Franco v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 12 March 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08–07–00160–CV.,08–07–00160–CV.
• Citation: 271 Ed. Law Rep. 1167,346 S.W.3d 605
• Parties: Marcelino FRANCO, Appellant,v.YSLETA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

346 S.W.3d 605

271 Ed. Law Rep. 1167

Marcelino FRANCO, Appellant,

v.YSLETA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.

No. 08–07–00160–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.

March 12, 2009.

Mark Berry, El Paso, TX, for Appellant.Steven L. Hughes, Mounce, Green, Myers, Safi, Paxson & Galatzan, El Paso, TX, for Appellee.Before CHEW, C.J., McCLURE, and RIVERA, JJ.

OPINION

DAVID WELLINGTON CHEW, Chief Justice.

Marcelino Franco appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of his employer the Ysleta Independent School District. In a single issue, Mr. Franco asserts that the summary judgment was improperly granted because a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the formation of the settlement agreement which serves as the basis for the District's motion. We reverse and remand.

This appeal stems from a suit filed by Mr. Marcelino Franco, against his employer, the Ysleta Independent School District (“YISD” or “the District”) for alleged violations of the Texas Whistleblower Act. In his original petition filed on January 15, 2003, Mr. Franco alleged that he was indefinitely suspended from his position as principal of Presa Elementary School after he reported asbestos hazards in the Robert F. Kennedy Pre–K Academy to school district officials. In its answer to the suit, the District alleged that the actions it had taken against Mr. Franco were for legitimate business purposes, and had nothing to do with Mr. Franco's report. YISD also filed a separate administrative proceeding with the Texas Employment Administration in an attempt to “non-renew” Mr. Franco's employment contract as a district principal due to his failure to conduct necessary teacher evaluations.

On August 29, 2003, the District filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement in the district court. The District represented to the court that the parties reached an agreement to settle the dispute the previous April. In support of its motion, the District attached a letter written by its own attorney, and signed by Mr. Franco's attorney on March 28, 2003. The letter dated March 27, 2003, stated as follows:

This will confirm that Marcelino Franco will accept and the Administration of Ysleta Independent School District will recommend to the YISD Board of Trustees the following settlement proposal:

1. YISD will dismiss [the non-renewal proceeding pending with the Texas Employment Administration];

2. Franco will be issued a one year contract as principal for Presa Elementary School for the 2003–04 school year;

3. Franco will dismiss and execute a release of all claims in Marcelino Franco v. Ysleta Independent School District: Cause No.2003–213; 34th District Court;

4. A written reprimand to Mr. Franco will be issued by YISD; and

5. The parties will bear their own costs and attorneys' fees.

We have agreed that Franco will immediately withdraw all of his Public Information Act requests to the Ysleta Independent School District. We have also agreed that we will jointly request that the nonrenewal hearing in Ysleta Independent School District v. Marcelino Franco (Docket No. 070–LH–303), which is scheduled for April 1–3, 2003, be postponed pending Board action.

The Administration's recommendation will be presented to the Board of Trustees on April 1, 2003. I shall promptly let you know the decision of the Board.

By signing below and returning a copy to my attention, you are indicating your acceptance of this proposal and these terms on behalf of your client, and that you have full and actual authority to enter into such a settlement on behalf of your client.

No action was taken on the District's motion to enforce. On November 17, 2006, the District filed a motion for summary judgment, and in the alternative, moved for enforcement of the settlement agreement again. As grounds for summary judgment, the District asserted that Mr. Franco breached the agreement by failing to dismiss the lawsuit, and by refusing to execute a release of his claims. Mr. Franco responded by arguing: (1) the parties disagreed regarding the existence of a settlement agreement, and therefore, a fact question existed precluding summary judgment; and (2) the District's compromise and settlement defense, as asserted in its summary judgment motion, was not included in any prior pleading. Subsequently, the District supplemented its original answer and asserted the alleged settlement as an affirmative defense. Mr. Franco objected to the supplement on the basis that it was not timely filed. The trial court granted the District's motion for summary judgment by written order on May 23, 2007. Mr. Franco appeals.

In a single issue, Mr. Franco asserts the trial court improperly granted the District's motion for summary judgment because a fact issue remains on the acceptance element of the district's affirmative defense. Mr. Franco contends that the evidence he raised in his summary judgment response controverts the District's claim that the settlement offer was accepted, and therefore, a fact issue remains as to whether there was a “meeting of the minds” which formed a binding agreement.

The movant for traditional summary judgment has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548–49 (Tex.1985); Duran v. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc., 921 S.W.2d 778, 784 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996, writ denied). When a defendant is the movant for summary judgment, it must either disprove at least one element of the plaintiff's cause of action, or conclusively establish all essential elements of an affirmative defense. Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex.1997). Once the defendant establishes a right to summary judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Scown v. Neie, 225 S.W.3d 303, 307 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2006, pet. denied). When determining whether a disputed fact issue exists, all the evidence favorable to the non-movant must be taken as true and all reasonable inferences including any doubts, must be resolved in the non-movant's favor. See Wyatt v. Longoria, 33 S.W.3d 26, 31 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.).

A settlement agreement is a contract, and is governed by principles generally applicable under contract law. See Kosty v. S. Shore Harbour Cmty. Ass'n, Inc., 226 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 20...