Francis v. W. Union Tel. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 July 1894
• Citation: 59 N.W. 1078,58 Minn. 252
• Parties: FRANCIS v. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

58 Minn. 252

59 N.W. 1078

FRANCIS

v.WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 17, 1894.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. A message delivered to the defendant for transmission was written on one of its blanks, upon which were printed the following conditions: (1) That the company would not be liable for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery or for nondelivery of the message beyond the sum paid for sending the same, unless the message was ordered repeated; (2) that the company would not be liable for damages in any case where the claim was not presented within 60 days after the message was filed with the company for transmission. The company neglected to transmit the message at all, and the addressee brought an action. Held, that these conditions were unreasonable and inapplicable.

2. In an action against a telegraph company for failing to transmit and deliver a message, damages for mental suffering cannot be recovered.

3. The common-law rule in this respect is not changed by Laws 1885, c. 208, entitled “An act to regulate the business of operating telegraph lines,” etc.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; Willis, Judge.

Action by S. O. Francis against the Western Union Telegraph Company. There was a finding for plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial defendant appeals. Reversed.

Ferguson & Kneeland, for appellant.

Henry & R. L. Johns, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

The allegations of the complaint are that the plaintiff and his wife had been separated for some time “on account of a certain family trouble,” she residing in Wyoming, in this state, and he in Indianapolis, Ind.; that he had been endeavoring to affect a reconciliation and a renewal of marital relations with her, and had written her on the subject, requesting her, in case a reconciliation was possible, to wire him to that effect, and to inform him how many physicians there were in a place called Lindstrom, with a view of his taking up his residence there, and engaging in the practice of his profession as a physician; that in response to this letter plaintiff's wife delivered to the defendant at Wyoming, for transmission, the following message, addressed to him: “Only one there. Yes, come;” and paid the sum charged for its transmission; that the defendant negligently failed to transmit or deliver the message to plaintiff at all; that, not receiving any message from his wife, he concluded that she was unwilling to renew her marriage relations with him, and feared that all hope of reconciliation with her was at an end; that he was kept in this mental state for more than three weeks before he learned that his wife had sent the message; that during this time, in consequence of the neglect of the defendant to transmit and deliver the message, “he suffered great mental pain, distress, and anguish, and sustained great damage to his feelings,” for which he seeks to recover. The evidence tended to show that the message was written on one of defendant's blanks, at the foot of which was printed, “Read the notice and agreement on the back.” On the back was printed: “All messages taken by this company are subject to the following terms: To guard against mistakes or delays the sender of a message should order it repeated; that is, telegraphed back to the originating office for comparison. For this one-half the regular rate is charged in addition. It is agreed between the sender of the following message and this company that said company shall not be liable for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery or for the nondelivery of any unrepeated message beyond the amount received for sending the same.” “The company will not be liable for damages or statutory penalties in any case where the claim is not presented in writing within sixty days after the message is filed with the company for transmission.” It is conceded that this message was not ordered repeated, and that no claim for damages for its nondelivery was presented to the company within 60 days after it was filed for transmission. Various questions arose on the trial with reference to these conditions, but this branch of the case can be very briefly disposed of. The repeating of a message may prevent mistakes in its transmission, but can have no tendency whatever to prevent a failure to transmit it. Hence this condition is not applicable to this case, or, if intended to be so, it is, as to such a case, void, because unreasonable. The same is true of the “sixty-day” limitation. It is either inapplicable-at least, as to the addressee of the message-to a case of failure to transmit the message at all, or, if intended to be applicable, unreasonable, for the 60 days might elapse before the addressee ascertained that any message had been delivered for transmission. The company has probably substituted the words, “after the message is filed,” for the words, “after sending the message,” formerly used, in view of the decisions of the courts that the old form did not apply where the claim was founded upon a failure to send the message at all. But there are some things which cannot be accomplished even by artfully worded “fine print” conditions. Our conclusion that these conditions are either inapplicable or unreasonable, under the facts of this case, is founded on general principles, and without reference to the provisions of Laws 1885, c. 208, entitled “An act to regulate the business of operating telegraph lines and imposing penalties for misconduct of owners and agents of such lines,” the effect of which upon attempted stipulations for exemption from liability we have now no occasion to consider.

This brings us to the principal question in the case, viz. whether the addressee of a telegraphic message can recover damages for mental suffering caused by the failure of the telegraph company to transmit and deliver the message. In the consideration of this question it is necessary at the outset to consider two preliminary questions, viz.: (1) Has the statute above cited, particularly section 5, changed the common-law rule? (2) What is the nature of such an action as this? Is it an action founded on contract, or is it one purely of tort? Section 5 of the act provides that, if any person or company owning or operating a telegraph line in this state shall fail to transmit a message within a reasonable time, or if it is shown due diligence has not been exercised after reception thereof for that purpose, or shall fail to deliver the same to the party to whom the same is addressed, if known, within a reasonable time after its arrival at the point of destination, they “shall be liable in a civil action at the suit of the party injured for all actual damages sustained by reason of such neglect or omission.” The courts were not entirely agreed as to whether an action against the telegraph company could be maintained by the addressee, for whose benefit the message was intended, but who had no immediate contract relations with the company. Again, assuming to follow the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, that the damages which one party to a contract ought to recover for a breach of it by the other are such as either arise naturally from the breach itself or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been contemplated by the parties when making the contract as the probable result of the breach, some courts held that under the latter clause of this rule consequential damages could not be recovered against a telegraph company unless the company was informed, either by the contents of the message or otherwise, of the nature of the subject-matter to which the message related, and that, where it was ignorant of this, only nominal damages, or the amount paid for the transmission of the message, could be recovered. We are of the opinion that the only object of section 5 was to settle both these questions, and to establish the rule-First, that the party injured, whether sender or addressee, may maintain an action; and, second, to hold the company liable for all actual damages proximately resulting from the breach of its contract, regardless of whether or not it was advised of the nature of the subject-matter of the message. In other words, that the company has nothing to do with, and has no right to speculate upon, the extent of the interest of either sender or addressee in the message, or as to its value or importance; that, when it receives a message for transmission and delivery, the company has but one duty to perform, viz. to transmit and deliver it correctly, and without unreasonable delay, and if it fails to do so it will be liable for all actual damages, although not of a character such as would be suggested by the message as the probable result of a failure to transmit and deliver it. The statute does not define actual damages, but leaves that to be determined by common-law rules. We are therefore of opinion that the statute has no bearing on the question before us. It is hardly necessary to add that the same is true of the declaration in the bill of rights that every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the law for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character. This is but declaratory of a general fundamental principle upon which the courts have always acted, and which would have been the law even if not incorporated in the...