Francois v. Goel

• Decision Date: 09 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. S126630.,S126630.
• Citation: 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 249,35 Cal.4th 1094,112 P.3d 636
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Philip Le FRANCOIS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Prabhu GOEL et al., Defendants and Respondents.

29 Cal.Rptr.3d 249

35 Cal.4th 1094

112 P.3d 636

Philip Le FRANCOIS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Prabhu GOEL et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. S126630.

Supreme Court of California.

June 9, 2005.

As Modified June 10, 2005.

Robinson & Wood, Jon B. Zimmerman, Helen E. Williams and Joanna L. Mishler, San Jose, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Thomas M. Eells as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Reed Smith, Paul D. Fogel, San Francisco; Law Offices of Philip R. McCowan, Philip R. McCowan and John M. Ingle, for Defendants and Respondents.

Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Raoul D. Kennedy, Davidson M. Pattiz, San Francisco, Douglas B. Adler, Los Angeles, and Seth M. Schwartz, Walnut Creek, for Citigroup, Inc., and Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

CHIN, J.

In this lawsuit, defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion. More than a year later, some of the defendants again moved for summary judgment on the same grounds. The court granted the second motion. We must decide whether the court had authority to consider the new motion even though it was not based on either new facts or new law. Code of Civil Procedure sections 437c, subdivision (f)(2), and 1008 seemingly prohibit a party from making such a new motion.¹ The Court of Appeal held that the trial court had inherent power derived from the California Constitution to consider the second motion notwithstanding any statutory limitation.

We conclude that sections 437c, subdivision (f)(2), and 1008 prohibit a party from making renewed motions not based on new facts or law, but do not limit a court's ability to reconsider its previous interim orders on its own motion, as long as it gives the parties notice that it may do so and a reasonable opportunity to litigate the question. So interpreted, the statutes are constitutional.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs Philip Le Francois and Eric Herald sued their former employer, Duet Technologies, Inc., and three officers of that company, claiming that the officers had made certain injurious misrepresentations and false promises. All defendants moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication (hereafter simply summary judgment). The trial court denied the motion, ruling that plaintiffs had raised a triable issue of material fact. Over a year later, the individual defendants filed a new motion for summary judgment based on the same grounds as the first motion. Plaintiffs opposed the motion on substantially the same basis that they opposed the first motion. They also objected that the second motion was impermissible under section 437c, subdivision (f)(2). The second motion was originally scheduled to be heard by the judge who had heard the first motion, but, without objection, it was transferred to another judge. The second judge granted the new motion and later entered judgment in favor of the individual defendants.²

Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. It concluded that because the second motion was based on the same law and evidence as the first motion, the motion violated sections 437c, subdivision (f)(2), and 1008. It also concluded, however, that the trial court had "inherent power to rule upon the second motion even if it was not based upon new facts or law," and this "inherent power does not depend on statute, nor may a statute confine it." Accordingly, it held "that notwithstanding either section 1008 or section 437c (f)(2), [the second judge] had inherent power to exercise his `constitutionally derived authority to reconsider the prior interim ruling and correct an error of law on a dispositive issue.'" (Quoting Scott Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. (2003) 107 Cal. App.4th 197, 212, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 89.)

We granted plaintiffs' petition for review to decide whether the trial court had authority to consider and grant the individual defendants' second motion for summary judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Background

Two statutes are relevant here: sections 437c, subdivision (f)(2), and 1008. Section 437c contains detailed procedures governing motions for summary judgment. Subdivision (f)(2) is merely a small part of that section. As relevant, that subdivision provides that "a party may not move for summary judgment based on issues asserted in a prior motion for summary adjudication and denied by the court, unless that party establishes to the satisfaction of the court, newly discovered facts or circumstances or a change of law supporting the issues reasserted in the summary judgment motion." This language was added in 1990, effective January 1, 1991, "to make the summary judgment process more efficient and to reduce the opportunities for abuses of the procedure." (Bagley v. TRW, Inc. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1096, fn. 3, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, citing Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, rev. of Sen. Bill No. 2594 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.), Aug. 23, 1990; see Stats.1990, ch. 1561, § 2, p. 7332.)

Section 1008 more generally states procedures for applications to reconsider any previous interim court order. It "applies to all applications for interim orders" (§ 1008, subd. (g)) and provides time limits and other requirements for such applications. It contains several provisions relevant here. It generally requires that any motion for reconsideration be based "upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law...." (§ 1008, subds. (a), (b).) It also provides: "If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order." (§ 1008, subd. (c).) Finally, it provides: "This section specifies the court's jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals of previous motions, and applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court, or for the renewal of a previous motion, whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final. No application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section." (§ 1008, subd. (e), italics added.)

Subdivisions (c) and (e) of section 1008 were added in 1992, effective January 1, 1993. (Stats.1992, ch. 460, § 4, pp. 1832-1833.) Legislative findings state that the 1992 amendment was intended to clarify that no motion to reconsider may be heard unless it is based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law, and that the Legislature found it desirable "to reduce the number of motions to reconsider and renewals of previous motions heard by judges in this state." (Stats.1992, ch. 460, § 1, p. 1831; see Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 688, 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 228; Morite of California v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 485, 491-492, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 666.) Before these changes, section 1008 "purported to be neither jurisdictional nor exclusive." (Kollander Construction, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 304, 310, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, and cases cited therein.)

One court has said that cases involving repeated summary judgment motions "must be decided by the specific requirements of the summary judgment statute [section 437c], not the general provisions of the reconsideration statute [section 1008]." (Bagley v. TRW, Inc., supra, 73 Cal. App.4th at p. 1096, fn. 3, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 909; see also Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 726, 738, 23 Cal. Rptr.3d 920.) This conclusion certainly seems logical. But for present purposes it does not particularly matter, for the two statutes say essentially the same thing: A repeated motion or motion for reconsideration must be based on new facts or law. As we discuss further in part II. C., post, any language differences between the statutes do not warrant different treatment of the issue before us.

The Court of Appeal found that the second summary judgment motion at issue here was based on the same law and evidence as the first motion and hence violated sections 437c and 1008. We did not grant review on this question and, accordingly, we accept the Court of Appeal's finding in this regard. (See People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1076-1077, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 337, 978 P.2d 1257.) The question we must decide is the significance of this finding. Specifically, we must decide whether the trial court had authority to consider, and then grant, the second summary judgment motion notwithstanding the provisions of sections 437c and 1008.

At first, the cases interpreting these statutes as amended in the 1990's generally held that a trial court has no authority or, as some of the cases phrased it, jurisdiction to consider a motion that violated section 437c or 1008. (Bagley v. TRW, Inc., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1096-1097, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 909 [§ 437c]; Pazderka v. Caballeros Dimas Alang, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 658, 669-670, 73 Cal. Rptr.2d 242 [§ 1008]; Baldwin v. Home Savings of America (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1195-1201, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 592 [§ 1008]; Garcia v. Hejmadi, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 690-691, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 228 [§ 1008]; Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1498-1502, 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 626 [§ 1008]; Morite of California v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 490-493, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 666 [§ 1008]; but see Bernstein v. Consolidated American Ins. Co. (1995) 37 Cal. App.4th 763, 774, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 817 [finding the requirements of § 437c were met, but also noting that the court was merely "correcting an erroneous ruling on its own motion"].) Only the most recent of these cases considered whether separation of powers principles prevent the Legislature from imposing this limitation, and that case summarily rejected that conclusion. (Bagley v. TRW, Inc., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1097, fn. 5, 86 Cal....