Fox v. Roy
| Decision Date | 22 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-cv-2594 (DSD/TNL) |
| Parties | THOMAS JAMES FOX, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS ROY, Commissioner; PENNY MALECHA, Director; HAROLD W. CLARKE, Director; AGENT DREW EVANS; SPECIAL AGENT GARY SWANSON; and INVESTIGATOR BARRY SMITH, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Thomas James Fox, #1541090, Wallens Ridge State Prison, P.O. Box 759, Big Stone Gap, VA 24219 (pro se Plaintiff); and
Ryan M. Zipf, League of Minnesota Cities, 145 University Avenue W., St. Paul, MN 55103 (for Defendant Investigator Barry Smith).
This matter comes before the Court, United States Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung, on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, (ECF No. 24 and 32), as well as Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint with the Permission of the Court (ECF No. 46). These motions have been referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation to the district court, the Honorable David S. Doty, District Judge for the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, under 28 U.S.C. § 636 and D. Minn. LR 72.1. Based upon the record, memoranda, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motions be GRANTED, Plaintiff's Motion be DENIED, and this matter be DISMISSED.
Plaintiff is a prisoner currently serving a life sentence following conviction for the murder of Lori Baker. (ECF No. 27-1, at 68-75.) Plaintiff currently resides in a prison in Virginia after being transferred from facilities in Minnesota. (ECF No. 4-1.) Plaintiff's Complaint concerns his detention prior to his arraignment, trial, and conviction.
On December 29, 2011, Plaintiff was arrested on a Department of Corrections warrant unrelated to the investigation into Baker's death. State v. Fox, 868 N.W.2d 206, 211 (Minn. 2015).1 Plaintiff had previously absconded from supervised release on April 24, 2011, until he was apprehended on December 29, 2011, on a warrant for a paroleviolation. (ECF No. 35-1.) See also Fox, 868 N.W.2d at 214. On January 6, 2012, while still in custody, the Department of Corrections revoked Plaintiff's parole and he remained in custody continuing to serve an earlier criminal sentence. (ECF No. 35-1.)
On April 19, 2012, a Washington County Grand Jury indicted Plaintiff on one count of first-degree premeditated murder and one count of first-degree intentional murder while committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery. Fox, 868 N.W.2d at 212. On April 20, 2012, Plaintiff was arraigned before Judge Elizabeth Martin in Minnesota State District Court. (ECF No. 27-1, at 68.) Plaintiff was in custody the entire time between December 29, 2011 and April 20, 2012. Plaintiff contends that this detention violated his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) ().
In addition to the Gerstein claims, Plaintiff initially tried to shoehorn into this action a separate lawsuit against Minnesota and Virginia prison officials. The Court, in a previous Order, noted the problem with filing two disconnected lawsuits together as one. (ECF No. 7, at 4 (citing George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007)).) The Court advised Plaintiff that if he wished to proceed in the case, he must dismiss without prejudice one set of claims. (Id.) Plaintiff informed the Court he wished to proceed with his Gerstein claims against Defendants Evans, Swanson, and Smith. (ECF No. 12.) Accordingly, Defendants Thomas Roy, Penny Malecha, and Harold W. Clarke were dismissed. (ECF No. 18, at 1-2, n.1.)
The remaining Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims. Defendants Evans and Swanson moved to dismiss the claims for alleged Gerstein violations, as well as challenging any claim related to Plaintiff's transfer to Virginia. (See ECF Nos. 24 and 26.) Defendant Smith directed his motion to Plaintiff's claim for alleged Gerstein violations. (See ECF Nos. 32 and 34.) Plaintiff responded by filing a document styled as a "Motion to Amend Complaint with the Permission of the Court." (ECF No. 46.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the case be dismissed and Plaintiff's Motion be denied.
Defendants moved for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and then determines "whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Furthermore, the court must draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1098 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Sletten & Brettin Orthodontics v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 782 F.3d 931, 934 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (quotations omitted); accord Zink, 783 F.3d at 1098. Facial plausibility of a claim exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).Although a sufficient complaint need not be detailed, it must contain "[f]actual allegations . . . enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted); see id. () (quotations and citation omitted). Additionally, complaints are insufficient if they contain "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In assessing a complaint by a pro se plaintiff, the court applies "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quotation and citation omitted); accord Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014). "If the essence of an allegation is discernible," then the court, in applying a liberal construction to pro se complaints, "should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework." Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). Despite the liberal construal of such complaints, the pro se plaintiff "still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced." Stringer v. St. James R-1 Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stone, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). Thus, pro se litigants "must set a claim forth in a manner which, taking the pleaded facts as true, states a claim as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Cunningham v. Ray, 648 F.2d 1185, 1186 (8th Cir. 1981)).
Evans and Swanson, employed by the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, begin by arguing that they are not properly subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 26, at 1, 3-5.) They argue that they are not "persons" under Section 1983 for the purposes of Plaintiff's suit and that they are additionally shielded from suit in federal court by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Evans and Swanson are correct.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for a cause of action against any "person" who, under the color of state law, causes another to be deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). States and state officials sued in their official capacities are not "persons" under Section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1010 (8th Cir. 1999). Thus, to state a claim against an individual state official, the claim must be against that official in his or her individual capacity. Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1010.
"Public servants may be sued under [S]ection 1983 either in their official capacity, their individual capacity, or both." Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997)). The Eighth Circuit has held that "in order to sue a public official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must expressly and unambiguously state so in the pleadings, otherwise, it will be assumed that the defendant is sued only in his or her official capacity." Johnson, 172 F.3d at 535 (citations omitted); see also Artis v. Francis HowellNorth Band Booster Ass'n, Inc., 161 F.3d 1178, 1182 (8th Cir. 1998). Johnson, 172 F.3d at 535 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)); see also Uland v. City of Winsted, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1119-20 (D. Minn. 2008) () (citations omitted).
Plaintiff has not made any statement in his pleadings—much less an express and unambiguous statement—that he intends to sue Evans and Swanson in their individual capacities. Therefore, the Court construes Plaintiff...
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