Francis v. Eddy

• Decision Date: 03 May 1892
• Citation: 52 N.W. 42,49 Minn. 447
• Parties: FRANCIS v EDDY ET AL.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

49 Minn. 447

52 N.W. 42

FRANCISvEDDY ET AL.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 3, 1892.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Action by a real-estate broker to recover commissions for procuring a purchaser for defendants' property. Held, that the evidence did not justify the verdict, because it did not show that plaintiff procured the purchaser, or that his efforts were the procuring cause of the sale.

Appeal from municipal court of Minneapolis; MAHONEY, Judge.

Action by S. J. Francis against E. W. Eddy and others to recover compensation as a real-estate broker. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed.

J. E. Waters, for appellants.

Hart & Brewer, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover compensation, as a real-estate broker, for procuring a purchaser for a lot belonging to the defendants. The evidence discloses substantially the following state of facts: The lot had been on the market about two years. It was, and during all that time had been, listed for sale by defendants with another broker, named Tabour. Plaintiff solicited defendants to list it with him, and to give him the exclusive sale of it. Defendants did list it with him under a contract to the effect that, if he procured a purchaser “at such price as defendants should agree on,” (that is, at a price acceptable to defendants,) they would pay him a reasonable commission; but they declined to give him any exclusive agency. Plaintiff knew that the property was also listed with Tabour. Stress is laid upon the fact that defendant Eddy, although declining to give plaintiff the exclusive agency, said to him: “You notify me who your customers are, and if you have any one that means business, and the property is sold to that customer, you will get your commission just the same;” but we see nothing in this which at all changes the legal effect of the contract as above stated, which is exactly as it is alleged in the complaint. Defendants' asking price was $10,000, but they had given the brokers to understand that they would shade this somewhat, if necessary to effect a sale. Collom (the purchaser whom plaintiff claims to have procured) already knew that the property was for sale, and was listed with Tabour. In fact, a year or two before, he had made Tabour an offer for the property, which defendants refused to accept, when the negotiations had for the time terminated. It also appears that about the time, or shortly before, the property was listed with plaintiff, and before Collom knew the fact, he had had some talk about the property with Tabour's clerk, who gave him a price on the property higher than that for which it was afterwards sold. Plaintiff, after the property was listed with him, advertised it, giving its general location, but apparently not describing the particular lot. Collom saw this advertisement, and, inferring that it referred to the lot in question, went to plaintiff's office, and inquired what it could be bought for, to which plaintiff replied, “$10,000.” Collom left, saying he would see plaintiff again soon, evidently not having made up his mind whether he would buy. Plaintiff immediately went and told defendant Eddy that Collom had been to see him about the property. Eddy remarked: “He is the most prospective party you have struck yet. Go and see him again.” Thereupon plaintiff went to see Collom, and after some talk, at which no decision was arrived at, Collom said he would see plaintiff the next afternoon, and let him know. So far as appears, $10,000 was the only price ever named by plaintiff to Collom. This ended plaintiff's connection with the matter. Collom never went to see plaintiff again, but the next day, having started for Tabour's office to see him about different...