Franciscan Hospital v. Town of Canoe Creek

• Decision Date: 19 December 1979
• Docket Number: No. 78-460,78-460
• Citation: 79 Ill.App.3d 490,34 Ill.Dec. 738,398 N.E.2d 413
• Parties: , 34 Ill.Dec. 738 FRANCISCAN HOSPITAL, a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOWN OF CANOE CREEK, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 413

398 N.E.2d 413

79 Ill.App.3d 490, 34 Ill.Dec. 738

FRANCISCAN HOSPITAL, a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOWN OF CANOE CREEK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 78-460.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Dec. 19, 1979.

Douglas C. Scovil, of Winstein, Kavensky, Wallace & Doughty, Rock Island, for defendant-appellant.

James J. Mesich of Walker, Gende, Hatcher, Doyle & Giamanco, Moline, for plaintiff-appellee.

STOUDER, Presiding Justice:

Plaintiff Rock Island Franciscan Hospital brought this suit in the circuit court of Rock Island County against the defendant Town of Canoe Creek to recover payment for services rendered to a resident of Canoe Creek Township pursuant to article VII of the Illinois Public Aid Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 23, par. 7-1 Et seq.). Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $2,145.

Article VII of the Illinois Public Aid Code (hereinafter the Code), captioned "Local Aid To The Medically Indigent" (hereinafter AMI) establishes a program under which individuals not eligible for other specified programs of public assistance, may receive aid in meeting the costs of medically related services or funeral expenses from local governmental units. The basic elements of eligibility for AMI are that the individual be a resident of the governmental unit, fail to qualify for other assistance and have non-exempt income and assets, over a three month period, which are above a departmental standard but below the amount of the individual's medical or funeral expenses. After the individual pays a portion of the expenses, the governmental unit pays the remainder. In the case at bar, applicant Roy Minge resided in Canoe Creek Township, was ineligible for other assistance, and had a family of six members to support on a three month net income of $2,062.86. The Minge family lived in a rented mobile home furnished with an old refrigerator and stove, two half beds and one full bed, and was unable to pay for Clara Minge's hospitalization for a lump on her left side.

On appeal, defendant asserts two constitutional challenges concerning the AMI provisions: (1) that the provisions represent an invalid delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency and (2) that the rules promulgated pursuant to these provisions are violative of due process and equal protection. The challenged portions of the Code are as follows:

"Eligibility Requirements.)

Aid in meeting the costs of necessary medical, dental, hospital, boarding or nursing care, or burial shall be given under this Article to or in behalf of any person who meets the eligibility conditions of Sections 7-1.1 through 7-1.3. " (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 23, par. 7-1.)

"Residence.)

The local governmental unit in which the person is at the time of his illness or death shall give or cause to be given the necessary aid. * * * " (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 23, par. 7-1.1.)

"Need.)

The money, property, or other resources available to the person. . . must be insufficient to meet the costs of necessary care, as defined by standards established in accordance with Section 7-2 of this Article. " (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 23, par. 7-1.2.)

"Amount of Aid Standards.)

The person shall be given such care as may be necessary and proper, including transportation, and if he dies he shall be decently buried.

The amount and nature of the care provided shall be determined in accordance with a uniform standard of eligibility established by the Illinois Department and its rules and regulations. The standard shall include provision for determining what, if any, portion of the income, property or other resources of an applicant or recipient is available to meet the cost of necessary care. * * * " (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 23, par. 7-2.)

"Recoveries.)

Expenses incurred under this Section on behalf of a person having sufficient money, property, or other resources to meet in whole or in part the cost of care or burial . . . shall be recoverable . . ." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 23, par. 7-6.)

Defendant premises its challenge of these provisions on the fact that the terms "necessary" and "sufficient" and the captions "medically indigent" and "need" are not defined in Article VII, resulting in an improper delegation of legislative power to the Illinois Department of Public Aid (hereinafter the Department) for lack of prescribed standards.

