Francis v. State
| Decision Date | 29 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | NO. 14-17-00958-CR,14-17-00958-CR |
| Parties | CHIRON SHARROL FRANCIS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 268th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas
A jury found appellant Chiron Sharrol Francis guilty of two counts of murder. The jury assessed punishment for each conviction at confinement for seventy-five years and a fine of $5,000. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Following the denial of appellant's motion for new trial, this timely appeal ensued. We affirm each count as to eleven of the twelve issues asserted by appellant. We overrule in part and sustain in part appellant's tenth issue as to both counts, modify the trial court's judgment in both counts to reflect appellant's sentences are to be served concurrently, and as to both counts affirm the judgments as modified.
Appellant was charged with intentionally and knowingly causing the death of Eric L. Heidbreder by shooting him with a deadly weapon, a firearm (count 1). Appellant also was charged with intentionally and knowingly causing the death of Douglas H. Schwartz by shooting him with a deadly weapon, a firearm (count 2).1 Both shootings occurred on April 11, 1994, in Fort Bend County, Texas. Appellant left the country in May 1994. In August 1994, an arrest warrant was issued for appellant. Appellant was detained in Caracas, Venezuela, sometime before June 16, 2014. In July 2014, appellant was charged with both murders, and in November of 2014, an application for extradition was submitted to Venezuelan authorities. Appellant was extradited in June 2015 and indicted for both homicides. Trial began in the fall of 2017, after multiple pretrial hearings were held in 2016 and 2017.
Because appellant's ninth issue, if sustained, would afford the greatest relief, we address it first. In his ninth issue appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict on both counts. Although appellant also challenges factual sufficiency of the evidence, we only address whether the evidence is legally sufficient. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
We apply a legal-sufficiency standard of review in determining whether the evidence supports each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, (1979); Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Under this standard, we examine all the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360; Criff v. State, 438 S.W.3d 134, 136-37 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd). We consider all evidence in the record, whether admissible or inadmissible. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We also consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We will uphold the jury's verdict unless a rational factfinder had a reasonable doubt as to any essential element. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); West v. State, 406 S.W.3d 748, 756 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref'd).
We consider all evidence presented at trial, but we do not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Because the jury is the sole judge of the witness's credibility and the weight given their testimony, we resolve any evidentiary conflicts or inconsistencies in favor of the verdict. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Schwartz's body was found in the driver's seat of a red Mazda on Park Manor. Heidbreder's body was on the pavement near the passenger side of the vehicle. Each complainant had three gunshot wounds to the head from a 9-millimeter handgun.
Appellant's defensive theory at trial was that he was not present when the complainants were shot. Accordingly, we discuss the evidence as it relates to the identity of the person who intentionally and knowingly caused the deaths of the complainants by shooting them with a firearm.
An expert for the defense, Louis Akin, prepared a video reconstruction of the shootings. The substance of Akin's testimony was that the shooter stood outside the car on the passenger's side. According to Akin, most of the shots were fired with the handgun held inside the car, as the shooter leaned into the car. Akin testified that Heidbreder was probably pulled out of the car, and he expected the person who pulled Heidbreder out of the car came in contact with Heidbreder's blood.
Raul Velasquez lived nearby. After hearing gunshots, he looked out the window and saw a man wearing a black cap and brown vest exit the backseat of a little red car on the passenger side. Velasquez saw that man drag another man out of the car. Velasquez moved to another window and saw the man in the vest on the other side of the bayou getting on a bike. Other than the man on the ground, the only person Velasquez saw was the man in the vest.
Officer Jack Greenwood testified that Velasquez described the person he saw as a light-complexioned male wearing a white baseball cap turned backwards, abrown vest, and dark pants. The man was about 5'7" or 5'8" tall and weighed 130 to 140 pounds.
Ralph Pawek lived on the opposite side of the bayou from Velasquez. Pawek was in front of his house, near the street, when he heard multiple gunshots. Pawek saw the shooter by the passenger's side door of a little red car. Pawek described the man's complexion as brownish and thought he was Mexican; he had a white hat on backward. The man reached into the car and fired three more shots. Pawek then saw him take a white envelope from the area of the glove box. The man started towards the bayou, walking fast. Pawek went to the backyard to avoid being seen, and after a few minutes, looked but did not see the man. Pawek did not see anyone else.
Roy Hammond was working his first day on a new postal route when he heard "bam, bam, bam." Hammond looked across the bayou and saw someone leaning over a red car as if talking to someone on the passenger's side. Hammond proceeded on his route and when he returned to that area, Hammond saw a light-skinned black or Hispanic man on a bicycle.
Veronica Wells lived on Park Manor. Her children were playing outside when she heard what she thought could be shots. Wells stepped outside and saw a man trot by. Wells checked on her children and went inside. Wells was subsequently shown a photographic lineup and identified the man she saw that day by signing the back of the photograph. The man she identified was appellant. The photographic lineup was admitted into evidence.
Two pagers were found at the scene. One pager was on the ground by the right front tire and the other pager was on Schwartz's body. On April 11, 1994, at 8:19 a.m., a call was made from Schwartz's apartment to appellant's pager. There were two numbers registered to appellant: (1) a pager number that was disconnected lessthan a day after the shootings; and (2) a phone number assigned to appellant's home address that was disconnected approximately two hours after the shootings.
John Chulsoo Paek, a close friend and housemate of Heidbreder, gave a video statement on April 26, 1994, that was admitted into evidence. Paek also knew Schwartz. The night of April 10, 1994, Schwartz made arrangements to purchase sixty pounds of marijuana for $24,000. Schwartz had $11,000, Heidbreder had $9,000, and Paek had $4,000. Schwartz did not reveal the name of the dealer but said he drove an Impala.
The deal was planned for April 11, 1994, because Schwartz's money was in a safe-deposit box, and he could not access it until the bank opened at 9:00 a.m. on Monday morning. About 10:00 a.m. on April 11, 1994, Paek and Heidbreder flew to Hobby Airport in Houston. Schwartz drove to Houston. Heidbreder and Paek were to check into a motel near the Astrodome and the deal would occur in the room. Heidbreder and Paek were picked up at the airport by Kelly King and his girlfriend, Katherine Aires. Around 11:15 a.m., Heidbreder and Paek checked into a motel.
Schwartz arrived at the motel about 12:15 p.m. and said the plan had changed. Schwartz was going to pick up the dealer at Taco Bell. While Schwartz was gone, Paek tried to talk Heidbreder out of the deal—believing it was a setup. Paek advised Heidbreder to leave the money at the motel and sit in the back seat of the car with Schwartz's gun. Paek had seen Schwartz's gun, a 9-millimeter, and Schwartz had told Paek that he never went to Houston without it.
When Schwartz returned, Heidbreder left with his and Paek's money in several white envelopes. Paek saw Heidbreder get in the front seat and a black male, wearing a baseball hat and shorts, climb into the back seat. Paek could not guess his height or weight.
Paek waited in the hotel room. About 4:30 p.m., Katherine Aires and Kelly King returned. When they saw the news at 5:00 p.m., they went to the police and Paek and King gave a statement.
Reynaldo Butanda testified appellant was a friend that he had known since junior high school. In the spring of 1994, appellant drove a green Chevy Impala and a brown or beige Suburban. On April 11, 1994, appellant arrived at Butanda's home on a bike. Appellant was wearing a "beanie type cap" and a brown vest but Butanda did not recall if appellant was wearing shorts or pants. Appellant needed a ride so Butanda and his neighbor drove appellant to a fast-food...
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