Francis v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 20 February 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 37325--6,37325--6 |
| Parties | Adella J. FRANCIS and Henry J. Francis, Appellants, v. Theodore B. ANDERSON, d.b.a. Anderson Trucking Company, and Vernon M. Anderson, Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A motion for a directed verdict accepts the view of the entire evidence most favorable to the adverse party and admits the credibility (except in extreme cases) of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom.
2. Where there is evidence that will support a verdict it is error to direct a contrary verdict even though there is some evidence opposing it which must be discarded by the jury before such verdict can stand.
3. Where there is conflicting evidence, some of which will support a verdict and some of which negates the facts upon which a verdict must stand, it is error to direct a contrary verdict unless the evidence against it preponderates to such an extent that reasonable persons could not differ.
4. The facts in this case present a fact question concerning identity of the truck involved in the collision for th determination of the jury.
Elmer Wiblishauser, St. Paul, for appellants.
McGuigan & McGuigan, St. Paul, for respondents.
These are appeals from an order denying plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.
Originally, separate actions were commenced by Adelia J. Francis, to recover for personal injuries, and Henry J. Francis, to recover damages to his automobile and medical and hospital expenses for his wife resulting from a collision between plaintiffs' automobile and a truck. The actions were consolidated for trial and have been consolidated here. They involve the same question so they will be considered as one case.
In these actions plaintiffs allege that the automobile owned by Henry J. Francis, and driven by Adelia J. Francis, was struck by a truck owned by defendant Theodore B. Anderson, doing business as Anderson Trucking Company, and driven by defendant Vernon M. Anderson at the time of the alleged collision. The collision is alleged to have occurred on March 23, 1956, on Trunk Highway No. 13, a short distance south of what is known as Happy Hollow Bridge or the First Bridge. At the close of all the evidence the trial court directed verdicts for defendants on the ground that the evidence as presented left 'little more than pure conjecture and speculation upon which to base a finding that it was defendant's truck that was (involved) in the accident in question.'
Plaintiffs thereafter moved for a new trial on the ground that the court erred in directing a verdict. The only question before us on this appeal is whether the evidence presented a fact question for the jury's determination.
1--2--3. The rules governing directed verdicts have been repeated so often that it seems useless to again repeat them here. 1
In passing upon such motion the entire evidence must be taken into consideration. Where there is conflicting evidence, some of which supports a verdict and some of which negates the facts upon which it must rest, the court must accept the credibility of the evidence in favor of the verdict, and, if that, standing alone, would be sufficient to sustain a verdict, then it is improper to direct a contrary verdict.
In Hanson v. Homeland Ins. Co., 232 Minn. 403, 404, 45 N.W.2d 637, 638, we said:
Before a contrary verdict may be directed under the above rule it must appear that the evidence against a verdict overwhelmingly preponderates over that which favors a verdict. Where there is evidence against a verdict for a plaintiff, which the jury may disbelieve, a contrary verdict may not be directed if the evidence in favor of a verdict would have been sufficient except for such evidence against it. In Kundiger v. Prudential Ins. Co., 219 Minn. 25, 28, 17 N.W.2d 49, 51, we said:
'* * * The 'test is not whether the court might in the exercise of its discretion grant a new trial,' but whether 'it would be its manifest duty to set aside a contrary verdict.' Applequist v. Oliver Iron Min. Co., 209 Minn. (230) 235, 296 N.W. (13) 15, * * *. 'Manifest duty to set aside a verdict' involves no discretion, no weighing of testimony, nor passing upon the credibility of witnesses, except in those extreme cases 'where the evidence is 'so overwhelmingly on one side as to leave no room to doubt what the fact is." Brulla v. Cassady, 206 Minn. (398) 410, 289 N.W. (404) 410, * * *.'
In the final analysis, it is for the jury to determine from all the evidence whether the alleged facts exist. If there is evidence from which an inference of negligence may be drawn, even though some evidence must be discarded in order to do so, then a fact question usually exists for the jury's determination. The rule stated in Hanson v. Homeland Ins. Co. supra, can be applied only when it can be said as a matter of law that the evidence against a verdict preponderates over that which favors a verdict to such an extent that reasonable persons could not differ. 2
4. Applying these rules to the facts in this case, the question arises whether the evidence which negates the fact that defendants' truck was involved in this automobile accident overwhelmingly preponderates over that from which the jury could infer that defendants' truck was involved.
In support of an inference that defendants' truck was involved in the collision, we may accept the following facts as being within the permissible range of findings which might be made by the jury.
Plaintiff Adelia J. Francis left her home on March 23, 1956, driving her husband's car, a 1952 Buick, to her work. She traveled on Highway No. 13 south toward Mendota and proceeded downhill after having passed the cross street of Annapolis. She then noticed through her rearview mirror that a truck was following her, proceeding in the same direction as she was traveling. The truck was approximately four car lengths behind her car when she first observed it. She then reduced her speed to about 20 miles per hour and kept to the right side of the highway. At the bottom of the hill she approached a concrete bridge, known as First Bridge or sometimes as Happy Hollow Bridge. At this point she increased her speed to 30 miles per hour, and, as she passed over the bridge, she again observed the truck following her, then about one and one-half car lengths behind her. The highway at this point is straight and level and about 20 feet wide, with a posted speed limit of 40 miles per hour.
After proceeding about a block beyond the bridge, Mrs. Francis observed the truck to be about 7 feet behind her. Believing that the driver of the truck was about to pass, she pulled over to the right side of the highway about a foot farther than she had been traveling. She then noticed that the truck was only a few inches from her bumper and it continued to follow her very closely for about half a block. She observed that the hood of the truck was red. Soon thereafter the right side of the bumper of the truck struck the rear left section of her car, pushing it ahead and to the right about 2 1/2 feet. Immediately after this impact, the truck passed her car, and at this point Mrs. Francis and the driver of the truck looked at each other. She observed that he wore a hat high on his forehead; that he wore glasses having a dark heavy top; that he was light complexioned; that he was heavy set; and that he wore a dark overcoat or dark jacket. She...
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...N.W.2d 637, 638; Hanrahan v. Safway Steel Scaffold Co. of Minnesota, 233 Minn. 171, 176-177, 46 N.W.2d 243, 247; Francis v. Anderson, 254 Minn. 341, 343-344, 95 N.W.2d 79, 81. Thus in Minnesota a mere "scintilla of evidence" is not sufficient to create a question for the jury. The Minnesota......
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