Under the doctrine of the separation of the powers of government, the lawmaking function is assigned exclusively to the legislature. Except when authorized by the constitution the legislature cannot delegate the power to make laws to any other authority or body. (E. g., People ex rel. Thomson v. Barnett (1931), 344 Ill. 62, 176 N.E. 108, 76 A.L.R. 1044.) The evolving aspects of the valid delegation of legislative authority to administrative agencies and the need for standards or guidelines to validate such delegation was recently and comprehensively discussed in Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. (1977), 68 Ill.2d 361, 12 Ill.Dec. 168, 369 N.E.2d 875, where the court concluded:

"Accordingly, we find that the view which has developed through the decisions of this court in recent years requires that the legislature, in delegating its authority provide sufficient identification of the following:

(1) The Persons and Activities potentially subject to regulation;

(2) The Harm sought to be prevented; and

(3) The general Means intended to be available to the administrator to prevent the identified harm. " (Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. (1977), 68 Ill.2d 361, 12 Ill.Dec. 168, 172, 369 N.E.2d 875, 879.)

The question presented for our determination thus becomes whether the AMI provisions meet the three Stofer identification guidelines.

Application of the first Stofer guideline that regulated persons and activities be sufficiently identified requires the legislature to define the scope of the legislation so as to put interested persons on notice of the possibility of administrative actions affecting them. This requirement is subject to practical limitations stemming from the complexity of the regulated subject. (See Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. (1977), 68 Ill.2d 361, 12 Ill.Dec. 168, 369 N.E.2d 875, 879.) Article VII affects those individuals within a local governmental unit at the time of illness or death who are ineligible for aid under other Code provisions and whose resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary care. While we do not reach the question of whether local governmental units are "persons" in the context of Article VII, such units are likewise clearly identified in the statutory language, as is the regulated activity of providing needed aid. Thus, the first prong of the Stofer test is met.

With regard to the second guideline of sufficiently identifying the harm to be prevented, it is sufficient if "it is apparent what types of evil the statute is intended to prevent." (Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. (1977), 68 Ill.2d 361, 12 Ill.Dec. 168, 172, 369 N.E.2d 875, 879.) The harm to be prevented is clearly set out in Article I of the Code which indicates its concern with "the alleviation and prevention of poverty" and promoting "the health and welfare" of the people of Illinois. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 23, par. 1-1.) The second prong of the test is thus met as "the legislature may use somewhat broader, more generic language than in the first element." Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. (1977), 68 Ill.2d 361, 12 Ill.Dec. 168, 172, 369 N.E.2d 875, 879.

The third guideline of sufficiently identifying the available means requires the legislature to "specifically enumerate the administrative tools (E. g., regulations, licenses, enforcement proceedings) and the particular sanctions, if any, intended to be available." (Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. (1977), 68 Ill.2d 361, 12 Ill.Dec. 168, 172, 369 N.E.2d 875, 879.) The administrative tools of Article VII and other articles of the Code are regulations. Article VII specifically dictates "a uniform standard of eligibility" and refers to the "rules and regulations" of the "Illinois Department" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 23, par. 7-2.) Article XII similarly calls for "standards by which need for public aid will be determined" and indicates factors which the Department must provide and include:

" * * *

The standards shall provide a livelihood compatible with health and well-being for persons eligible for financial aid under any Article of this Code. They shall include recognition of any special needs . . . . Standards established to determine the eligibility of medically indigent persons for aid under Articles V or VII shall take into account the requirements of the spouse or other dependent or dependents of the applicant for medical aid.

In establishing standards under this Section the Illinois Department shall consult with the Legislative Advisory Committee, as provided in Section 12-14. " (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 23, par. 12-4.11.)

Thus it can be seen that regulations are sufficiently identified as the administrative tool to be utilized, that standards and guidelines are provided, and that legislative supervision in establishing these standards is mandated.

Defendant correctly notes the broad enabling language of Article VII and other Code provisions, as well as the failure of the legislature to define the aforementioned terms and captions. These factors are not dispositive of the issue of the propriety of delegation. Latitude must be given to administrative agencies (Cf. James v. Illinois Department of Public Aid (1970), 126 Ill.App.2d 75, 261 N.E.2d 420.) and an examination of the Code evidences a broad delegation of power. Consequently the Department can do all that is reasonably necessary to execute its powers and perform its statutory duties. (Accord, Cornue v. Weaver (1975), 29 Ill.App.3d 546, 331 N.E.2d 148). As the court noted in Hill v. Relyea (1966), 34 Ill.2d 552, 216 N.E.2d 795,...