Franciosa v. Hidden Pond Farm, Inc., 2017-0153
| Decision Date | 21 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2017-0153,2017-0153 |
| Citation | 195 A.3d 816,171 N.H. 350 |
| Parties | Anthony W. FRANCIOSA, III f/n/f Vaneesa S. Franciosa v. HIDDEN POND FARM, INC. & a. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Colliander & Brown, P.A., of Portsmouth (John D. Colliander on the brief, and David S. Brown orally), for the plaintiff.
Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer PC, of Manchester (Gary M. Burt and Clara E. Conklin on the brief and Mr. Burt orally), for the defendants.
The plaintiff, Anthony W. Franciosa as father and next friend of Vaneesa S. Franciosa, appeals an order of the Superior Court (Anderson, J.) granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, Jessica Grace Elliott and Hidden Pond Farm, Inc. a/k/a Hidden Pond Farm, and denying the plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court ruled that, pursuant to RSA 508:19 (2010), the defendants were entitled to immunity from liability for the injuries Vaneesa sustained in a horseback riding accident. We affirm.
The material facts are not in dispute. On July 20, 2014, Vaneesa was severely injured in a horseback riding accident. At the time of the accident, she was thirteen years old, had been riding horses for eight years, and had been taking weekly riding lessons from Elliott, an expert equestrian, for almost two years. Approximately once each week, Vaneesa also went on a "free ride" — a ride that did not involve a lesson. On those occasions, Elliott was not always present and no one was assigned to supervise Vaneesa.
On July 19, the day before the accident, Vaneesa texted Elliott to arrange a lesson for the following day. Elliott texted Vaneesa that, although she would not be present at the farm on the 20th, Vaneesa had permission to take a free ride on Wilma, a horse that Vaneesa had ridden without incident on at least two occasions. On July 20, after riding Wilma for about 30 minutes, Vaneesa fell to the ground as she tried to dismount. She was seriously injured when Wilma then stepped on her.
Before turning to the instant lawsuit, it is useful to review the statutory scheme in New Hampshire governing the liability of any person engaged in an equine activity. See RSA 508:19, II. Notably, more than 25 states have similar statutes, see Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutory Exemptions from Liability for Persons Injured by Equine or Equestrian Activities, 79 A.L.R.6th 487 (2012). Although courts in other jurisdictions have construed these statutes, see id., this is our first opportunity to interpret RSA 508:19. Enacted in 1998, RSA 508:19 limits the liability of persons engaged in equine activities "for an injury or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities." RSA 508:19, II. The pertinent portions of the statute are as follows:
The plaintiff filed this action against the defendants seeking damages for Vaneesa's injuries. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that the equine immunity provisions set forth in RSA 508:19 bar the plaintiff's negligence claim. The plaintiff filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that Vaneesa's injuries were not caused by an "inherent risk" of horseback riding, and, therefore, that the defendants are not immune from liability. Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that even if the statute applies, a jury trial was necessary to resolve issues of material fact regarding the statutory exceptions in RSA 508:19, III. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion.
In its order, the trial court concluded that Vaneesa's injuries resulted from the "inherent risks of equine activities." See RSA 508:19. The trial court also concluded that, as a matter of law, Elliott's conduct did not come within any of the exceptions to immunity set forth in RSA 508:19, III. Specifically, the trial court determined that the exception set forth in RSA 508:19, III(b) did not apply because "no reasonable juror could find that Elliott failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to assess [Vaneesa's] ability before [giving] her permission to ride Wilma." See RSA 508:19, III(b). The trial court also concluded that the exception in RSA 508:19, III(d) did not apply because the plaintiff could not establish proximate cause: in other words, the plaintiff failed to establish that Elliott's failure to supervise Vaneesa proximately caused the accident which resulted in Vaneesa's injuries. See RSA 508:19, III(d). The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
When reviewing the trial court's rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to each party in its capacity as the nonmoving party and, if no genuine issue of material fact exists, we determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. JMJ Properties, LLC v. Town of Auburn, 168 N.H. 127, 129, 122 A.3d 977 (2015). If our review of that evidence discloses no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, then we will affirm the grant of summary judgment. Id. at 129-30, 122 A.3d 977. A fact is material if it affects the outcome of the litigation under the applicable substantive law. Bond v. Martineau, 164 N.H. 210, 213, 53 A.3d 608 (2012). We review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo. Conant v. O'Meara, 167 N.H. 644, 648, 117 A.3d 692 (2015).
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and found that: (1) subject to certain limitations, RSA 508:19 immunizes equine professionals from negligence suits; (2) Vaneesa's injuries resulted from an inherent risk of equine activity; and (3) Elliott's conduct does not come within one of the exceptions to immunity set forth in paragraph III of RSA 508:19.
Resolution of the issues in this case requires that we engage in statutory interpretation. We review the trial court's statutory interpretation de novo. Olson v. Town of Grafton, 168 N.H. 563, 566, 133 A.3d 270 (2016). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole. Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721, 82 A.3d 917 (2013). We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id. Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole. Id. This enables us to...
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