Framers' Bank of Hickory v. Bradley
| Decision Date | 06 October 1926 |
| Docket Number | No. 26569.,26569. |
| Citation | 288 S.W. 774 |
| Parties | FARMERS' BANK OF HICKORY v. BRADLEY. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Action by Farmers' Bank of Hickory against Glade T. Bradley. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed by the Court of Appeals (271 S. W. 857), and the case was transferred to the Supreme Court, on the ground that there was a conflict in the decisions of the Courts of Appeals. Judgment of trial court reversed.
L. P. Main, of St. Joseph, for appellant.
Paul Barnett, of Sedalia, amicus curiæ.
Scott J. Miller, of Chillicothe, for respondent.
This is an action in replevin. Elva Brassfield and Zella Brassfield, his wife, were the owners of a farm in Grundy county, Mo., upon which they gave a deed of trust, duly acknowledged and recorded May 17, 1922, securing one note for the principal amount of $1,000, clue May 1, 1923, and five other notes, for $150 each. After defaulting in the payment of the $1,000 note, Elva Brassfield gave a chattel mortgage to respondent to secure a note for $1,214.95, with property described in said chattel mortgage as "75 acres of corn located on the farm where I reside, and other property," which was filed in the office of the recorder of deeds of Grundy county July 14, 1923, and 10 or 12 days thereafter he advised respondent's cashier that he had traded the farm off and was going to turn the corn over to him as security; that the corn was his and he should see after it. According to the abstract of the record, respondent's cashier "took possession" of the corn; but it does not appear when or how this was done. Thereafter, on August 31, 1923, the farm was sold under foreclosure of the deed of trust, and appellant herein became the purchaser and took possession thereof, together with said corn, none of which at that time had actually been severed from the ground, and respondent, on November 19. 1923, filed this action in replevin to recover the corn, with damages for its detention. The trial court, at the close of all the evidence, instructed the jury at plaintiff's request as follows:
"You are instructed, under the pleadings and the evidence in this case, to find for the plaintiff as to possession of the property, and that the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the property at the commencement of this action, and you will find the value of the plaintiff's lien on the corn in such sum as you deem proper from the evidence, and also the plaintiff's damages as such sum as you deem proper from the evidence."
The jury thereupon found for plaintiff, fixing the damages for detention at $250. Defendant perfected his appeal, and the Kansas City Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, but, deeming its decision in conflict with the decision of the Springfield Court of Appeals in Farmers' Bank of Mt. Vernon v. Parker, 215 Mo. App. 96, 245 S. W. 586, the case was transferred to this court.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals, considering only one assignment of error, held that the lien of the deed of trust was paramount to that of the chattel mortgage as to the growing corn crop not actually severed from the ground at the time of the foreclosure sale, and that the purchaser at the foreclosure sale took clear title thereto. The contrary doctrine was announced by the Springfield Court of Appeals in the Farmers' Bank of Mt. Vernon v. Parker, supra, although such announcement appears to have been unnecessary to a determination of the case, for the opinion recites that there was "an actual severance by cutting the wheat on June 20th, 6 days before the sale under the land mortgage." This opinion makes no assault upon the well-established rule that the lien of a deed of trust extends to the growing crop. In effect, it simply holds that the owner of the land, while in possession and before foreclosure, can mortgage the growing crop to a third party free and clear of the lien of the deed of trust, on the theory that this severance of ownership, called "constructive severance" in the opinion, is tantamount to an actual severance of the crop from the soil, which in this state has been heretofore considered as the only way the owner of the land could remove the growing crop from the lien of the deed of trust.
In disposing of this apparent conflict it is not necessary for us to discuss the reasons for the rule permitting the removal of the growing crop from the lien of the deed of trust by actual severance from the soil. Respondent in the instant case necessarily concedes the rule, and seeks to liken the act of severance of ownership to that of actual severance from the soil, and bring the former also within the rule. It is sufficient if we indicate some conclusive reasons, if any exist, why in this state the rule should not be extended or construed so that the mere act of severance of ownership would remove the growing crop from the lien of the deed of trust, and prevent title to the crop, unsevered from the ground at the time of the foreclosure sale, from passing to the purchaser thereat.
It is obvious that the grantee in the chattel mortgage has only such rights as were thereby transmitted to him, and the grantor could not transmit rights he did not have. We have uniformly held that neither the owner of the land nor his grantee could free the growing crop of the lien of the deed of trust, except by an actual severance from the soil before possession taken or foreclosure had under the deed of trust. Steele, to Use of Milroy et al., v. Farber et al., 37 Mo. 72 loc. cit. 80; Hayden v. Burkemper, 101 Mo. 644 loc. cit. 647, 14 S. W. 767, 20 Am. St. Rep. 643; Reed v. Swan, 133 Mo. 100, 34 S. W. 483; Jones on Mortgages, § 1658; 8 R. C. L. 362; 27 Cyc. 1144. Certainly this chattel mortgage is in no better position than the owner was, or an outright purchaser would have been. In so holding we fully recognize, and have heretofore held in Hayden v. Burkemper, 101 Mo. 644 loc. cit. 648, 14 S. W. 767, 20 Am. St. Rep. 643, that there may be a severance in the ownership of land and crops growing thereon; but such act of severance in and of itself does not relieve either property of the lien of a prior deed of trust. So much for the chattel mortgagee's claim that the growing corn crop was removed from the lien of the deed of trust by the landowner's execution and delivery of the chattel mortgage thereon.
Respondent's position, in the light of the unquestioned rights of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, is likewise untenable. It has long been the unbroken rule in this state that a conveyance of real estate, without reservation or exception, vests title to the growing crops, as well as the land, in the purchaser. In the words of Judge Black, speaking for this court in Hayden v....
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