Fowler v. Valencourt

• Decision Date: 30 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. 428PA92,428PA92
• Parties: Carolyn B. FOWLER, v. J.M. VALENCOURT and City of Salisbury, North Carolina.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 530

435 S.E.2d 530

334 N.C. 345

Carolyn B. FOWLER, v. J.M. VALENCOURT and City of Salisbury, North Carolina.

No. 428PA92.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

July 30, 1993.

Smith, Follin & James by Seth R. Cohen and Norman B. Smith, Greensboro, for plaintiff-appellant.

Michael B. Brough & Associates by Michael B. Brough and William C. Morgan, Jr., Chapel Hill, for defendant-appellees.

PARKER, Justice.

Plaintiff instituted this civil action for actual and punitive damages against J.M. Valencourt, a police officer for the City of Salisbury, and the City of Salisbury alleging state common-law tort claims for assault, false arrest and imprisonment, and malicious prosecution and a claim for relief pursuant to the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants' answer denied these allegations and asserted the affirmative defense of governmental immunity on the part of the City of Salisbury, the one-year statute of limitations contained in N.C.G.S. § 1-54(3) as to plaintiff's claims for assault and false arrest and imprisonment, and qualified immunity on the part of Officer Valencourt. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on all issues and plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals.

In its opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the ruling of the trial court. Summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution against both defendants and for the section 1983 claim based on false arrest and imprisonment against defendant Valencourt was reversed. Summary judgment on plaintiff's common-law claims for assault and false arrest and imprisonment and for the section 1983 claim based on assault and malicious prosecution against both defendants and for the section 1983 claim against the City of Salisbury was affirmed. The Court of Appeals further affirmed summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against both defendants.

This Court allowed plaintiff's petition for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals' decision that the one-year statute of limitations in N.C.G.S. § 1-54(3), rather than the three-year statute in N.C.G.S. § 1-52(13), was applicable and barred plaintiff's common-law claims for assault and false arrest.

The underlying facts pertinent to plaintiff's claims for assault and false arrest are these. Plaintiff was employed by Rowan County as a data entry operator for the Department of Social Services. On the afternoon of 18 October 1989, plaintiff's sister, Ann Blackwell Dixon, telephoned her at work to pick up their younger brother, Norman Blackwell, at Ms. Dixon's home later that day. When plaintiff arrived at her sister's residence, she found Officer Valencourt investigating the theft of a television set. Officer Valencourt learned through a telephone conversation with a Rowan County Sheriff's Deputy that there were outstanding warrants against Norman Blackwell. When Officer Valencourt informed Ms. Dixon of the warrants for her brother's arrest, she began screaming that he "was not going to arrest her baby brother." Officer Valencourt then instructed Norman Blackwell that the orders for his arrest were en route and that he was not to leave the premises. Notwithstanding this instruction, plaintiff and Norman Blackwell got into plaintiff's automobile and drove away. Officer Valencourt followed in his patrol car and pulled plaintiff's vehicle over approximately two blocks away from Ms. Dixon's residence. Plaintiff was placed under arrest for resisting, delaying, and obstructing a police officer pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-223. Another police officer who had arrived at the scene handcuffed plaintiff and seated her in his patrol car. Plaintiff was unruly and uncooperative while being restrained and thereafter complained on several occasions that the handcuffs were too tight. When the handcuffs were later removed, her hands were blistered and numb. At her trial in Rowan County District Court on 8 December 1989 on the charge of resisting, delaying, and obstructing a police officer, plaintiff was found not guilty. Plaintiff filed her complaint in this action on 22 October 1990, more than one year from the date of the incident giving rise to her claims.

The sole question before this Court for review is whether N.C.G.S. § 1-54(3) or N.C.G.S. § 1-52(13) is the applicable statute of limitation. Section 1-54(3) places a one-year limitation on actions for "libel, slander, assault, battery, or false imprisonment." N.C.G.S. § 1-54(3) (Supp.1992). Section 1-52(13) imposes a three-year limitation on actions "[a]gainst a public officer, for a trespass, under color of his office." N.C.G.S. § 1-52(13) (Supp.1992).

In construing a statute, the Court must first ascertain the legislative intent to assure that the purpose and intent of the legislation are carried out. Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Electrical Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991). To make this determination, we look first to the language of the statute itself. Id. If the language used is clear and unambiguous, the Court does not engage in judicial construction but must apply the statute to give effect to the plain and definite meaning of the language. Utilities Comm. v. Edmisten, Atty. General, 291 N.C. 451, 465, 232 S.E.2d 184, 192 (1977). Applying these principles of statutory construction, we examine the language of the statutes at issue.

