Framboise v. Day
| Decision Date | 02 March 1917 |
| Docket Number | 20,080 - (205) |
| Citation | 161 N.W. 529,136 Minn. 239 |
| Parties | DAVID W. LA FRAMBOISE v. R. NOBLE DAY AND OTHERS |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for St. Louis county to determine adverse claims to certain vacant and unoccupied land. The separate answer of defendant Maher alleged that he was the owner in fee simple of an undivided one-third interest in the land, and the separate answer of R. Noble Day alleged that he was the owner in fee simple of an undivided two-thirds interest in the land. The case was tried before Cant, J. who made findings and ordered judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied. From the judgment entered pursuant to the order for judgment plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
Descent and distribution -- Indian divorce -- evidence.
In this action involving the title to real estate, the pivotal question was as to whether plaintiff was the son and heir of the Indian half-breed to whose heirs a patent for the land was issued. It is held:
(1) The complaint alleging the marriage of the half-breed and plaintiff's mother, and that plaintiff was the son and heir, evidence to show a divorce some years before the birth of plaintiff was admissible under a general denial.
(2) Where a half-breed marries an Indian woman according to Indian custom, lives with her as her husband in the tribal haunts, and is there divorced from her according to Indian custom, such divorce will be recognized by the courts of the state as terminating the marriage relation. The evidence sustains a finding that plaintiff's mother and the half-breed, claimed by plaintiff to be his father, were divorced four years before plaintiff was born, and that he is not the son or an heir of the half-breed.
(3) There was no abuse of discretion in refusing a new trial because of alleged newly discovered evidence.
F. D McMillen, for appellant.
H. G. Gearhart and C. O. Baldwin, for respondents.
This is an action to determine adverse claim to real estate in St. Louis county. The land, the title to which is in controversy, was patented by the United States to the heirs of Alexis La Framboise. Plaintiff claims that he is the son and heir of Alexis and therefore the owner of the land. At the time of his death, Alexis, who was a Sioux Indian of the half-blood, owned certain Sioux scrip which gave him a right to select and receive a patent for a given amount of government land. After his death, Ellen Cekiya, claiming to be his widow and sole heir, and the sole heir of their children, gave to one Burke a power of attorney to locate the scrip and sell the land when located and patented. The power to locate was exercised and the patent issued, as before stated. Burke then conveyed the land to defendant Day, who conveyed an undivided one-third to defendant Maher.
The issue is as to whether plaintiff is the son and heir of Alexis La Framboise. If he is, his claim of title to an undivided two-thirds of the land must be sustained. If he is not, the title of defendants is good. This is conceded. The trial court found that plaintiff was not the son of Alexis. He was admittedly the son of an Indian woman named Quana or Emma, who was once the wife of Alexis, but the court found that Alexis and Emma were divorced four years before the birth of plaintiff. The whole case turns on the question whether this so-called divorce, which was according to Indian customs, will be recognized by the courts as valid, as severing the marital relations of Alexis and Emma. The proper decision of this question, as we shall see, depends to a great extent upon the facts. The trial court found these as follows:
The father of Alexis La Framboise was a full-blooded Canadian Frenchman, the mother a Sioux Indian of the full-blood. Alexis was born near Fort Ridgeley, Minnesota. He became, and was at the time of his marriage, sufficiently educated in the English language to converse and write therein, and for a time served in a clerical capacity in a general merchandise store. He associated with the Sisseton-Wahpeton and Santee bands of Sioux Indians some of the time, adopted some of their customs, and was carried on the rolls of the United States government as a mixed-blood of the Sioux tribe of Indians. The scrip, under a part of which the land in controversy was located near the place of his birth, was so-called Sioux half-breed scrip, and was issued by the government to Alexis as a mixed-blood of the Sioux tribe. In 1859 Alexis duly intermarried with one Quana, or Emma, a Sioux Indian maiden, and for a time they lived together as husband and wife. During this time two children were born to them, both of whom died in infancy. In 1863 the marriage relation between Alexis and Emma was duly terminated. Thereafter and during the year 1867 plaintiff was born to Emma, and is her son. He is not the son or heir of Alexis.
As conclusions of law the court determined that defendants are the owners in fee of the land in dispute, and that plaintiff has no right, title or interest therein, and ordered judgment accordingly. Plaintiff made a motion for a new trial, assigning as grounds that the decision was not justified by the evidence and was contrary to law, that there were errors in certain rulings on the trial, and newly discovered evidence. The motion was denied, judgment was entered on the decision, and this appeal taken from the judgment.
The assignments of error raise two main questions for decision: Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the finding that the marriage relation between Alexis and Emma was duly terminated?
Was it error to refuse to grant a new trial because of newly discovered evidence?
1. Before taking up consideration of these questions we will dispose of the claim of plaintiff that the evidence to show an Indian divorce was not admissible under the pleadings. This is not difficult. The complaint alleged that Alexis La Framboise died intestate, leaving Emma La Framboise, his widow, and plaintiff his son, his sole surviving heirs at law. This allegation was met by a general denial. There can be no doubt that any evidence to show that Emma was not the widow of Alexis, or that plaintiff was not his son or heir, was admissible under the general denial. Evidence to prove a divorce went directly to this issue, and was properly received against the objection that divorce had not been pleaded.
2. The first real question on the merits is as to the validity of the Indian divorce. The claim is that the evidence to prove an Indian divorce was incompetent and legally insufficient to show that there was a divorce which the courts will recognize as terminating the marriage relation between Alexis and his Indian wife. The evidence does not leave a doubt that the parties were divorced if an Indian divorce will be recognized. According to the custom of the Sioux Indians an Indian marriage might be terminated, and either party be at liberty to marry again, by mere abandonment, without further ceremony. Alexis abandoned Emma in 1863, and the evidence though conflicting, sustains a finding that he did not return to her but took another wife. Whether the marriage relation between Alexis and Emma was "duly terminated" by this Indian divorce, as the trial court found it was, is an interesting question. Alexis was a half-breed, as stated. He was recognized by the Sisseton-Wahpeton band of Sioux as a member of the tribe; adopted its customs; lived and associated with its members; was on the rolls of the United States government, and received rations as a member thereof. As a Sioux half-breed the government issued to him the scrip which entitled his heirs to the land involved herein. He lived according to the Indian customs, and when he "bought" Quana, niece of Chief Other Day of the Shakopee band of Sioux, and took her to live with him, it was a marriage according to the Indian customs. That the courts of this state recognize this as a valid marriage...
To continue reading
Request your trial