Franceschi v. Hyatt Corp.
Decision Date | 16 January 1992 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 88-0285(PG). |
Citation | 782 F. Supp. 712 |
Parties | Astrid Castro FRANCESCHI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HYATT CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Harry Anduze, Hato Rey, P.R., for plaintiffs.
Keith A. Graffam, Old San Juan, P.R., for defendants.
In this case, the Court considers an issue of considerable import to civil rights, namely, whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits the exclusion, on the basis of race, ancestry, or ethnic background of non-registered guests to a privately owned hotel with a facially neutral "no visitors policy," see Defendant's Motion For Partial Reconsideration p. 4, but which allegedly excludes guests on impermissible grounds. The Court also considers the novel question whether intra-racial discrimination is actionable under § 1981. This Court answers both question in the affirmative. We hold, in light of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1990), Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) and Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 107 S.Ct. 2019, 95 L.Ed.2d 594 (1987), that § 1981 affords plaintiffs a remedy for the alleged wrong; therefore, Defendant's Motions for Dismissal And/Or Summary Judgment and For Partial Reconsideration must be denied.
A summary of the facts is a necessary prerequisite for a pellucid understanding of the interesting and novel issues raised by this case. Even though the parties, through a plethora of documents filed with this Court over a two year period, have bitterly contested virtually every statement of fact, we accept as true the facts alleged by the plaintiff for defendant moves for dismissal for failure to state a cause of action and or summary judgment. F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6); Chongris v. Board of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021, 107 S.Ct. 3266, 97 L.Ed.2d 765 (1987) ( ).
Plaintiffs, Ms. Astrid Castro Franceschi, Esq., and Annette Nogueras, seek damages and injunctive relief for the alleged refusal by Hyatt Cerromar Hotel1 (the "Hotel") to admit Ms. Castro's son, Miguel A. Nogueras, Esq., and daughter in law, Ms. Barbara F. Blanco, into its premises.2
On March 26, 1987, Ms. Castro and Ms. Nogueras registered as guests of the Hotel purportedly to attend an important 936 conference. Amended Complaint at par. 12. Ms. Castro invited Mr. Nogueras and Ms. Blanco to spend the afternoon at the Hotel and remain for dinner at the Hotel's restaurant. Id., at par. 14. Co-plaintiffs Nogueras and Blanco allege that upon arrival, they were denied entrance to the Hotel's premises by the guard on duty.3 According to co-plaintiffs, the guard informed them of the Hotel's no visitors policy and denied them access to the premises. Id., at par. 15. They were also informed that in order to contact Ms. Castro, they would have to drive to a public telephone down the road from the Hotel. Id.
Mr. Nogueras begrudgingly complied. He reached the public phone, contacted Ms. Castro at the Hotel, and explained the situation. After telling Mr. Nogueras that she would take care of the matter, Ms. Castro proceeded to the front desk of the Hotel. Id. At the front desk, Ms. Castro informed the clerk on duty that her son and daughter were at the gate, that they had been denied access to the premises, and that they were her invitees for the afternoon. Ms. Castro was then informed of the Hotel's no visitors policy. Id.
Unsatisfied with the explanation, Ms. Castro asked to see the manager, Ms. Carmen Garcia, who in essence repeated the Hotel's policy and reiterated that her invitees could not enter the premises. Id., at par. 16. Ms. Castro, a lawyer, protested that these were her guests and added that, pursuant to both state and federal law, they could not be denied access to a public accommodation such as the Hotel. Id.
Amended Complaint at par. 19.
Defendant, Hyatt Hotels of Puerto Rico,4 strenuously denies allegations that the Hotel, its management, officers or agents have ever had a hotel policy of racial or ethnic discrimination on the basis of visitors' hispanic ancestry and categorically denies that its management has ever excluded or denied access to anyone on the basis of the same. Answer to Amended Complaint at pp. 4-5. The Hotel emphasizes that 90% of its registered guests are of Puerto Rican descent. Because of this fact, it submits that it is illogical to assert that the Hotel has ever had a discriminatory hotel admission policy.5
In this action, plaintiffs seek money damages for violation of their civil and constitutional rights, injury to their integrity and reputation, infliction of emotional and mental anguish and "insidious" discriminatory practices. Plaintiffs also request attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. As the statutory bases for a cause of action, plaintiffs allege violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1988 and 2000a-1, 2000a-2, 2000a-3 & 2000a-6. Amended Complaint at par. 3. Not surprisingly, defendants deny, in essence, each and every allegation raised by the plaintiffs save the fact that one of four plaintiffs, Ms. Castro, was a registered guest of the Hotel when the alleged violation took place.
Following plaintiff's Amended Complaint And Defendant's Motion To Dismiss And/Or For Summary Judgment, a deluge of motions contributing niggardly to form or substance ensued. On September 25, 1990, this Court entered an Opinion and Order (1) granting summary judgment and dismissal of claims filed against Hyatt Corporation, (2) finding that plaintiffs stated a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, and (3) instructing the parties to file legal briefs on the question whether in light of Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987), intraracial discrimination is actionable under § 1981 et seq. 747 F.Supp. 138.
On October 18, 1990 defendants filed a Motion For Extension Of Time, where, for the first time, it was suggested that plaintiffs' action should be dismissed on the further ground that the scope of § 1981 had been curtailed by Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (hereinafter "Patterson"). Defendant Motion For Extension Of Time at par. 3. Although this Court finds both plaintiff and defendant's analysis in this area lacking, it is bound by the Patterson decision and must therefore reconsider its earlier finding in light of the aforementioned case. Upon review, this Court still adheres to its earlier findings and holds that the "full and equal benefit of all laws" clause of § 1981 affords plaintiff a cause of action. It further finds that § 1981 does not have a state action requirement and that claims of intra-racial discrimination are actionable under the section.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress enacted, in 1866 and again in 1871, a series of civil rights statutes with the intent of implementing the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Of particular interest in this case are the first two sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1866: 1981 and 1982. Section 1981 primarily concerns itself with racial discrimination in contractual relationships while section 1982 addresses discrimination in property transactions. Both statutes were enacted pursuant to authority granted to Congress by the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See e.g. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 440 n. 11, 93 S.Ct. 1090, 1095 n. 11, 35 L.Ed.2d 403 (1973); In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22, 3 S.Ct. 18, 29, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). As initially drafted, they were intended to "break down all discrimination between black men and white men." Cong.Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866); remarks of Senator Trumbull, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and chief proponent of the bill embodying both sections.
Seldom evoked prior to 1968, the civil rights statutes in general and § 1982 in particular became increasingly popular after the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968). Jones's holding to the effect that § 1982 proscribed private as well as public discrimination, presented a unique opportunity for redress to aggrieved parties who were the subject of private discrimination. The following year, the Court went a step further and decided, given the similarities in language construction between § 1981 and § 1982 and the absence of a state action requirement under the Thirteenth Amendment, that private discrimination in the creation and enforcement of contracts was...
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