"False imprisonment," used in N.C.G.S. § 1-54(3), has been defined as "the illegal restraint of the person of any one against his will." State v. Lunsford, 81 N.C. 528, 530 (1879). If not lawful or consented to, any restraint is unlawful. Hales v. McCrory-McLellan Corp., 260 N.C. 568, 133 S.E.2d 225 (1963). A technical assault is always committed with false imprisonment. False arrest is a form of false imprisonment. Mobley v. Broome, 248 N.C. 54, 56, 102 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1958).

Addressing the meaning of "trespass" in applying former C.S., sec. 443, subsec. 1, the predecessor of both N.C.G.S. § 1-54(1) and N.C.G.S. § 1-52(13), this Court in Brown v. R.R., 188 N.C. 52, 123 S.E. 633 (1924), stated:

True, in its more general sense, a trespass is sometimes said to include any wrongful invasion of the rights of another, but in its more natural and usual meaning it is properly restricted to unlawful acts done to the person or property of another by violence or force, direct or imputed. It is to acts of trespass in this sense that the one-year statute of limitations applies-- that is, a trespass committed by a public officer under color of his office and constituting a wrongful invasion of the rights of third persons by force shown or imputed, and the statute does not and was never intended to apply to a breach of official duty in reference to the principal and employer--in this case the municipality.

Id. at 58, 123 S.E. at 636 (citation omitted). "In all cases where an injury to the person is done with force and immediately by the act of the defendant, trespass may be maintained (at common law, the form of action denominated 'trespass vi et armis.')." 7 Stuart M. Speiser et al., The American Law of Torts § 23:4, at 604 (1990). Assault and false imprisonment including false arrest exist under the umbrella of the ancient action of trespass. Id. §§ 26:1, at 877; 27:1, at 927.

In addition to the rules mandating that the Court discern the legislative intent from the plain language of the statutes themselves, another applicable rule of statutory construction must be considered. This rule, argued by both plaintiff and defendants, is that where two statutes deal with the same subject matter, the more specific statute will prevail over the more general one. As stated by this Court in Trustees of Rowan Tech. v. Hammond Assoc., 313 N.C. 230, 328 S.E.2d 274 (1985):

Where one of two statutes might apply to the same situation, the statute which deals more directly and specifically with the situation controls over the statute of more general applicability. National Food Stores v. North Carolina Board of Alcoholic Control, 268 N.C. 624, 151 S.E.2d 582 (1966); State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Union Electric Membership Corp., 3 N.C.App. 309, 164 S.E.2d 889 (1968). "When two statutes apparently overlap, it is well established that the statute special and particular shall control over the statute general in nature, even if the general statute is more recent, unless it clearly appears that the legislature intended the general statute to control." Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453, 459, 259 S.E.2d 544, 549 (1979); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Neill, 296 N.C. 503, 251 S.E.2d 457 (1979).

Id. at 238, 328 S.E.2d at 279.

As might be expected, plaintiff argues that N.C.G.S. § 1-52(13) is the more specific statute because it deals with actions by a public officer under color of office. Defendants contend that N.C.G.S. § 1-54(3), which specifically mentions assault, battery, and false imprisonment, is the more specific statute. As noted above, the authorities are consistent that the term "trespass" includes assault, battery, false imprisonment, and false arrest. Given this definition, N.C.G.S. § 1-52(13) deals expressly with claims arising out of assault, battery, and false imprisonment by a public officer acting under the color of his office, and thus is a statute "special and particular" rather than a general limitation statute like N.C.G.S. § 1-54(3). In this sense, N.C.G.S. § 1-52(13) deals more particularly with the precise situation presented by plaintiff's claims. See Trustees of Rowan Tech. v. Hammond Assoc., 313 N.C. at 239, 328 S.E.2d at 280. Accordingly, we hold that N.C.G.S. § 1-52(13), not N.C.G.S. § 1-54(3), governs plaintiff's claims for false arrest and assault. While plaintiff has couched her complaint in terms of assault, false imprisonment, and false arrest, "[t]he nature of the action is not determined by what either party calls it," Hayes v. Ricard, 244 N.C. 313, 320, 93 S.E.2d 540, 545-46 (1956), but rather "by the issues...