Fox v. Vice

Decision Date19 January 2010
Docket NumberNo. 08-31135.,08-31135.
Citation594 F.3d 423
PartiesRicky D. FOX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Billy Ray VICE, Chief of Police for the Town of Vinton; Town Of Vinton, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Christopher Paul Ieyoub, Plauche, Smith & Nieset, L.L.C., Lake Charles, LA, for Vice.

John Mark MIller, Joseph Bath Stamey, Stamey Law Firm, Natchitoches, LA, for Town of Vinton.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before REAVLEY, CLEMENT and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from the district court's order granting Defendants-Appellees attorneys' fees and costs after the dismissal of Appellant Fox's federal claims. Fox argues that the district court erred because Appellees were not prevailing parties, and because Fox still maintains state-law claims against Appellees. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

Fox's causes of action stem from two incidents that took place in 2005 after Fox and Appellee Vice each announced his candidacy to be police chief in the Town of Vinton, Louisiana. The first event took place in January, when incumbent Vice sent Fox an "anonymous" letter in which Vice attempted to blackmail Fox into not running for office. The second event took place at a local high school basketball game in February, when a third party accused Fox of uttering a racial slur and, at the instigation of Vice, filed a false police report regarding Fox's alleged utterance.

In December 2005, Fox brought a suit in Louisiana state court against Vice and the Town of Vinton, alleging the above-stated facts and claiming federal and state causes of action. In January 2006, the case was removed to federal court. In April 2007, Vice was tried and found guilty of extortion in state criminal court for the anonymous letter. Meanwhile, discovery in the civil case produced evidence of Vice's participation in the filing of the false police report. In September 2007, the defendants brought a motion for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment. In their motion, they argued that Fox's claims had no basis in federal law. In his response to the motion, Fox admitted that he had failed to properly present any federal cause of action. Specifically, Fox stated:

Defendants correctly argue that Fox presents no valid claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As to the extortion letter, it was sent anonymously. Vice did not act under "color of law" concerning the extortion letter.

As to the fabricated basketball game incident, Fox cannot show a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the United States Constitution and its laws. Although Vice and Cary acted under "color of law" whenever they conspired to fabricate the basketball game incident and file a false police report, Fox was not prevented from running for election. Nor is the defamation Fox suffered as a result of this fabrication deprivation of a property right.

In light of Fox's own admissions, the district court dismissed Fox's federal claims with prejudice and remanded the remaining state-law claims to state court.

The defendants moved for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19881 and for costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54,2 arguing that Fox's federal claims were frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation. The district court granted that motion, and Fox now appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

We review a district court's award of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for abuse of discretion. Merced v. Kasson.3 We review findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. Dearmore v. City of Garland.4

For the district court to properly award a defendant attorneys' fees in a § 1983 action, the court must find that (1) the defendant is a prevailing party, and (2) that the plaintiff's claims are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Hughes v. Rowe;5 Stover v. Hattiesburg Pub. Sch. Dist.6 An award of costs simply requires a determination that the defendant was a prevailing party.7

1. Whether Appellees are prevailing parties

We address first whether Appellees are prevailing parties for purposes of § 1988 and Rule 54. See Dean v. Riser.8 The record shows that the court granted Appellees' motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Fox's § 1983 claims with prejudice after Fox conceded that he had failed to state a federal claim. All other things being equal, this makes Appellees prevailing parties. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.;9 Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., U.S.A.;10 Anthony v. Marion County Gen. Hosp.11 However, Fox argues that Appellees are not prevailing parties because Fox voluntarily dismissed his federal claims. Fox points to our decision in Dean, where we held that when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his claims in a § 1983 action, the defendant is not a "prevailing party" for attorneys' fees purposes "unless the defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff withdrew to avoid a disfavorable judgment on the merits."12

Fox did not file a motion to voluntarily dismiss his federal claims before defendants responded.13 Rather, Fox allowed the case to proceed for more than eighteen months in federal court and through considerable discovery before he was challenged on the legal sufficiency of his federal claims. At that point, Fox was forced to concede their lack of legal merit and shifted focus to his state claims. Therefore, any decision Fox made to abandon his federal claims did not "merely indicate[] his preferred forum," or a change in the law or decisive facts.14 Rather, it represented recognition that Fox's federal claims should never have been brought. Moreover, without decisive action by Appellees, Fox's baseless federal claims would have proceeded to trial. He chose to dismiss the federal claims because he could manufacture no argument to support them when he was challenged. To deny fees under these circumstances would defeat the purpose of ever recognizing defendants as "prevailing parties," which is to "`protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis.'"15

We hold, therefore, that Appellees are "prevailing parties" for purposes of Rule 54 and § 1988.

2. Whether Fox's § 1983 claims are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation

We next look to the merit of Fox's claims. When determining whether a claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, a district court should consider (1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case, (2) whether the defendant offered to settle, and (3) whether the court held a full trial. Myers v. City of West Monroe.16 In making these determinations, a court must "resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation."17 Instead, a court must ask whether "`the case is so lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless or without foundation rather than whether the claim was ultimately successful.'"18

Looking to the first factor, the district court correctly concluded that Fox failed to establish any prima facie federal claim. Contrary to Fox's assertions on appeal, the dismissal of Fox's federal constitutional claims is not based on evidentiary hurdles that he faced at the end of discovery. Rather, Fox's claims are groundless because the offenses as alleged in his Complaint have no redress in the Constitution or laws of the United States.19 The anonymous nature of Vice's letter to Fox and the lack of constitutionally-protected harm stemming from the false police report were circumstances of which Fox was aware from the outset of litigation. Consequently, no evidence produced in the discovery process could change the underlying deficiencies in Fox's Complaint.

Looking to the second factor, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Appellees did not engage in settlement negotiations with Fox. The evidence presented by both parties shows that all the documented settlement attempts were one-sided, with Fox asserting the settlement demands. No evidence points to Appellees making their own settlement offers. While Fox points to billing statements from Appellees' counsel showing charges for discussions of settlement and possible mediation with Fox, these statements alone do not show clear error in the district court's finding. They only show that Appellees considered Fox's demands, not that they replied with their own.

Regarding the third factor, it is undisputed that Fox's federal claims were all dismissed without trial.

In conclusion, all the factors establishing a frivolous case have been satisfied. Accordingly, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellees entitled to attorneys' fees.

3. Whether Appellees must prevail over the entire case to be awarded fees

In the alternative, Fox argues that even if his federal claims are meritless, Appellees are not entitled to attorneys' fees and costs because Appellees did not prevail over the entire action. Specifically, Fox points to the fact that the district court remanded Fox's state claims that were based on the same alleged facts.

When speaking of whether a defendant is entitled to attorneys' fees, the Supreme Court describes a "suit,"20 an "action,"21 and both a "claim" and an "action"22 as the proper quanta for determining frivolity, with little guidance as to which is the final determinant. There also appears to be no Fifth Circuit precedent on whether a defendant must prevail over an entire suit before that defendant may seek attorneys' fees or whether success on an individual claim is sufficient. Indeed, other circuits appear to be split on the issue.23

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