Francis v. City of Schenectady
Decision Date | 30 September 2022 |
Docket Number | 1:20-CV-00703 (LEK/TWD) |
Parties | TYRELL FRANCIS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SCHENECTADY, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Plaintiff Tyrell Francis commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C §§ 1983 and 1988 on June 24, 2020, against the City of Schenectady (or “City”), the County of Schenectady (or “County”), Detective Craig Comley of the Schenectady Police Department (or “SPD”), and John and Jane Doe Defendants 1-10 (“John and Jane Doe Defendants”). Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 7-11, 14 (“Complaint”). The County of Schenectady filed a motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 8, and On March 24, 2021, this Court issued a Memorandum-Decision and Order that terminated the County from the docket. Dkt. No. 18 at 5 (“March 2021 Order”). Thereafter, the City of Schenectady, Comley, and John and Jane Doe Defendants remained. See generally Docket.
On January 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, bringing § 1983 and § 1988 claims against the City of Schenectady, Schenectady Police Department Detectives Craig Comley, Steven Nelson, Bret Ferris, Christopher Semione, Eric Peters, Shane Cieszynski, Matthew Hoy, and unnamed John and Jane Doe Defendants 1-10. Dkt. No. 53-3 ¶¶ 12, 20 (“Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Complaint”); Dkt. No. 53 (“Plaintiff's Motion to File Amended Complaint”). On February 22, 2022, the City of Schenectady and Comley (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a Cross-Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 61 (“Defendants' Cross-Motion”). Plaintiff filed a response on April 29, 2022. Dkt. No. 67 (“Plaintiff's Response”). Defendants filed a reply on May 6, 2022. Dkt. No. 68 (“Defendants' Reply”). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion to File Amended Complaint and denies Defendants' Cross-Motion.
The factual allegations in Plaintiff's original Complaint are set forth in the Court's March 2021 Order, familiarity with which is assumed. March 2021 Order at 1-2.
With regard to Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n September 13, 2018, plaintiff attended a meeting with his parole officer, at which time he was arrested on a parole violation and thereafter imprisoned in the Schenectady County Jail.” Dkt. No. 53-1 at 2 (“Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law”). Plaintiff asserts:
Id. Plaintiff asserts that he “was returned to the custody of the Schenectady County Jail and imprisoned there solely on the basis of this new arrest.” Id.
Plaintiff claims that he “was arrested notwithstanding that defendants knew or otherwise deliberately disregarded the fact that plaintiff could not have committed the September 13, 2018 offense insofar as he was at the NYS Parole office to meet with his parole officer at the time of the alleged offense.” Id. at 2-3. According to Plaintiff this “verifiable alibi as to the September 13, 2018 incident . . . vitiated probable cause to arrest as to the September 11, 2018 offense.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff also states that he “had a verifiable alibi as to the September 11, 2018 offense, to wit: plaintiff had attended a dinner with his fiance, which was hosted by his friend, and both parties were able to attest to plaintiff's presence at the dinner on the aforementioned date.” Id.
Id. at 4. According to Plaintiff, after he was incarcerated in Schenectady County Jail “the charges were dismissed and sealed in Schenectady County City Court, and plaintiff was released into New York State custody to then serve out his aforementioned sentence for his parole violation.” Id. at 3-4.
The City of Schenectady and Comley dispute Plaintiff's version of the facts. According to Defendants, four criminal charges were filed against Plaintiff, but Plaintiff contests only the charges for criminal possession of a controlled substance on September 11, 2018, and September 13, 2018. Dkt. No. 61-15 at 1 (“Defendants' Memorandum of Law”). Defendants assert: “[Comley] directly and personally observed Plaintiff engage with the SPD's CI [(‘Confidential Informant')] on both September 11, 2018 and September 13, 2018 (controlled wire buys that [Comley] recorded through video and audio surveillance footage) . . . .” Id. at 23 (emphasis omitted). Furthermore, Defendants assert that “[Comley] additionally conducted a valid photo array on September 25, 2018, where the same CI who was present with Plaintiff during the September 11, 2018 and September 13, 2018 controlled wire buys identified Plaintiff out of a photo array consisting of six (6) very similar individuals . . . .” Id. at 24. Plaintiff contests these assertions at length in his Response. Pl.'s Resp. at 9-12.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), notwithstanding the provisions set forth in Rule 15(a)(1): Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).
“Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes a liberal policy in favor of allowing amendments.” Warboys v. Proulx, 303 F.Supp.2d 111, 115 (D. Conn. 2004); United States v. New York, 82 F.R.D. 2, 4 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (). “In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowing the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.'” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). “[T]he grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.” Id.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Complaint should be denied based on bad faith, undue delay, and futility. Defs.' Mem. of Law at 1-2.
“Few courts have denied leave to amend on the basis of bad faith.” Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 199 F.R.D. 61, 80 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). “It is well established . . . that ‘when the opponent of an amendment asserts that the movant is acting in bad faith there must be something more than mere delay or inadvertence' to warrant denial of a Rule 15 motion.'” Id. (quoting Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. DirectTV, Inc., No. 99-CV-3307, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5022, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2000)). “A finding that a party is seeking leave to amend solely to gain a tactical advantage . . . supports a finding that such an amendment is made in bad faith.” Oneida Indian Nation, 199 F.R.D. at 80. “However, ‘it is [often] hard to tell the difference between a legitimate strategic choice and bad faith conduct, and cour...
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