Fox v. O'Leary
Decision Date | 14 March 2012 |
Docket Number | NO. 03-11-00270-CV,03-11-00270-CV |
Parties | Jeffrey A. Fox, Appellant v. James F. O'Leary, Jr., Appellee |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
NO. D-1-GN-10-002394, HONORABLE AMY CLARK MEACHUM, JUDGE PRESIDING
Jeffrey A. Fox appeals a take-nothing judgment rendered against him in his suit for injunctive relief arising out of his claim that James F. O'Leary, Jr.'s construction of a home on his lot violated deed restrictions governing their subdivision. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that Fox's claims were barred by the affirmative defense of laches. We will reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Fox and O'Leary own adjoining lots in the Highland Hills subdivision in Austin. O'Leary purchased his lot in 1977, and Fox purchased his lot in early 2007. At the time of both purchases, the lots had houses on them that were built during the original development of the subdivision in the 1960s. All the lots in the subdivision, including those owned by Fox and O'Leary,are subject to deed restrictions recorded in Volume 2392, Page 620 of the Travis County Deed Records. The deed restrictions have been in place since 1963 and provide, in pertinent part:
In October 2007 O'Leary's house was destroyed by fire. In 2009 O'Leary decided to rebuild on the lot and hired an architect to prepare plans and specifications for the new construction. Construction began in January 2010. By mid-February the slab for the foundation (apparently slightly larger than the old slab) was poured, and by early March framing of the exterior walls was under way.
On March 4 Holly Eaton, O'Leary's next-door neighbor on the south side of his property, notified O'Leary that his new house was in violation of the setback provisions of the deed restrictions. Specifically, she informed him that the house was nearer than 10 feet to the boundary between their lots. At that time she showed O'Leary a copy of the deed restrictions. The next day, O'Leary reviewed the Travis County real property records and confirmed the existence of the deed restrictions Eaton had showed him. O'Leary testified that he "went down there to check to find out whether or not there were any other additional documents that were relevant to the documents orthe copy of the deed restrictions [Eaton] had provided" and "to find out if there was anything in addition to those deed restrictions that would impact the validity of the original document." O'Leary further testified:
In July 2010 Fox sued O'Leary for breach of restrictive covenants, alleging that O'Leary's construction of the home violated deed restrictions governing their subdivision. Fox sought a permanent injunction that would require O'Leary to bring his home into compliance with the deed restrictions. O'Leary filed a general denial and, as affirmative defenses, asserted that Fox's claims were barred by limitations, waiver, laches, and unclean hands. In a counterclaim, O'Leary alleged that Fox's house also failed to comply with the deed restrictions and sought to enjoin Fox from allowing his house to remain on his property in violation thereof. O'Leary also sought a declaration that Fox's right to enforce the deed restrictions was barred by limitations and had been waived by (1) the presence of other non-conforming residences in the subdivision, and (2) Fox's conduct in waiting an unreasonable length of time to assert his claim. O'Leary requested that the trial court declare any non-compliance to be de minimis, balance the equities between the parties, and allow the house to remain in place. After a four-day bench trial, the court rendered judgment in O'Leary's favor on the ground that he had established that Fox's claims were barred by the affirmative defense of laches. The trial court expressly denied O'Leary's other affirmative defensesand also rendered judgment that O'Leary take nothing by way of his counterclaim. Fox perfected this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an appeal from a judgment rendered after a bench trial, the trial court's findings of fact have the same weight as a jury's verdict, and we review the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support them as we would review a jury's findings. See Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). When the trial court's express findings of fact do not address all grounds for recovery or defenses, an appellate court implies findings of fact regarding the omitted grounds or defenses that are needed to support the judgment. Pulley v. Milberger, 198 S.W.3d 418, 427 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied). To determine whether legally sufficient evidence supports a challenged finding, we must credit evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not, and reverse the factfinder's determination only if the evidence presented in the trial court would not enable a reasonable and fair-minded factfinder to reach the judgment under review. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We will sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge if the record reveals: (1) the complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) that the court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) that the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) that the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. Id. at 810.
In reviewing a factual-sufficiency challenge, we examine the entire record and consider and weigh all the evidence, both in support of and contrary to the challenged finding. Ortizv. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996). When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which it has the burden of proof, it must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Urista v. Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc., 245 S.W.3d 591, 601 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on which it does not have the burden of proof, we set aside the finding only if the evidence is so weak as to make the finding clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176...
To continue reading
Request your trial