Fowler v. State

• Decision Date: 20 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. 15120,15120
• Citation: 712 P.2d 703,109 Idaho 1002
• Parties: Daniel L. FOWLER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 703

712 P.2d 703

109 Idaho 1002

Daniel L. FOWLER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.

No. 15120.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Dec. 20, 1985.

Thomas W. Callery of Lewiston for petitioner-appellant.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

SWANSTROM, Judge.

Daniel Fowler applied for post-conviction relief from a judgment of conviction entered upon his plea of guilty to the charge of first degree burglary of a restaurant. The district court denied the requested relief and Fowler has appealed. He contends that relief should have been granted because his guilty plea was not voluntary; that the sentencing judge failed to: (1) inform him of the nature of the charge of first degree burglary and (2) make a determination that a factual basis existed for the acceptance of a guilty plea. We affirm. ¹

Fowler first contends that his guilty plea was not voluntary because he was not informed of the nature of the charge when he withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of guilty. The guilty plea was a result of plea bargaining by which the state agreed to dismiss an additional charge of first degree burglary and to not file a charge of assaulting a police officer. Specifically, Fowler alleges that the district court did not inform him that one of the elements of burglary which the state is required to prove is that the entry into the building was made with the "intent to commit any theft or any felony." I.C. § 18-1401. It is well-established that a plea of guilty must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently in order to be valid. State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 557 P.2d 626 (1976). A defendant must be informed of the intent element in order for a guilty plea to be considered voluntary. Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60, 625 P.2d 414 (1981). However, reading to the defendant an information, which refers to the elements of the charge including the intent element, satisfies this requirement in the absence of a showing that the defendant is not conversant with the English language or lacks normal intelligence and education. State v. Bradley, 98 Idaho 918, 575 P.2d 1306 (1978); Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 647 P.2d 796 (Ct.App.1982).

In the present case the information was read to Fowler at the arraignment hearing approximately two months prior to his change of plea. The information contained the elements of first degree burglary, including the element of intent, by stating that Fowler entered the restaurant "with the intent to commit the crime of larceny by the taking, stealing and carrying away of certain persona [sic] property belonging to another." We believe this language would inform Fowler that he was charged with having the intent to commit theft when he entered the building. See State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 543, 661 P.2d 328 (1983); Bates v. State, 106 Idaho 395, 679 P.2d 672 (Ct.App.1984).

There is no assertion that Fowler is not conversant with the English language or has a below normal intelligence. At the change of plea hearing, when the judge inquired about Fowler's education, Fowler responded he had about one year of college. Fowler was not unfamiliar with the charge of burglary, having been convicted of burglary in 1974 and in 1979. This prior experience in legal proceedings may be considered in determining whether Fowler understood the nature of the charge to which he pled guilty. Bates v. State, supra. In connection with the presentence investigation Fowler wrote out his own explanation of events leading to his arrest and to his plea of guilty. While Fowler's statement omitted numerous incriminating "facts" contained in police reports, Fowler's statements do show that he had a clear understanding of the intent element of the crime of burglary. ² Fowler's statement, as well as the police reports, were made a part of the presentence report. The record shows that Fowler signed his statement on December 31, 1981, the day after he changed his plea to guilty. Further, Fowler stated that he decided to plead guilty after discussing the matter with his attorney. The record, including the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, affirmatively shows that Fowler had been informed of the nature of the charge to which he pled guilty.

Fowler relies on Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976), in support of his argument. In Henderson, the defendant was charged with first degree murder but pled guilty to second degree murder pursuant to a plea bargain. The charge of second degree murder was never formally made, resulting in the failure to inform the defendant of the necessary elements of the crime. The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant's plea of guilty in such circumstances was not voluntary. However, Fowler's circumstances differ significantly from those in Henderson. Fowler was formally charged with first degree burglary and pled guilty to first degree burglary. The information stating the elements of first degree burglary was read to him. In view of all of the foregoing circumstances, we conclude that Fowler knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily pled guilty.

Fowler has asked us to examine his statement of the crime, contained in the presentence report, for a different purpose. It contains a disclaimer of any intent to steal when the unlawful entry into the restaurant was made. ³ Fowler asserts that the lack of an express factual admission of guilt made by him when he pled guilty and his disclaimer of the prerequisite intent obligated the court to inquire into the factual basis of his guilty plea at the time it was accepted. At present, Idaho does not require a district judge to establish a factual basis prior to accepting a guilty plea. State v. Coffin, supra; Schmidt v. State, supra. Certain exceptions to this rule have been recognized, such as when the defendant is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the crime or continues to assert his innocence while pleading guilty. Schmidt v. State, supra. Fowler has failed to show that he falls within any of the exceptions. Fowler neither expressly admitted his guilt nor asserted his innocence when he entered his guilty plea. Fowler stated he was pleading guilty because the state would dismiss the additional first degree burglary charge and he believed the evidence against him to be overwhelming.

THE COURT: You've also given up the presumption of innocence?

THE DEFENDANT: I--I'm not sure about that. I'm pleading guilty because the charges are being dropped.

THE COURT: Well, I want you to understand this: As a matter of law you're giving up the presumption of innocence if I accept this plea of guilty.

THE DEFENDANT: Oh, I understand that.

THE COURT: You understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand that.

THE COURT: You can protest whatever you want and so on but as a matter of law--

THE DEFENDANT: I understand that.

THE COURT: If you plead guilty you are guilty; okay?

THE DEFENDANT: I understand that.

We hold that--at the time when the guilty plea was entered--the court was not required to establish a factual basis for the charges. The district court did not err at this stage of the proceeding in accepting Fowler's plea of guilty. See State v. Coffin, supra.

However, Fowler argues that the statement in the presentence report concerning his lack of intent to steal from the restaurant created a duty of the district court--at the time of sentencing--to inquire into the factual basis for the plea. We have stated that:

this holding does not diminish a court's obligation to conduct such an inquiry if--after a plea is entered but before sentence is imposed--the court receives information raising an obvious doubt as to whether the defendant is in fact guilty. In such circumstances, the trial court should inquire into the factual basis of the plea, either to dispel the doubt or...