Francini v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC

• Decision Date: 05 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 37258.,37258.
• Citation: 134 A.3d 1278,164 Conn.App. 279
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: William FRANCINI v. GOODSPEED AIRPORT, LLC, et al.

164 Conn.App. 279

134 A.3d 1278

William FRANCINI

v.GOODSPEED AIRPORT, LLC, et al.

No. 37258.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 20, 2015.

Decided April 5, 2016.

Jonathan D. Chomick, for the appellant (plaintiff).

John R. Bashaw, New Haven, with whom was Mary Mintel Miller, for the appellee (named defendant).

DiPENTIMA, C.J., and LAVINE and LAVERY, Js.

LAVERY, J.

The plaintiff, William Francini, appeals from the trial court's judgment granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant Goodspeed Airport, LLC.¹ On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the motion for summary judgment as a matter of law because the court wrongly concluded that an easement by necessity may be granted only to provide physical access to a landlocked parcel and not for the purpose of installing commercial utility lines. Although the issue of whether an easement by necessity is reserved only for physical access to a landlocked parcel is one of first impression for this court, we recognize that this issue has been squarely addressed by many of our sister states and by a federal magistrate judge in this state. We conclude that the court incorrectly concluded, as a matter or law, that an easement by necessity may be granted to a landlocked parcel only for the purpose of ingress and egress. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court.

The following facts, as alleged by the plaintiff and admitted by the defendant, are not in dispute for the purpose of this motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff owns a parcel of land in East Haddam. The parcel's only access to a public highway is over an abutting property, owned by the defendant. The defendant took title to its property by warranty deed in 1999, subject to a right-of-way easement now enjoyed by the plaintiff as well as several of the plaintiff's neighbors, landowners who also own land abutting the defendant's property. The 1999 warranty deed expressly described the right-of-way, in general terms and without limitations on its use, by providing for "[s]uch rights as others may have to a Right of Way over a passway or driveway as set forth in a deed from [the property's prior owner], dated August 16, 1963 and recorded in Volume 77 at Page 526 of the East Haddam Land Records...."

In 2001, the defendant entered into an agreement with several of the plaintiff's neighbors, who also share the plaintiff's right-of-way across the defendant's property, to allow the neighbors to improve the right-of-way by installing and maintaining a utility distribution system under the existing right-of-way easement. As a result, a commercial utility system was constructed under the existing right-of-way and now provides electricity to the plaintiff's neighbors. In exchange for this utility easement, each of the plaintiff's neighbors paid the defendant $7500. The plaintiff offered to pay the defendant the same $7500 that his neighbors had paid for use of the utility easement, but the defendant requested that the plaintiff not only pay the $7500, but also grant it the power to move the location of the easement at will. The plaintiff declined the additional terms and the two parties never reached an agreement. Without an agreement, the plaintiff does not enjoy an easement for commercial utilities and his property is currently landlocked from access to commercial electricity. Currently, the plaintiff's house is powered by a generator, but the generator is alleged to be insufficient to run and maintain the basic requirements of the plaintiff's house such as powering security devices, turning on automatically in the event of a flood, and running a refrigerator to preserve perishable food without constant operation of the generator.

In 2011, the plaintiff commenced this action seeking an easement by necessity for access to commercial utilities across the same right-of-way that he already owned and that already provided his neighbors with commercial electric power. In 2012, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, admitting the facts as alleged by the plaintiff for the purpose of the motion, and arguing that, under those facts, the plaintiff was not entitled to an easement by necessity for commercial utilities because easements by necessity may be granted only to provide physical access to landlocked parcels. The plaintiff opposed the motion by claiming that there was a dispute of material fact—his need for commercial electricity² —and maintaining that he was entitled to an easement by necessity for access to commercial utilities because electricity was reasonably necessary for the continued enjoyment of his property and connecting his property to the already existing utility easement would not unreasonably burden the defendant's property. The court, Aurigemma, J., granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that easements by necessity may not be granted for any purpose other than to provide physical access to a landlocked property. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that he is entitled to an easement by necessity for access to commercial utility services, i.e., electricity. Acknowledging that no such easement by necessity has yet been recognized by an appellate court in our state, the plaintiff argues that easements by necessity should be extended to provide access to commercial utilities because access to utilities, consistent with the easement's element of necessity, supply something that is highly convenient and beneficial to the use of property. The defendant responds that Connecticut law has recognized easements by necessity to exist only in the classic context of providing a property owner with physical access to a landlocked parcel for purposes of ingress and egress, which is to say that an easement for commercial utilities does not exist simply because one has never been granted before. The trial court, correctly observing that no such easement has ever been granted by an appellate court in this state, agreed with the defendant and rendered summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim. We reverse the judgment based on this conclusion of law and determine that easements by necessity for access to utility services exist in Connecticut.

Before we address the specific claim advanced in this appeal, we set forth the standard for appellate review of a court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment. Practice Book § 17–49

provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case.... The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.... In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fernandez v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 44 Conn.App. 220, 222, 688 A.2d 349 (1997)

.

The parties agree, however, that there is no dispute of material facts in this case. Instead, the plaintiff challenges only the court's conclusion of law, that an easement by necessity may not be granted to provide commercial electricity to a parcel cut off from commercial electricity. Accordingly, "[b]ecause the trial court rendered judgment for the [defendant] as a matter of law, our review is plenary and we must determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Soares v. George A. Tomasso Construction Corp., 66 Conn.App. 466, 469, 784 A.2d 1041 (2001)

. Moreover, the plaintiff's claim raises a question of law "concerning the court's application of the law of easements by necessity, over which our review is plenary." Thomas v. Primus, 148 Conn.App. 28, 32, 84 A.3d 916 (2014).

The common-law easement by necessity creates an implied servitude that burdens one piece of property, the servient estate, for the benefit of another, the dominant estate, to enable the normal "use and enjoyment of the [benefited] property." Id., at 33, 84 A.3d 916

; see also 1

Restatement Third), Property, Servitudes § 2.15

, comment (a), p. 203–204 (2000); 2 G. Thompson, Real Property (Permanent Ed.1939) § 550, p. 150 ("[the extent of] a way of necessity covers such a way as is required for the complete and beneficial use and enjoyment of the land to which such way is impliedly attached"). In the classic example, "an easement by necessity will be imposed where a conveyance by the grantor leaves the grantee with a parcel inaccessible save over the lands of the grantor, or where the grantor retains an adjoining parcel which he can reach only through the lands conveyed to the grantee." Hollywyle Assn., Inc. v. Hollister, 164 Conn. 389, 398–99, 324 A.2d 247 (1973). In such cases, the element of necessity lies in the grantee's inability to use his property beneficially because he lacks physical access to it, "[f]or the law will not presume, that it was the intention of the parties, that one should convey land to the other, in such manner that the grantee could derive no benefit from the conveyance; nor that he should so convey a portion as to deprive himself of the enjoyment of the remainder." Robinson v. Clapp, 65 Conn. 365, 385, 32 A. 939 (1895). In other words, "the necessity does not create the way, but merely furnishes...