Francis v. Carusso

• Decision Date: 04 November 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 3:22-cv-1191 (CSH)
• Parties: ERNEST FRANCIS, Plaintiff, v. FRANCESCA CARUSSO, PROJECT MORE COUNSELOR; GRANT, PAROLE SUPERVISOR; REDELL THOMAS, DIRECTOR; and JOHN DOE BIVENS, PAROLE SUPERVISOR, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

ERNEST FRANCIS, Plaintiff,
v.
FRANCESCA CARUSSO, PROJECT MORE COUNSELOR; GRANT, PAROLE SUPERVISOR; REDELL THOMAS, DIRECTOR; and JOHN DOE BIVENS, PAROLE SUPERVISOR, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-1191 (CSH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

November 4, 2022

INIITAL REVIEW ORDER AND RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DOC. 3]

CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR. Senior United States District Judge.

Pro se plaintiff, Ernest Francis, currently residing at the Walter Brooks House in New Haven, Connecticut, has filed a complaint pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four state employee defendants. Defendants Francesca Caruso^[1]and Redell Thomas are employed at Walter Brooks House, a halfway house for Connecticut inmates. Defendants Grant and Bivens are employed by the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Parole. Defendants are named in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief.^[2]

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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a prisoner's civil complaint seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee and dismiss any portion that “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). Although highly detailed allegations are not required, the Complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This plausibility standard is not a “probability requirement” but imposes a standard higher than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

In reviewing the complaint, the Court must “draw all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor, assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 596 (2d Cir. 2000). However, the Court is “not bound to accept conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions.” Faber, 648 F.3d at 104 (quoting Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2008)). Moreover, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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Consequently, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Ultimately, “determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common sense.” Id. at 663-64 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Dismissal of the complaint is only appropriate if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Cruz, 202 F.3d at 597 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). “This rule applies with particular force where the plaintiff alleges civil rights violations or where the complaint is submitted Pro se.” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1998).

With respect to Pro se litigants, it is well-established that “[p]ro se submissions are reviewed with special solicitude, and ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'” Matheson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 706 Fed.Appx. 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). See also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed Pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,' and ‘a Pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'”) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

This liberal approach, however, does not exempt Pro se litigants from the minimum pleading requirements described above: a Pro se complaint still must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its fact.” Mancuso v. Hynes, 379 Fed.Appx. 60, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Therefore, even in a Pro se case, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

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action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may not “invent factual allegations that [the plaintiff] has not pled.” Id.

II. BACKGROUND

The facts recounted herein are those alleged in the Complaint [Doc. 1]. For purposes of this review, they are accepted as true and all inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Faber, 648 F.3d at 104; Cruz, 202 F.3d at 596.

Plaintiff currently resides at Walter Brooks House in New Haven, Connecticut.^[3]Doc. 1 (“Complaint”), ¶ 6. Plaintiff was convicted of murder and, on April 15, 1992, was sentenced to a term of fifty years imprisonment.^[4] Id. ¶ 11. On February 22, 2022, the Board of Pardons and Parole granted Plaintiff a commutation and reduced his sentence by three years, eleven months, and one day. Id. The commutation made Plaintiff “immediately eligible for a Halfway House placement.” Id. ¶ 12.

Plaintiff alleges that he “does not drink or smoke narcotics,” and he “does not suffer from any mental health issues.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that “[s]ince his transfer to Walter Brooks [H]ouse,

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he has followed all rules and regulations ....” Id. However, because he is outspoken about his perceived “lack of rehabilitation offered [to residents] at the facility,” he has “become the target of staff.” Id. When he entered the facility, Plaintiff noted that “the house was infested with drugs” and “not conducive to his rehabilitation.” Id. ¶ 13. Due to the pervasive “culture of drug-use, Plaintiff “was forced to act on his own and make strides toward his acclimation into society.” Id. ¶ 14. As a result of his dissatisfaction, Plaintiff “filed several complaints [about] the Walter Brooks facility in the form of several grievances.” Id.

One grievance concerned the denial of Transitional Placement by the Director of Parole.^[5]Id. ¶ 15. In particular, Plaintiff was denied Transitional Placement on April 16, 2022, and advised to resubmit his application in October. Id. Plaintiff noted, however, that current parole rules permitted resubmission of such a request within four months of a denial, as opposed to six. Id. Moreover, Plaintiff contends that another inmate who was the same age as Plaintiff, was convicted of the same crime, worked at the same job, and had similar savings in his account was granted Transitional Placement while he was denied. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the only differences between him and the other inmate were his skin color and the fact that Plaintiff “ha[d] been

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outspoken as to his lack of assistance from the Walter Brooks [H]ouse and parole.” Id.

When Plaintiff filed his grievance regarding denial of Transitional Placement, he did not receive a receipt or any acknowledgement that he had filed it. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff noted that Walter Brooks House does not have a Department of Correction (“DOC”) approved administrative remedies box; rather, there are two unlocked boxes marked “administrative remedies” and “health remedies.”^[6] Id. (capitalizations omitted). There is no DOC grievance coordinator assigned to Walter Brooks House to retrieve and process grievances. Id. Walter Brooks has created its own grievance forms. Id. In addition, Walter Brooks staff are “solely responsible” for handling the grievances, a situation Plaintiff believes creates “a conflict of interest.” Id. ¶ 17.

On August 4, 2022, Plaintiff asked Counselor Francesca Caruso to provide him with an administrative remedies form. Id. ¶ 18. She denied the request. Id. Plaintiff made several calls to the Board of Pardons and Parole and was assured that grievance forms would be made available at all halfway houses. Id. A week later, after Plaintiff placed several more calls to the Board of Pardons and Parole, Counselor Caruso gave him an administrative remedies form. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff completed the form, alleging that he was denied Transitional Placement by the Board of Pardons and Parole “for insufficient reasons.” Id. ¶ 20. He then asked Redell Thomas, the Director of Walter Brooks House, to file the form with DOC. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. Defendant Thomas refused, stating, “Whatever problem you have is between you and Parole” and “[I am] not getting in the

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middle of that s-t.” Id. ¶ 20.

Upon entry to Walter Brooks House, Plaintiff had been assigned Defendant Caruso as his counselor. Id. ¶ 21. However, she failed to take any “meaningful action” to assist him in his rehabilitation; he thus had to obtain “his own Husky [health insurance], Social Security card and other programs and services.” Id. Plaintiff became “perturbed” with what he perceived as the “inefficiency” at Walter Brooks House. Id. ¶ 22. He thus posted a Google review of the facility stating that Defendants Caruso and Thomas were “inefficient.” Id.

After he filed several grievances, Plaintiff was issued “several write-ups for [being] out of place in the community.” Id. ¶ 23. After Plaintiff posted his Google review, Defendant Caruso “ratcheted up her microaggressions, and made [him] the target of her retaliation.” Id. ¶ 24. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Caruso then “formed an alliance” with Defendant Parole...