Francis v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles

• Citation: 338 Conn. 347,258 A.3d 71
• Decision Date: 16 March 2021
• Docket Number: SC 20377
• Parties: Ernest FRANCIS v. BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

338 Conn. 347

258 A.3d 71

Ernest FRANCIS

v.BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES et al.

SC 20377

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 16, 2020

Officially released March 16, 2021^*

Ernest Francis, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

James M. Belforti, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Clare E. Kindall, solicitor general, for the appellees (defendants).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Vertefeuille, Js.

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

The plaintiff, Ernest Francis, an inmate in a Connecticut correctional facility, brought this declaratory judgment action, proceeding pro se, against the defendants, the Board of Pardons and Paroles (board) and the Commissioner of Correction (commissioner). The plaintiff sought a judgment declaring that General Statutes § 54-125g¹ applies to him, that the commissioner must factor his eligibility for early release under § 54-125g into his "time sheet,’’² and that the commissioner must "schedule dates to determine [his] suitability for release.’’ Thereafter, the trial court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to file briefs addressing the issue of whether the plaintiff's claims were ripe for review given that, even if § 54-125g applied to the plaintiff, he would not be eligible for parole under the statute for several years. After a hearing on that issue, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff's claims were not ripe and dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment in a memorandum decision. Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles , 189 Conn. App. 906, 204 A.3d 1263 (2019). This court granted the plaintiff's petition for certification on the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly uphold the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's declaratory judgment action as not ripe?’’ Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles , 333 Conn. 907, 215 A.3d 731 (2019). We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following facts, which the trial court reasonably could have found or are undisputed, and procedural history. In 1992, the plaintiff was convicted of murder and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. The plaintiff has been incarcerated since August 30, 1990, and contends that, after applying the sentence reductions that he has earned and will continue to earn pursuant to General Statutes §§ 18-7a³ and 18-98a,⁴ his estimated release date is approximately August 18, 2025. According to the commissioner, the plaintiff's maximum release date after applying the sentence reductions that the plaintiff had already earned as of March 16, 2020,⁵ was October 4, 2027.

In 2013, the plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brought this declaratory judgment action against the defendants, alleging that he will be eligible for early release after serving 95 percent of his sentence pursuant to § 54-125g and that the defendants had failed to include his eligibility for early release in calculating his estimated release date. The plaintiff sought a judgment declaring that § 54-125g is applicable to him, that the commissioner must factor his eligibility for early release under § 54-125g into his time sheet, and that the commissioner "should schedule dates to determine [his] suitability for release.’’ Thereafter, the trial court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to file briefs on the issue of whether the plaintiff's claims were ripe. In his brief, the plaintiff contended that the trial court should construe the term "definite sentence,’’ as used in § 54-125g, to mean the sentence that an inmate will actually serve and not the full amount of the sentence imposed by the sentencing court because, otherwise, he would never serve 95 percent of his sentence. The plaintiff also contended that his eligibility for various rehabilitative programs that are offered in prison is dependent on his eligibility for parole under § 54-125g. He further contended that the board's website indicated that persons convicted of murder are not eligible for parole, and he attached a copy of the website page to his brief.

The defendants argued in their brief on the ripeness issue that the plaintiff's claims were not ripe because the term "definite sentence’’ means the full amount of the sentence imposed by the trial court, not the sentence that an inmate will actually serve after the application of the various statutory credits. The defendants contended that, because the plaintiff had not served and, indeed, would almost certainly never serve, 95 percent of his fifty year sentence, the plaintiff's claim that he was eligible for parole under § 54-125g was not ripe. The defendants further contended that, even if the plaintiff were correct that "definite sentence’’ means the length of the sentence after the application of the various statutory credits, his claim still would not be ripe because he would not have served 95 percent of that sentence until approximately January, 2024.

At the hearing on the ripeness issue, the plaintiff again referred the trial court to the board's website, indicating that prisoners convicted of murder are not eligible for parole. The plaintiff contended that, because, according to him, parole eligibility is a prerequisite for eligibility for rehabilitative programs, he would be effectively ineligible for such programs if § 54-125g did not apply to him.

In its memorandum of decision, which was dated December 28, 2017, the trial court concluded that, "even under the rosiest possible scenario, the plaintiff would not be eligible for parole until 2024.’’ Accordingly, the court concluded that, although, "with the passage of time, the issue raised by the plaintiff may indeed become ripe for adjudication, it is not ripe at present, at least six years prior to the earliest possible triggering event.’’ Thus, the court appears to have assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiff was correct that the term "definite sentence,’’ as used in § 54-125g, means the sentence that a convicted defendant will actually serve. The court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint without prejudice to his reassertion of the claims in a future action filed on or after January 1, 2022.

The plaintiff then appealed to the Appellate Court. The sole claim that the plaintiff made in his brief to that court was that the trial court had applied an improper standard when it determined that his claims were not ripe. Specifically, the plaintiff pointed out that, in its memorandum of decision, the trial court had stated that, "[i]n reviewing this matter prior to trial, the court recognized the possibility that the matter was not currently ripe for adjudication ....’’ The plaintiff contended that the mere possibility that the matter was not ripe was not sufficient to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. The defendants again claimed as an alternative ground for affirmance—without expressly denominating the claim as such—that the term "definite sentence’’ means the full sentence that is imposed by the sentencing court, not the sentence that a defendant actually serves. Because the plaintiff would never serve 95 percent of his fifty year sentence, the defendants argued, his claim was not ripe. The Appellate Court summarily affirmed the judgment of the trial court in a memorandum decision. Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles , supra, 189 Conn. App. 906, 204 A.3d 1263.

This certified appeal followed. The plaintiff contends on appeal that his claims are justiciable because, if this court determines that § 54-125g applies to him, the board can provide him with a "parole date,’’ and he will then be eligible for rehabilitation programs.⁶ Although his brief to this court does not expressly raise the issue, it is implicit in this claim that, as the defendant claimed below, the term "definite sentence,’’ as used in the statute, means the sentence that the trial court imposed less any accrued statutory credits. The defendants again contend, essentially as an alternative ground for affirmance, that the plaintiff's claim is not ripe because "definite sentence,’’ as used in § 54-125g, means the sentence that the trial court imposed, not the sentence as reduced by the various statutory credits. They argue that, even if § 54-125g applies to inmates, like the plaintiff, who have been convicted of murder, because it is virtually certain that the plaintiff will never serve 95 percent of his fifty year sentence, he will never become eligible for parole under the statute.⁷ Accordingly, they argue that the plaintiff's claim is not ripe because it is contingent on an event that will not occur.

We agree with the defendants that the plaintiff's claim is nonjusticiable because the term "definite sentence’’ means the full amount of the sentence that the trial court imposed. Although we ordinarily would not address an alternative ground for affirmance without first determining that the ruling that the appellant has challenged on appeal was incorrect, we do so in the present case because it is clear to us, for the reasons discussed subsequently in this opinion, that the term "definite sentence,’’ as used in § 54-125g, means the full amount of the sentence imposed by the trial court. Accordingly, it is clear that the plaintiff's claims are nonjusticiable because they are contingent on an event that will never occur, namely, his serving 95 percent of his definite sentence of fifty years imprisonment.⁸ It is a closer and more difficult question whether the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff's claim is not ripe because it is contingent on an event that will transpire with virtual certainty—namely, the defendant's serving 95 percent of his sentence as reduced by the various statutory credits—but not in the near future.⁹ Cf. Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager , 288 Conn. 69, 86–87, 952 A.2d 1 (2008) ("in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case ...