France v. Bell
Decision Date | 15 June 1897 |
Citation | 71 N.W. 984,52 Neb. 57 |
Parties | FRANCE v. BELL ET AL. |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
1. In all actions in equity either party may appeal from the judgment or decree or final order made by the district court to the supreme court. Code Civ. Proc. § 675.
2. In an action to foreclose a mortgage it was determined and adjudged that the mortgage was void, and the mortgagee entitled to no relief thereon, and the action was continued for hearing of the controversy in regard to the indebtedness, the payment of which the mortgage purported to secure. Held to be a final order in relation to the mortgage, within the meaning of the Code, and appealable.
3. The mere fact that a grantor, in a conveyance of a family homestead, is described therein as a single person, will not estop the grantor from asserting the homestead character of the premises included in the conveyance, or the right of homestead therein, as against a grantee or mortgagee.
4. The homestead of married persons may be property the title to which is in either the husband or wife, and, to be valid, a mortgage thereof must be signed and acknowledged by both the husband and wife. The fact that they are not living together at the time of the execution of the instrument does not affect the rule or rob it of any of its force.
Appeal from district court, York county; Bates, Judge.
Action by George B. France against John Bell and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.Harlan & Taylor and Geo. B. France, for appellant.
F. C. Power, for appellees.
This action was instituted in the district court of York county to foreclose a mortgage on lot numbered 2 in block numbered 25 in the village of York, York county, Neb., which had been given to secure to appellant the payment of a promissory note in the principal sum of $100. In the answer it was stated: It was further pleaded in the answer that, on or about the date of the mortgage in suit, the son of appellee was held to answer to a criminal charge in the district court of York county, and desired to give a recognizance for his appearance before said court on a certain day, and it was represented to appellee by the attorneys (of whom appellant was one) who had been employed to defend her son that a note in the sum of $500 and a mortgage on her real estate must be delivered to the parties, to secure them in signing the recognizance as sureties; that she agreed to, and did, comply with this demand; that, about the time of the execution of the note and mortgage, she was about sixty-five years old, her eyesight was poor, and she did not have her spectacles, and could not or did not read the papers then signed, but was told that it was a note in the sum of five hundred dollars, and the mortgage to secure the same, and nothing other, further, or different; that, if the $100 note was then signed and included in the mortgage, it was without her knowledge and consent, and fraudulently procured to be done; and that the case in which the recognizance was given had been disposed of and ended, and she had become entitled to have the mortgage in suit canceled and annulled, for which, as relief, she prayed. The reply, to the extent it referred in direct terms to the portion of the answer in which the mortgaged property was described as the home of the appellee, was as follows: “The defendant admits that the said Amanda Bell, at the time of the execution of said mortgage deed, and ever since said time, was and has been residing upon the premises described in the petition and in said mortgage deed, and that said premises at that time were and have been of less value than $2,000, and are of the value of $500 or $600; and that the same consists of one lot within the corporate limits of New York, and the same is now a part of the city of York, all in York county, Nebraska; and that the said lot has a small dwelling thereon.” There was also stated in the reply that the mortgage had been given to secure the parties in signing the bail bond of appellee's son; and, further, that the $100 note evidenced the amount of the fee which was to be paid the attorneys in defense of appellee's son; and that the same was included in the mortgage with the full knowledge and agreement of appellee. There was also a general denial of all matters alleged in the answer not expressly admitted.
There was a hearing, the following being a copy of the journal entry thereat: ...
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Wells v. Shriver
...8 Minn. 96. Missouri--Guardian Sav. Bank v. Reilly. 8 Mo. App. 544. Compare Deickhart v. Rutgers, 45 Mo. 132. Nebraska - France v. Bell, 52 Neb. 57, 71 N.W. 984; Younkin v. Younkin, 44 Neb. 729, 63 N.W. 31, holding that such a decree is final in the sense that there can be no further inquir......
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Wells v. Shriver
...96 (Gil. 71). Missouri.--Guardian Sav. Bank v. Reilly, 8 Mo. App. 544. Compare Deickhart v. Rutgers, 45 Mo. 132. Nebraska.--France v. Bell, 52 Neb. 57, 71 N.W. 984; Younkin v. Younkin, 44 Neb. 729, 63 N.W. 31, that such a decree is final in the sense that there can be no further inquiry int......
- France v. Bell