Francis v. Northcote

• Decision Date: 01 January 1851
• Parties: FRANCIS, ADM'R, v. NORTHCOTE.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

6 Tex. 185

FRANCIS, ADM'R,

v.NORTHCOTE.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1851.

The powers of the County Court as a court of probate are defined and limited by the Constitution and the laws enacted in pursuance thereof, and it possesses no powers except those enumerated.

The County Court has no authority to cite an administrator who has rendered his account and been discharged to come into court for the purpose of restating his account; after an administrator has been discharged, the jurisdiction of the County Court as to him is terminated. (Note 29.)

It is not necessary, before suing an administrator and his sureties in the District Court, to establish the fact and amount of his indebtedness by a proceeding against him for that purpose in the County Court, but the proper mode of proceeding is to sue on the bond in the District Court in the first instance. (Note 30.)

Appeal from Austin. This was a suit brought by the appellant as administrator de bonis non of the estate of John D. Harvey, deceased, in the County Court against the appellee as former administrator of the estate. The petition alleged that the defendant, Northcote, had long since gone beyond the jurisdiction of the court; that he did not account truly for the effects of the estate in his hands as administrator, but that he squandered and wasted the same, and “is now liable to the estate for a large amount as for a devastavit.” It asked the court to re-examine and restate his account as administrator, and to give judgment against him for the amount which might be found to be due the estate. The petition did not state, nor did it appear from the record, in what manner the administration of the defendant was terminated; but it appeared that it was terminated before the commencement of this suit.

The defendant objected to the jurisdiction of the County Court, but the court overruled the objection, and after hearing the case gave judgment for the plaintiff for six thousand nine hundred and fifty-five dollars, with interest, &c. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the District Court. That Court sustained the objection to the jurisdiction of the County Court, and gave judgment for the defendant upon his demurrer to the petition, and the plaintiff appealed.

N. Holland, for appellant.

N. H. Munger, for appellee.

WHEELER, J.

The jurisdiction of the County Court as a court of probates is conferred under the 15th section of article IV of the Constitution, which constitutes it an ““inferior tribunal,” with a jurisdiction limited to certain enumerated subjects. These are: “The appointing of guardians, granting of letters testamentary and of administration, settling the accounts of executors, administrators, and guardians, and the transaction of business appertaining to estates.” The act of 1848 to organize County Courts (Hart. Dig., art. 308) confers on them the exercise of the powers here enumerated. By this act an administrator is not permitted to resign, and the court retains its jurisdiction and authority over him until he shall have accounted for and delivered the estate to the party entitled to receive it. (Id., art. 1146.) But we are not aware of any provision which gives that court authority to call to account an administrator whose office has terminated. Being a court whose powers are defined and limited by express law, its authority is restricted to the enumerated subjects. It cannot transcend the powers conferred by the Constitution and laws enacted in pursuance of it. The adjudication of matters in controversy between the estate and the former administrator, whose office as such has been finally determined, is not within the powers conferred. As respects the jurisdiction of the County ...