Frame's Estate v. Frame

• Decision Date: 13 October 1911
• Docket Number: No. 7,354.,7,354.
• Citation: 96 N.E. 35,48 Ind.App. 481
• Parties: FRAME'S ESTATE v. FRAME et al.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

48 Ind.App. 481

96 N.E. 35

FRAME'S ESTATE

v.FRAME et al.

No. 7,354.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2.

Oct. 13, 1911.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pike County; John L. Bretz, Judge.

Action by John W. Frame and others against the estate of Matilda Frame, deceased; William C. Vawter, administrator. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Reversed, with directions.

De Witt Q. Chappell, for appellant. A. J. Rutledge, S. B. Hatfield, H. F. Fulling, and W. S. Hatfield, for appellees.

IBACH, J.

Matilda Frame was, under the terms of her husband's will, the life tenant of a farm in Warrick county. In July, 1907, she made an agreement with John H. Sasse, whereby he was to cultivate parts of the farm in wheat, under her direction, and deliver to her at threshing time, as her part of the crop, one-third of the grain raised. Mrs. Frame died in February, 1908, before the maturity of the crop sown by Sasse, in accordance with his agreement. After the wheat was threshed, the third part to come to Mrs. Frame was claimed both by appellant, her administrator, on behalf of the devisees and legatees under her will, and by appellees,the remaindermen in fee of the land under the will of Mrs. Frame's husband. By agreement the administrator was allowed to sell the wheat and keep the proceeds in lieu thereof, pending settlement by the court. Appellees filed a claim against decedent for the value of the wheat, and the cause was tried without jury on an agreed statement of facts, which contained all the evidence in the case. The court found that there was due appellees for rents of lands cultivated by tenant of said decedent the full amount held by the administrator to abide the event of this suit, and ordered him to pay over to appellees such sum received for the wheat sold.

Twenty errors are assigned, but the consideration of those assigning that the decision of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence, and that the decision of the court is contrary to law, will be sufficient, in view of the disposition made of the case.

Appellees base their claim on the following statute: “When a tenant for life who shall have demised any lands shall die on or after the day when any rent becomes due and payable, his executor or administrator may recover from the under-tenant the whole rent due; if he die before the day when any rent is to become due, they may recover the proportion of rent which accrued before his death, and the remaindermen shall recover the residue.” Burns' Statutes 1908, § 8069.

[1][2][3] Rents due to a life tenant at his death are collectible by his personal representative. Rents have not accrued until they become due, and grain rent, to be paid at threshing time, does not become due until that time. Rents, until they become due, are annexed to the real estate, and thus go with the reversion to the remainderman. Lowrey v. Reef, 1 Ind. App. 249, 27 N. E. 626;King v. Anderson, 20 Ind. 385;Watson v. Penn, 108 Ind. 21, 8 N. E. 636, 58 Am. Rep. 26;Henry v. Stevens, 108 Ind. 283, 9 N. E. 356;Murray v. Cazier, 23 Ind. App. 600, 53 N. E. 476, 55 N. E. 880. But growing annual crops belonging to a life tenant are a part of his personal property, and go to his estate. Burns' Statutes 1908, § 2777; Kluse v. Sparks, 10 Ind. App. 444, 36 N. E. 914, 37 N. E. 1047;Austin v. McMains, 14 Ind. App. 514, 43 N. E. 141;Shaffer v. Stevens, 143 Ind. 295, 42 N. E. 620. Both of these principles are fully settled and firmly incorporated in the law of our state by statute and by judicial interpretation.

[4] The controlling question in the present case is whether, under the contract with Mrs. Frame, Sasse leased the lands cultivated, and was her tenant, or whether, under his contract, he was a cropper, and thus a tenant in common of the crop with her. If the contract is a lease, creating the relation of landlord and tenant, and the third part of the grain was to go to Mrs. Frame as rent, appellees should recover under the statute; if the contract is a cropping agreement, creating the relation of tenants in common in the crop, appellant must recover, for in such case Mrs. Frame was, at the time of her death, the owner of an undivided interest in the growing wheat.

The decisions of the courts are not entirely in harmony in interpreting contracts where one farms the lands of another, and the crops are divided. Usually, if the contract is for a single season, it is held not to be a lease. The case of Scott v. Ramsey, 82 Ind. 330, holds that, even if such an agreement be considered a lease, the parties are tenants in common of the crop. In the case of Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Linard, 94 Ind. 319, 48 Am. Rep. 155, the court, after reviewing many cases, say: “The sounder view undoubtedly is that, where the terms of the contract are such as to show that the contracting parties understood and intended that the relation of landlord and tenant should be created thereby, the contract will be a lease, although the landlord is to be compensated for the use of the land by a portion of the crops raised.” The case of Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hart, 119 Ind. 273, 21 N. E. 753, 4 L. R. A. 549, holds that, where, under an arrangement between the owner of land and another person, the latter harvests the hay grown upon the land, and gathers the whole in stacks, he is to have three-fifths, and the landowner two-fifths, they are tenants in common of the hay in the stacks.

[5][6] The announcement in Chicago, etc., Co. v. Linard, supra, is in harmony with the general rule, as announced in 24 Cyc. 1466: “The intention of the parties, as expressed in the language they have used, interpreted in the light of the surrounding circumstances, controls in determining whether or not a given contract constitutes a lease. Where there is a reservation in the agreement of a certain portion of the crop eo nomine as rent, this necessarily constitutes a lease, and creates the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.”

In a leading case (Warner v. Abbey, 112 Mass. 355) the court say: “In construing contracts for the cultivation of land at halves, it is impossible to lay down a general rule applicable to all cases, because the precise nature of the interest or title between the contracting parties must depend upon the contract itself, and very slight provisions in the contract may very...