Henry v. Stevens

• Decision Date: 22 November 1886
• Citation: 108 Ind. 281,9 N.E. 356
• Parties: Henry, Adm'r, etc., v. Stevens.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

108 Ind. 281

9 N.E. 356

Henry, Adm'r, etc.,

v.Stevens.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

November 22, 1886.

Appeal from Fayette circuit court.

Action on promissory note.

Conner & Frost, for appellant. Chas. Roehl and J. J. Littell, for appellee.

Elliott, J.

This action was commenced by the appellee before a justice of the peace, and is founded on a promissory note executed by the appellee to James D. Stevens, guardian of Wells Stevens. The appellee filed an answer, alleging that the note was executed in payment of rent due the ward of appellant; that the rent for which the note was executed was for the term of one year; that, before the expiration of the year for which the land was demised, Wells Stevens died; that he was the owner of a life-estate only, in the land; that this estate terminated at his death; that the plaintiff was entitled to the rent which accrued prior to his death, to-wit, $120, and that of this sum the defendant had paid $100. For the rent unpaid the defendant offered to confess judgment. The case was certified to the circuit court; and there the appellee filed a reply, setting forth, in substance, these facts: That on the sixth day of April, 1861, Wells Stevens executed to the defendant a deed for the land in controversy; that the deed was executed for the purpose of defrauding the grantor's creditors; that it was the agreement between the parties that no title to the land should pass by the deed; that Wells Stevens had open and notorious possession of the land at the time the deed was executed, and held such possession, under claim of title, until the day of his death; and that the defendant never had any interest in the land.

We think the court did right in sustaining a demurrer to this reply. It is not good as a denial, for it is well settled that a general allegation of title is controlled by the specific facts pleaded, and that a pleading is to be judged from its general scope and tenor, and not by the fugitive denials cast into it. Reynolds v. Copeland, 71 Ind. 422;Neidefer v. Chastain, Id. 363; S. C. 36 Amer. Rep. 198; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Reed, 96 Ind. 195, and authorities cited page 198; Pennsylvania Co. v. Marion, 104 Ind. 239; S. C. 3 N. E. Rep. 874; Louisville, etc., Co. v. Schmidt, 106 Ind. 73, see page 74; S. C. 5 N. E. Rep. 684.

It is not good because of the averment that the deed was executed to defraud creditors, for it is perfectly well settled that a fraudulent conveyance is valid between the parties. Second Nat. Bank v. Brady, 96 Ind. 498;Edwards v. Haverstick, 53 Ind. 348;State Bank v. Davis, 4 Ind. 653.

It is not aided by the averment of the mutual agreement between the parties, because the...