at Central State Hospital, Petersburg, Virginia, found petitioner competent to stand trial after approximately three months of observation and treatment in that institution. Petitioner was returned to the jurisdiction of the court on November 18, 1964, tried by jury on January 18 and 19, 1965, and convicted; final judgment being entered on January 23, 1965, after the court denied petitioner's motion for a sanity hearing.

This court has examined the record and is not persuaded that any of petitioner's constitutional rights were thwarted as he alleges in his first contention. The United States Supreme Court, in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), has made it compulsory upon investigating officers to apprise a suspect whom they are questioning of his right to counsel, whether or not the suspect has asked for such assistance. The guidelines of Miranda have evolved from those guidelines set out by the Supreme Court in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), which are formulated by that court as follows:

Where * * * the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied `The Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as `made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), and that no statement elicited by the police

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