Fowler v. Soc. Sec. Admin.
| Decision Date | 09 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-11826-RGS |
| Parties | DAVID LIONEL FOWLER v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
STEARNS, D.J.
On October 2, 2012, plaintiff David Lionel Fowler, (Fowler), currently residing at the Massachusetts New England Center for Homeless Veterans in Boston, Massachusetts, filed a skeletal self-prepared complaint against the Social Security Administration (SSA).1 Apart from identifying the parties to the action, Fowler includes only one paragraph for relief, stating:
Plaintiff requests the jurisdiction over thic [sic] case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332. Reasons Non-Payment 6 month Default on Federal Court Demand Filed 03/23/2012 Defendant Caused Detrimental Harm Causing Plaintiff to Be Homeless.
Compl. (Docket No. 1 at 1, ¶ 4). The Civil Cover Sheet attached to the Complaint states the cause of action is based on civil rights and Recover of Defaulted Non-Payment on Demand. He demands $50,000,000.00.
This civil action is a refiling of a case Fowler filed in the District of Arizona (Phoenix Division). See Fowler v. Social Security Administration, et al., Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-00628-JAT. On May 8, 2012, Fowler was ordered to appear before James A. Teilborg in Phoenix, Arizona and show cause why his case should not be dismissed for failure to return the service packets inaccordance with the Court's Order of March 27, 2012. On May 21, 2012, a show cause hearing was held; however, Fowler did not appear. In light of the failure to appear, the case was dismissed without prejudice. Thereafter, Fowler filed a number of motions, and on July 10, 2012, an Order issued denying his Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order. The grounds asserted by Fowler were that difficult living circumstances led to problems with his receiving mail. In that Order, Fowler's underlying claims were discussed. It appears that Fowler alleged that he was denied social security benefits. He also alleged that the Berrien County Probate Court (mentioned in the Complaint but not named as a party), improperly concealed records of his adoption.2 See Order (Docket No. 18 at 1). On September 4, 2012, Fowler filed a Motion to Transfer this case to Massachusetts. See Motion to Transfer (Docket No. 20).
Accompanying the instant complaint, Fowler filed a document entitled "Motion Subpoena Felony Complaint" (Docket No. 3), directed to Chief Judge Mark L. Wolf. He requests that warrants issue against the SSA for Motion (Docket No. 3 at 1). Additionally, Fowler alleges that the SSA is in "felony negligence tort-criminal and civil violation reasons ignoring a federal court order failing to meet complaint within a specified time period." Id. Fowler alleges that he filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office (civil division) in September, 2012 and was told that he needed to have an attorney, and that he was six-months pastthe demand date.3 He claims the SSN purposely violated his civil rights because he is a 19-year veteran of the U.S. Army. He seeks both payment from the SSA and felony charges against it.
In addition to the Motion Subpoena Felony Complaint, Fowler filed a "Motion Pettion [sic] Non-Payment (Docket No. 4). He reiterates his claims that he is entitled to money and seeks criminal actions against all (unidentified) defendants. He threatens that if he does not obtain judgment, "more litigations and jail time will be filed in the UNITED STATES SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT to enforce this action against all Defendants in felony violation." Motion (Docket No. 4 at 1). Notably, attached to this motion is, inter alia, a May 31, 2012 letter from the Michigan Governor's Office indicating that there was a discrepancy between information on Fowler's birth record as contained in the Michigan Vital Records Office, and an application submitted by Fowler. This discrepancy involved a switch of the first and middle names.
Finally, along with the two motions noted above, Fowler filed a Notice o f Default form (Docket No. 5) for execution and issuance by the Clerk of Court, and a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Docket No. 2).
Upon review of Fowler's financial disclosures indicating that he has no assets or income, this court finds that lacks the $350.00 to pay the filing fee for civil actions.
Accordingly, his Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is ALLOWED.
Because Fowler is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint is subject to screening under28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).4 Further, in addition to the statutory screening requirements under § 1915, the Court has an independent obligation to inquire, sua sponte, into its subject matter jurisdiction.5 In connection with this preliminary screening, Fowler's pro se complaint is construed generously. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Instituto de Educacion Universal Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Education, 209 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000). Even under a broad reading, however, the complaint is subject to dismissal for the reasons set forth below.
Fowler's Complaint fails to comport with the pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a) requires a plaintiff to include in the complaint, inter alia, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This statement must "'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2005). It must afford the defendant(s) a "[']meaningful opportunity to mount a defense,'" Díaz-Rivera v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 377 F.3d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Rodríguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1172 (1st Cir. 1995)). See also Redondo-Borges v. U.S.Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., 421 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2005). "In a civil rights action as in any other action . . . , the complaint should at least set forth minimal facts as to who did what to whom, when, where, and why." Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2004). Although "the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) are minimal . . .[,] 'minimal requirements are not tantamount to nonexistent requirements.'" Id. (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988)).
Here, Fowler's sparse complaint fails to set forth plausible claims in accordance with Rule 8. Although he demands payment from the SSA, he fails to set forth the underlying factual basis for the demand. It appears that he is asserting that he obtained a judgment from the Arizona District Court; however, as noted above, the public records (PACER) do not indicate that to be the case, since Fowler's claims were dismissed. In any event, he fails to set forth the "who, what, where, when, and why" type information necessary to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Even considering the attachments submitted, this court cannot discern any cognizable claim against the SSA. Moreover, Fowler references "all defendants" but fails to set forth any claims against defendants, and it is unclear to whom he is referring.
In short, it would be unfair to the SSA to have to respond to the complaint as pled. In light of all of the above, this case is subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
In addition to the Rule 8 pleading deficiencies, Fowler's complaint has other legal impediments subjecting his claims to dismissal. Specifically, Fowler may not recover damages against the SSA (a federal agency) because it is entitled to sovereign immunity.
It is well-settled that under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States (including its various branches, departments, and agencies) enjoys immunity from suit except in those instancesin which it has expressly consented to be sued. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976). A waiver of this immunity may never be implied from the factual circumstances of the particular case. Rather, the waiver must be unequivocally expressed in each instance. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, (1980).
The United States has waived its sovereign immunity for certain common law torts under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), § 2671 et seq. ("FTCA"), including a waiver of immunity with respect to negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees.
Section 1346(b) directs that "the district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government...." 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (emphasis added). Section 2675(a) provides, in relevant part, that:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make...
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